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ABSTRACT 
 
As South Africa entered the transitional period towards establishing a multi-party democracy, 
its defence policy changed fundamentally.  The African National Congress (ANC) as the 
upcoming governing party established the Military Research Group (MRG), to help formulate 
its defence policy positions, which subsequently largely determined South African defence 
policy.  Through this think-tank the ANC leadership became interested in and supported the 
idea of non-offensive defence (NOD).  NOD is a European idea of the Cold War era, which 
was aimed at preventing the security dilemma, arms races and accidental war between states.  
The aim of this study is to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa since 
1994, by describing how NOD became prominent. 
 
Non-offensive defence ideas influenced South African defence policy significantly and 
appeared in all legislation and policies pertaining to defence.  NOD complemented the ANC’s 
domestic policy goals with the new security paradigm, which like NOD, originate from the 
Peace Research school of thought. As a defensive idea, NOD emphasised South Africa’s 
intention to improve relations with Southern African states, as well as its strategic 
defensiveness, which determined the military doctrine of the South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF).  The ANC used NOD to transform the SANDF, especially to scale down its 
power projection capabilities.  Two arguments are made in this study to describe the nature of 
defence policy-making in South Africa when the prominence of NOD is considered. Firstly, 
that South African defence policy-makers are open to ideas and models from industrialised 
states, despite the limited applicability and shortcomings of such models.  Secondly, models 
can be used in various ways by interest groups to influence policy.  NOD was used as a 
theoretical tool by the MRG and the military to influence defence policy according to their 
interests.   
 
Several characteristics of South African defence policy-making were also identified.  Firstly, 
that the Constitution does not prioritise state or individual security as more important.  This 
makes conflicting world-views of realism and idealism about defence possible.  Defence policy 
therefore often has to involve a compromise between these views.  Secondly, although the 
Constitution makes provision for public participation in defence policy-making, there is no 
equal distribution of power for interest groups to influence policy. In this regard the legislature 
and parliamentary defence committees are also weak compared to the executive authority.  
Thirdly, the use of non-governmental organisations in defence policy-making has created a 
form of direct and unrestricted lobbying, as well as the privatisation of policy-making. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Tydens die politieke oorgangsperiode en die aanloop tot die vestiging van ‘n veelparty 
demokrasie, het Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid wesenlike veranderinge ondergaan.  As 
opkomende regerende party het die African National Congress (ANC), die Military Research 
Group (MRG) gestig om díe party se standpunte rondom verdedigingsbeleid te formuleer. 
Sedertdien het die MRG, Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid grootliks omskrywe.  Die MRG het 
ANC leiers aan die term non-offensive defence (NOD), wat ‘n Europese idee uit die Koue 
Oorlog-era is, bekendgestel.  NOD is daarop gemik om die veiligheidsdilemma, 
wapenwedlope en toevallige oorlog te verhoed.  Die ANC het NOD ondersteun en bevorder. 
Die doel van hierdie studie is om die aard van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleidmaking 
sedert 1994 te beskryf aan die hand van NOD se prominensie. 
 
Non-offensive defence idees het Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid beduidend beïnvloed en 
verskyn in alle wetgewing en beleid wat verband hou met verdediging.  NOD het die ANC se 
plaaslike beleidsdoelwitte binne die nuwe veiligheidsparadigma ondersteun. Soos NOD, is díe 
paradigma ‘n produk van die Peace Research denkskool.  As ‘n defensiewe idee het NOD, 
Suid-Afrika se oogmerk om betrekkinge met state in Suider-Afrika te verbeter, benadruk.  
NOD het verder ook SA se strategiese defensiewe postuur en gepaardgaande militêre 
doktrine bepaal en beklemtoon. Die ANC het NOD gebruik om die Suid Afrikaanse Nasionale 
Weermag (SANW) te transformeer en magsprojeksievermoëns af te skaal. Twee argumente 
word in hierdie studie benut om die aard van verdedigingsbeleidmaking in Suid-Afrika te 
beskryf, met die inagneming van die belangrikheid van NOD.  Eerstens, dat beleidmakers 
ontvanklik is vir idees en modelle van nywerheidslande, ten spyte van die beperkte 
toepaslikheid en tekortkomings van sulke modelle.  Tweedens, dat modelle deur verskeie 
belangegroepe gebruik kan word om beleid te beïnvloed.  Die MRG en die SANW het NOD as 
‘n teoretiese instrument benut om verdedigingsbeleid tot die bevordering van eie belange te 
beïnvloed.                  
 
Verskeie eienskappe van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleidmaking is geïdentifiseer in die 
studie.  Eerstens, dat die Grondwet nie die staat of die individu se veiligheid bo die ander stel 
nie. Dit veroorsaak botsende wêreldbeskouings van realisme en idealisme oor verdediging.  
Beleid behels dus dikwels kompromieë tussen die twee uitgangspunte.  Tweedens, alhoewel 
die Grondwet voorsiening maak vir openbare deelname in beleidmaking, is daar nie gelyke ‘n 
verspreiding van mag tussen belangegroepe om beleid te beïnvloed nie.  In die opsig is die 
wetgewende gesag en parlementêre komitees aansienlik swakker as die uitvoerende gesag. 
 v
Derdens, die gebruik van nie-regeringsorganisasies in verdedigings-beleidmaking, het ‘n vorm 
van direkte en onbeperkte invloed werwing, asook die privatisering van beleidmaking, tot 
gevolg gehad. 
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KEY CONCEPTS 
 
Policy: Policy is a form of generalised decision-making in which whole sets of decisions are 
considered.1  Policy involves decisions about what to do and how to do it, as well as a series 
of purposive actions over time to implement it.           
 
Defence policy: Defence policy consists of those elements of both foreign and domestic policy, 
which directly affect the armed forces.2  
 
Policy-making: Policy-making is the conscious and deliberate act of analysing problems and 
the examining of grand alternatives in all their implications, as well as alternatives chosen 
aimed at achieving over-arching ends.3  It involves many interests, which makes it a political 
decision-making process.4  
 
Pluralism:  Pluralism is a theory of group politics, in which individuals are represented 
principally through their membership of organised groups within a democratic political system, 
and all such groups can compete for influence.5  
 
Posture: Force posture is usually defined in terms of the entire military means possessed by a 
state in terms of numbers, characteristics and the deployment disposition of its armed forces.6  
 
Security:  Security involves some or all of the following: social, economic, political, military, 
and physical (including ecological and environmental) concerns.7  It involves perceptions of 
the well-being of individuals and collectives, as well as the assurance of the core values 
central to the self-definition of communities. 
                                                
FOOTNOTES 
 
1     Garnett, J, “Defense Policy-Making”, In: Baylis, J, Contemporary Strategy II,  The Nuclear 
 Powers, vol 2 (2nd Ed), New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987, p 2. 
2     Huntington, SP, “The Two Worlds of Military Policy”, In: Horton, FB et al (eds), Comparative 
Defence Policy, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974, p 108. 
3     Garnett, J, “Defense Policy-Making”, op cit, p 16. 
4     Ibid, pp 18-19. 
5     Heywood, A, Politics (2nd Ed), New York: Palgrave Foundations, 2002, p 78. 
6     Lider, J, Military Theory: Concept, Structure, Problems, Swedish Institute of  International Affairs, 
 Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1983, p 358. 
7     Job, BL, “The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World”, In: 
 Job, BL (ed) The Insecurity Dilemma, National Security of Third World States, Boulder: Lynne 
 Rienner Publishers, 1992, pp 14-16. 
 viii
National security policy: It is that part of government policy that creates national and 
international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national 
values against existing and potential adversaries.8  
 
Human security: Axworthy defined it as the “...freedom from pervasive threats to people’s 
rights, their safety, or even their lives…taking people as its point of reference, rather than 
focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments”.9  
 
                                                
8     Trager, FN, and Simonie, FL, “An Introduction to the Study of National Security”, In: 
 Trager, FN, and Kronenberg, PS (eds), National Security and the American Society, 
 Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973, p 36. 
9     Hadingham, J, “Human Security and Africa: Polemic Opposites”, South African Journal of 
 International Affairs, 7, no 2, Winter 2000, p 117. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE POLICY AND THE IDEA OF  
NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENCE  
 
1. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
In 1990, South African society moved into a period of political transition, which included the 
unbanning of all liberation movements, developments toward a multi-party democracy and 
the renunciation of apartheid.1  South Africa’s security and defence policy subsequently 
changed fundamentally.2  The 1994 general elections and the constitutional reform that took 
place had immediate effects on security policy, which emphasised strategic defensiveness.  
Even prior to the 1994 democratic elections in South Africa, some of the leading members of 
the African National Congress’ (ANC) workgroup on military affairs (Military Research Group) 
expressed strong support for non-offensive defence (NOD), which convinced ANC members 
of parliament (MPs) also to uphold it.3  NOD is an approach to defence aimed at creating an 
environment that favours defensive rather than offensive strategies.4 The ANC then called for 
the restructuring of the military along NOD lines, which also influenced government policy 
commitments.5   
 
Non-offensive defence thinking had a significant impact on the formulation of South African 
defence policy in the 1990s.  According to Williams, the principles of NOD “…remain 
explicitly and implicitly pronounced within policy positions of South Africa.”6 Williams refers in 
this instance to the Interim Constitution, the ANC’s guidelines as a ruling party as published 
in Ready to Govern, the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council agreement, as well as the Draft 
White Paper on Defence. NOD thinking featured prominently in the White Paper on Defence, 
which underlined the already strong support for a defensive posture.7  The subsequent 
Defence Review explained the defensive posture in much more detail and many principles of 
NOD were “borrowed” in order to broaden this concept.8  There is, however, no clear 
reference to the term “non-offensive defence” and terminology, such as “confidence-building 
defence” and “primarily defensive posture,” was rather used in the context of NOD-type 
policy-guidelines.  
 
Two questions then arise: Firstly, how did NOD become so influential in defence policy? 
Secondly, what does that signify about policy-making in South Africa? The aim of this study 
is to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa since 1994, by describing 
how NOD became prominent.  By addressing several features about NOD and how it was 
advocated, the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa will be addressed. 
 2
The research problem has several parts. What is the nature of public policy-making in South 
Africa? What does NOD entail? What was the influence of NOD on South African defence 
policy-making? By addressing these questions, conclusions will be made about the nature of 
defence policy-making in South Africa since 1994. 
 
2. THE VALUE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
 
The academic value of this study is threefold.  Firstly, many studies have been conducted on 
the transformation of the defence community in South Africa since 1994, but little research 
has been done on defence policy-making in South Africa.  Secondly, few empirical studies 
have been done about public policy in South Africa during the same period. Thirdly, there is 
a deficiency in literature about the influence of NOD in South African defence thinking.  
Williams acknowledges that very little academic research has been done on the role of NOD 
thought in South Africa.9  Because of the gap in the literature, this study also relates to 
relevant empirical facts regarding the influence of NOD in South Africa.  The contribution of 
this study is twofold.  Firstly, it will contribute to a better understanding of public policy-
making in a transitional South Africa in general and secondly, it will also shed more light on 
defence within a democratic transition.    
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In order to obtain an overview of research that was done about NOD in South Africa, the 
work by several authors needs to be discussed.  Most of these studies (or range of 
publications) strongly advocate NOD in South Africa. The contribution of non-South African 
authors will be discussed first. 
 
One of the first authors to write about NOD in South Africa was Finan.  In 1991, he wrote an 
unpublished paper entitled “The Republic of South Africa: Nonoffensive Defence”10.  Finan 
followed a quantitative approach to indicate the asymmetry between the military power of 
South Africa, compared to its regional neighbours.  The aim of his study was to determine 
the degree of disarmament needed in South Africa to stabilise relations with states in the 
region without making South Africa too vulnerable to outside threats.  Finan argued that arms 
control in Southern Africa could be feasible in an NOD context and that states should adopt 
similar defensive force structures, as well as defensive weapon systems capabilities.  
 
Unterseher also wrote an unpublished paper dealing with NOD and South Africa, in 1993, 
which was titled “Confidence-Building Defence for South Africa?”11  In this paper Unterseher 
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argued that in principle, the possession of military power (for the purpose of invasion) should 
be substituted by a defensive capability and orientation that would only allow the defence of 
territory.  He added that disarmament and defensive weapons alone did not always remove 
the threat of invasion and, therefore, suggested a system of confidence-building defence.  
With reference to South Africa it was suggested that in such a system there should be no 
invasion capability and that the location of infantry bases should be geographically 
distributed so as to avoid a concentrated threat.  Unterseher highlighted the apparent 
financial advantages of such a defensive system and its potential to make the South African 
armed forces compatible with a regional security regime.  
 
Mφller, one of the first authors to use the term non-offensive defence12, wrote extensively on 
NOD in Southern Africa, yet his research was not focussed on suggesting specific models for 
South Africa.  He did, however, argue in several publications that NOD had significant utility 
for South Africa as a strong military power located near weak military powers. Examples of 
his publications are “Small States, Non-Offensive Defence and Collective Security”,13 “Non-
Offensive Defence: A Brief Introduction”14 and “Non-Offensive Defence: A European(ised) 
Concept with Wider Application?”.15   
 
In 1997, Connetta, Knight and Unterseher presented a case in an article “Building 
Confidence Into the Security of South Africa”16 for restructuring the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) along the lines of NOD and they emphasised the need to reduce 
South Africa‘s power projection capabilities. Their article was based on the same views as 
most NOD proponents, as they emphasised the disadvantages of an offensively orientated 
military structure, which could aggravate the security dilemma and lead to an arms race with 
neighbouring states.  They also supported the need for a small, full-time military with a large 
part-time force for deployment in local areas, which refers to territorial defence.  They made 
specific force structure suggestions for both part-time and full-time forces.      
 
Non-offensive defence has received little attention in both academic and defence circles in 
South Africa.  Prior to the Defence Review in 1996, Williams stated that: "In light of the 
strong defensive orientation of South Africa's major policy documents, surprisingly little has 
been written on NOD in an academic context”.17 Williams refers to himself, Nathan and 
Cawthra as authors who wrote about specific themes of NOD in South Africa by 1996. He 
describes Nathan’s work as “…strongly normative…stressing why NOD ought to be 
introduced without providing detailed analysis”.18  Williams describes his own work as 
“…attempted to apply European NOD principles to an African environment”.19  Williams also 
refers to the research of Cawthra as “…concentrated on the regional dynamics of NOD 
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without detailing force design and strategic implications”.20  At this stage it may be useful to 
refer to a number of the publications and papers of these authors and other authors.    
 
In 1994, Nathan made a case for NOD in South Africa in the book The Changing of the 
Guard; Armed Forces and Defence Policy in a Democratic South Africa.21  In a chapter on 
doctrine Nathan argued for the acceptance of NOD as an alternative to the former South 
African doctrine, which was based on offensive defence and cross-border raids.22  He argued 
that such a doctrine was against international law on armed conflict, as well as inherently 
provocative and destabilising to neighbouring countries.  Nathan further argued against a 
new defence force obtaining a significant offensive capability, which could make states in the 
region more insecure and create an arms build-up.  He proposed NOD because it is aimed at 
minimising offensive capabilities, but ensures the necessary defence against attack.  Nathan 
expressed his support for the reduction of force levels in South Africa to levels comparable 
with those of neighbouring states and he argued for a volunteer reserve as the bulk of the 
country’s fighting force. 
 
Williams wrote several papers on NOD in South Africa.  In 1996 he wrote an unpublished 
paper, “Non Offensive Defence and South Africa: Considerations on a Post-Modern Military, 
Mission Redefinition and Defensive Restructuring”.23  In this paper Williams argued that 
South Africa had to adopt a primarily defensive posture, but not a totally defensive one 
based on a pure model of defensiveness.  He used the theory of NOD to argue that a higher 
premium should be placed on defensive mechanisms and strategies.  Williams also referred 
to the principles and application of NOD for Southern African states with reference to NOD’s 
possibilities and inconsistencies in a Third World context.  In a paper, entitled “The South 
African Defence Review and the Redefinition,”24 Williams alluded to the introduction of NOD 
into the policy-making debate and process of South Africa.  In an article on “Confidence-
Building Defence and Southern Africa: Implications for Non-Offensive Defence for South 
Africa’s Defence Posture”,25 Williams acknowledged that many central principles of NOD 
have been taken up in South African defence policy pronouncements and defence strategy.26  
He also pointed out that certain post-apartheid developments made NOD an ideal concept to 
apply in South Africa.  The improving regional security co-operation in Southern Africa was 
cited as an example.  Williams identified aspects that limit the total application of NOD in 
South Africa by referring to the country’s need for mobile forces to protect its borders and the 
international expectations placed on South Africa to become more involved in peace support 
operations in Africa.  He argued that although NOD had some direct relevance for Southern 
Africa, it could not be applied in totality because of current political, financial, geo-strategic 
and operational reasons.       
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Cawthra’s relevant work on NOD focused to a large extent on the defence policy-making 
process in South Africa since 1994, despite his other work on regional security co-operation.  
In these publications he briefly referred to the role of NOD thinking in the making of South 
African defence policy, but he never discussed it in any detail.  One such publication is a 
book Securing South Africa’s Democracy; Defence Development and Security Transition.27   
 
The existing research on NOD in South Africa has focussed mainly on its usefulness as a 
defensive approach for security and defence transformation.  Most of the authors advocated 
NOD, although Williams pointed out some limitations of NOD for the South African context.  
Although there are some references to the influence of NOD thinking on the defence policy-
making process in South Africa, there is no specific descriptive literature on this aspect.  
Most of the work on NOD in South Africa merely advocated NOD, which implies that little 
empirical study has been done on this.       
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
Two questions are posed in this study: How did NOD become so influential in defence policy 
and how does this reflect upon policy-making in South Africa?  Since the type of question 
asked here is in the empirical realm, it also follows that this study revolves around empirical 
facts and is largely presented as a descriptive study of defence policy-making.   
 
There are different meanings attached to the term defence policy and it has several 
dimensions.  It would, therefore, be important to define defence policy-making and defence, 
its limits, as well as its nature.  It is essential to include a perspective from a theoretical 
framework and to exclude other dimensions.  This means that theory will be used to 
demarcate limits of policy, as well as policy-making.  Pluralism will be used as a perspective 
on how defence policy is made in a competitive policy-making framework.  It will also be 
used as a guide to assemble the relevant facts about defence policy-making in South Africa. 
Interpretive explanations will be provided to foster a better understanding of defence policy-
making in South Africa by observing how NOD was promoted.  Consequently this study 
could be termed an empirical case study, bolstered by some theory.  
 
Primary sources such as draft policy documents, published policy documents, Hansards and 
interviews were primarily relied upon in order to obtain the appropriate facts. The content of 
South Africa’s defence policy documents and drafts, especially parts that contain NOD 
principles, were of particular importance.  The draft documents were analysed in order to 
study certain proposals for the acceptance of NOD.  The final policy documents were studied 
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in order to determine which principles of NOD were accepted into South African defence 
policy.  Personal correspondence and interviews were also used.  Interviews were used to 
obtain views about NOD thinking in South Africa and were conducted with practitioners, 
academics and researchers who were involved in the defence policy-process. This was done 
in order to obtain facts and views about South Africa’s defence policy-making process and 
the promotion of NOD.  The data was collected through voice recorder and electronic mail 
(whenever personal interviews were impossible).  The data was analysed after relevant parts 
of interviews had been transcribed.  Relevant information and views regarding the study 
were used.  Secondary sources, such as journal articles and books were used, especially for 
the literature overview and theoretical framework of the study. 
 
The first chapter of the study will deal with the theory of both defence and policy-making in 
general, in order to define and explain these two concepts.  The dynamics involved in 
defence policy-making, as elaborated in the theory, will be discussed and the context of 
policy-making in South Africa will also receive some attention.  The broad consultative nature 
of these processes will be emphasised and the pluralist model will be used as a theoretical 
point of departure to explain the function of various role-players. The second chapter of the 
study will deal with the concept of NOD, its meaning, origins and the support for this within 
the context of the Cold War and the early post-Cold War era.  The theory of what NOD 
entails and the critique against it will also be discussed.  The third chapter will deal with three 
questions: The first deals with the reasons why South Africa’s defence community was 
receptive to NOD thinking, the second with how NOD was promoted during the policy-
making process, and the third with the impact of NOD principles in South Africa.  
Conclusions will then be made about defence policy-making in South Africa. The last chapter 
is a summary and conclusion of the whole content of the study.    
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CHAPTER 2 
DEFENCE POLICY-MAKING:  A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The first aim of this chapter is to define policy and the second aim is to discuss the way 
policy is formulated in South Africa, according to the definition.  Concepts, such as policy and 
defence policy, will be defined, which will be used to direct the descriptive part of the study.  
A theory of policy-making will also be discussed to gain a better understanding of policy-
making in a democracy. 
 
In the first part of this chapter, public policy-making is demarcated by means of the pluralist 
perspective.  The chapter then continues by explaining the meaning of defence and the 
dynamics involved in formulating defence policy.  The ambiguity around the meaning of 
defence and defence policy will be elaborated and these concepts will then be clarified.  
Secondly, the general trends in South African public policy-making will be explained in order 
to understand the broader context in which defence policy is formulated.  The discussion will 
focus on constitutional guidelines, formal procedures, as well as the role and power of 
various institutions and role-players in South African public policy-making.  The third part of 
the chapter then deals more specifically with defence policy-making in South Africa, with an 
overview of the defence policy processes, as well as the role of interest groups and 
individual officials. 
 
1. UNDERSTANDING POLICY, PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING AND DEFENCE POLICY  
 
Policy and decision-making are often viewed as synonymous.1  Although the two concepts 
are related, there is a difference between them.  Policy is usually considered a concept of 
higher order than decisions.  Policy may be described as a form of generalised decision-
making in which whole sets of decisions are considered.  It is also a flow of purposive actions 
over time, which suggests that policy is in constant flux.  Policy involves decisions about 
what to do and how to do it. Although policy is revealed by general statements of purpose, it 
should be borne in mind that statements of intent are not policies.  Policy also refers to 
implementation and actual behaviour attempting to effect goals.  Policy, therefore, entails 
decisions about what to do, as well as the actual behaviour to implement those goals. This 
study deals with defence policy-making, which forms part of public policy and will be 
discussed in more detail in the next few paragraphs. 
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Public policy and legislation in particular are used to direct the essential services and 
products provided by the state through public institutions.2 According to Van der Walt, the 
formulation of public policy involves the participation of state institutions and fragmented 
structures of semi-independent groups and organisations through a complex system of 
formal and informal delegation of responsibility and control. Public policy is processed, 
authorised and ratified within the framework of a government and, therefore, has to be 
approved and promulgated by an institution that is authorised by the legislative branch of 
government through a Statute or the Constitution of a state. Policy-making cannot be 
separated from the entities that implement and administer it and, therefore, also involves the 
bureaucratic institutions and relevant Public Service departments, as well as the executive 
authority of government. 
 
Public policy is shaped by both public and private role-players and their interests, as well as 
frameworks of beliefs or attitudes toward certain policy proposals.3  The institutional and/or 
personal interests may play a role in policy-making.  Public policy involves a process that is 
political and involves diverse interests.4  It entails negotiation, persuasion, bargaining and 
compromise. The making of public policy, therefore, embodies a competitive political process 
between political actors, often referred to as pluralism.   
 
1.1 Pluralism: A Description of Public Policy-making 
 
Pluralists make the following observations about public policy-making.  Firstly, that public 
policy is made by a large number of state and non-state actors.  Secondly, that those role-
players consist of various interest groups.  Thirdly, that policy making is a competitive 
process between interest groups.  Fourthly, that the power between interest groups is 
distributed evenly.  Lastly, that because of various interests, policy-making often involves 
compromise.   
 
The interest group approach to politics is largely based on the work of Bentley's The Process 
of Government (1908), which influenced Truman's The Governmental Process (1962).5 This 
approach addresses the complexity of policy-making, by appreciating the large number of 
role-players functioning both within, as well as outside, the state.6  It is of significant 
importance because the typical role-players in policy-making consist of groups. The state 
itself is composed of groups, rather than a single entity.  For example, political parties are 
composed of groups, legislatures are constituted by group action, and bureaucracies also 
behave as groups in their own right. Governing institutions are often fragmented and even 
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form alliances with other groups. Public policy-making processes are influenced by interest 
groups within and outside state bureaucracies. 
 
The pluralist (or interest group approach) to public policy tends to assume that public policy 
is the outcome of a free competition between ideas and interests.7 Interest groups are 
organised bodies seeking to influence public policy.8  Their activity is a fundamental feature 
of modern democracies and establishes a system of representation parallel to electoral 
representation. Interest group theorists argue that groups are not only important in a policy 
process, but that they actually define the process. Truman even argued that groups usually 
"…formulate policy and set the agenda; they try to influence the legislative and executive 
decisions…".9  Public policy-making is, therefore, a competitive process where interest 
groups attempt to influence both policy, the agenda and process of making policy.  According 
to some pluralists, power is distributed between different groups and is structured by a series 
of minorities.10  The interest group approach suggests that public policy-making is a 
competitive political process where power is distributed fairly evenly between interest groups.       
 
Pluralism suggests that change occurs in small increments.  The incrementalist view of 
policy-making (which is one view that resembles defence policy sectors), however, assumes 
that groups are unequal participants in the policy process and that powerful interests aim at 
preventing change.11  The problem with the incrementalist view in general is that it does not 
explain different types of group interaction and, therefore, limits the descriptive approach 
needed to study public policy-making.  Incrementalism on its own does not provide a 
framework to study the varying influence of interests, ideas and change in a policy sector.  
Incrementalism is often considered as a justification of the pluralist model of decision-
making. According to pluralists, change in a pluralist system in fact works in small 
increments.12  The interest group approach provides for a descriptive study of the interaction 
between interest groups. 
 
The interest group approach with regard to policy-making has several limitations.  Firstly, the 
assumption of the interest group approach that politics could be reduced to, or is mainly 
concerned with associational relationships, can not be supported in theory or practice.13  The 
theory is limited as an explanation of decision-making, because it does not provide insight 
about which issues are processed and why they differ between various sectors and 
countries. Secondly, the interest group approach could be a restrictive and reductionist 
explanation of policy-making as its framework may exclude small, but relevant details outside 
group interaction. The third point of criticism is that the interest group theory underplays the 
role of the state and institutions. Although institutions are recognised in interest group theory, 
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it underplays the state’s influence to dominate the policy agenda and exclude groups from 
debating and influencing the policy-process.  Political parties for instance are not merely a 
combination of interests, but institutional entities “…that seek to fuse their actions with 
branches of the state.” 14  In the last instance, another shortcoming of pluralism in domestic 
politics is that the best organised and best financed interest groups are able to represent 
their points of view and interest most effectively, leaving groups with fewer resources and 
expertise in a weaker position to influence policy.15   
 
The discussion on policy-making and pluralism was aimed at identifying and demarcating 
public policy-making, in order to describe it more fully at a later stage.  Pluralism involves 
numerous state and non-state actors in public policy-making, which consist of various 
interest groups.  These interest groups compete to promote their interests in policy, which 
converts this into a competitive process.  In practice opposing interests often lead to 
compromise on the policy-making level.  
 
1.2 Understanding Defence Policy 
 
The term defence policy is often used, but its meaning is rarely defined.16  This term has to 
be clarified and pinned down, because it is often inaccurately used to refer to various levels 
of security policy.  The term is alternatively used to refer to operational capabilities and 
policies concerning the armed forces, to strategy and strategic policy, as well as to imply the 
whole spectrum of national security policy, which includes all elements of national power.  
The overlapping domains involved in defence policy complicate an understanding of this 
term. Its formulation takes place within both the military and political domains, which creates 
problems of demarcating its boundaries.          
 
It is often argued that defence policy relates to the implementation of a given set of national 
goals.17  Most models assume that national policy, foreign policy and national security policy 
are decided first and defence policy is then formulated subsequently. Although this appears 
like a logical process, it is hardly ever the case in reality. Defence policy is often formulated 
without adequate national or foreign policy guidelines in place. 
 
The more contemporary view of defence policy involves the provision, deployment and use 
of military resources to facilitate not only the protection, but also the pursuit of the perceived 
national interests of the state.18  National interest normally does not subsist within domestic 
society, but is rather unique to the sphere of international politics.19  It is those vital interests 
on which a nation-state is unwilling to compromise (for example territorial integrity) and for 
 13
which it is willing to go to war.  Defence policy is, therefore, concerned with the policies 
pertaining to the utilisation of armed forces to achieve the policy goals of the state. The term 
defence involves not only the defence of a country’s territorial integrity and protection of its 
population against foreign invasion, but also the protection of its overseas territories and 
population, as well as the political and economic interests of the state worldwide.  Defence 
policy entails the selection of objectives, which have be achieved by the armed forces in 
order to support foreign and even domestic policy. Furthermore, defence policy issues often 
overlap with regional security issues, as regional security structures traditionally serve as a 
common front for defence against external adversaries.20  Defence policy consequently 
involves the use of the military to protect the state’s national interests and its population, 
often with regional co-operation. 
 
1.3 Defence Policy and the Interest Group Approach 
 
The interest group approach is relevant to the way defence policy is formulated. Huntington 
states the following about the dynamics involved in defence policy-making: “military policy is 
not the result of deductions of a clear statement of national objectives…it is the product of 
the competition of purposes within individuals and groups and among individuals and 
groups”.21  Defence policy is the outcome of the competition between the external goals of 
government  (such as trade, influence and power) and its domestic goals (such as social 
welfare, individual freedom and low taxation).  It is thus the result of politics.  Particular 
groups participating in the policy process have their own specific and limited goals and 
interests.  The interest group approach is suitable to defence policy-making, since it is a 
competitive process between various interest groups.   
 
Defence policy-making is the outcome of a complicated process that involves many interests. 
Hillsman argued that defence policy is the sum of separate or vaguely related actions and 
“…on occasion it is an uneasy, even internally inconsistent compromise among competing 
goals or an incompatible mixture of alternative means for achieving a single goal.”22  Defence 
policy is multifaceted because it includes not only the governmental decision-making 
processes but also civil-military relations.23  Defence policy-making is a competition between 
many interest groups, which often leads to inconsistent compromise between interest 
groups.   
 
According to Dillan, defence policy processes are incremental and sometimes confusing.24  
The incrementalist model of decision-making implies that policy is the result of slow-moving 
bargaining between groups. Slow adjustment and progress is characteristic of much public 
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policy-making. There is, however, no “best” way to formulate policy.25  Defence policy-
making would consequently typically involve compromise and bargaining between interest 
groups.   
 
1.4 The Two Worlds of Defence Policy 
 
Huntingtoni, a renowned author on the military, describes defence policy as existing in two 
worlds.26  One is international politics and the other is domestic politics.  International politics 
involves the world of power politics, wars and alliances, the "…subtle and the brutal uses of 
force and diplomacy…" to influence the behaviour mainly of state actors.27  The actual or 
potential use of military power is used in this environment as one avenue to achieve the 
goals of security policy.  The international environment produces threats to the state's 
interests and provides opportunities, which may be exploited to promote the state’s 
interests.28   
 
The other arena of defence policy is the domestic political environment, the world of political 
parties, interest groups and social classes, often with conflicting interests and goals.  In this 
environment, two basic political influences should be distinguished.  Firstly, the governing 
political doctrine of long-term national goals is related to the socio-economic and political 
system.29  Secondly, the influence of the current policy and the decision-making process has 
a significant bearing on the domestic domain. Defence policy may be determined by a single 
principal decision taken by leadership based on long-range policy.  It could, however, also be 
determined by a number of separate decisions, which are an outcome of rivalry and 
bargaining between political groups, institutions and individuals.  Many decisions on specific 
problems of defence policy fall between these two extremes.  Since defence policy is largely 
determined by the domestic political processes, many variables of this process and 
bureaucratic politics may be significant.  The outcome depends for instance on the strategies 
and tactics chosen by the rival groups, organisations and individuals, and their ability to 
implement these.   
 
In the domestic dimension of defence policy, the resources of a society are at stake, which 
include financial, material and manpower resources.30  Any decision that is taken in either 
the international (external) or domestic (internal) political environment has a direct impact on 
the other. Foreign policy consists of those activities of a government that affect the allocation 
                                                     
i Although Huntington uses the term military policy, the term has generally been dropped in 
 favour of the term defence policy (See the introduction to: Baylis, J (ed), British Defence 
 Policy in a Changing World, London: Croom Helm, 1977, p 13). 
 15
of values between the said government and other (external) governments.  On the other 
hand domestic policy refers to those activities of a government that affect the allocation of 
values among groups in (the internal) society.  It should be borne in mind that these 
categories are not mutually exclusive, since defence policy overlaps the usual distinction 
between foreign policy and domestic policy. 
 
Domestic politics serve as a constraint on the formulation of policies, which are largely 
responses to the international environment and have their main impact on that arena.31  The 
most persistent domestic constraint is the financial one, which is influenced by economic 
realities. Ministries of defence have to compete with other Public Service departments for a 
share of the national budget. Another significant constraint on defence policy is the 
inheritance of a former defence policy. For example, ongoing military acquisition 
programmes and agreements of military co-operation could severely restrict the defence 
planner's short to medium term policy options.  Dillan, therefore, argues that policy-makers 
have to make decisions about the future of militaries at a specific point in time onwards and 
should not focus entirely on future goals without considering ways to address current 
challenges.32   
 
International politics are also a constraint on the formulation of policies, which are responses 
to the domestic environment.33  In terms of defence policy it is difficult to identify the primary 
focus of this domain and its constraints.  It would be unambiguous to say that defence policy 
consists of those elements of both the foreign and domestic policy environments that directly 
affect the armed forces of a country. 
 
The interest group approach is frequently used as a framework to explain the nature of public 
and defence policy-making and this is also the case in South Africa.  This approach is suited 
for this purpose, because it explains the role of various interest groups in a competitive 
political environment, where compromises often have to be made to reach some consensus. 
It also underscores that the legitimacy of policy is enhanced with the involvement of interest 
groups.  Defence policy involves the use of armed forces to protect the state’s national 
interests and its population, but it should simultaneously be conceded that it is often 
formulated without clear national policy guidelines.  Defence interests compete with other 
national interests, especially individual security concerns.  The making of defence policy is 
consequently characterised by competition between interest groups, which often involves 
bargaining and compromise in terms of the external and domestic interests of a nation.  In 
summary: Defence policy exists in two worlds; an external and domestic dimension.  The 
external dimension deals with the use of military power in an international context, while the 
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internal dimension involves domestic politics and debates about the allocation of resources 
to the military. Hence the interest group approach is applicable to defence policy-making. 
 
The following part of the chapter discusses the various interest groups and role-payers in 
South African defence policy-making, within the framework of the Constitution, as well as the 
domestic political scene.  The competition between these interest groups, in terms of policy-
making, will also receive some attention.  South African defence policy will be discussed in 
terms of its external and internal dimensions, as well as the changes it underwent during the 
last decade.    
 
2. PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1994 
 
In the first part of this section a discussion follows on the constitutional framework in South 
Africa, which determines how public policy is formulated.  The discussion then continues with 
the influence of various groups in public policy-making, such as the legislature, the executive 
and NGOs.  The focus of the discussion then turns more specifically to defence policy-
making and the changes that occurred in the new dispensation.  An overview will be given 
about the nature of the defence policy process since 1994 and the influence of the various 
interest groups and role-players in the formulation of policy.      
 
An analysis of defence policy takes place within the context of the institutional structure by 
which governments formulate and implement their defence policies. 34  The domestic political 
process determines the nature of policy-making in a state and a proper understanding 
thereof is essential. All legislation of a state is subject to the supremacy of its Constitution.35 
One of the primary principles in the South African Constitution is democracy and a 
representative, multi-party governmental system.36  South Africa is a constitutional 
democracy, which makes provision for proportional representation and a common voters’ 
roll.  This ensures party representation in the legislature.  The Constitution is considered  
South Africa’s supreme law and, therefore, defence legislation and policy should comply with 
its underlying principles.  
 
The South African Constitution of 1996 established important responsibilities with regard to 
the making of public policy and three of these, which are relevant to this study, will be 
highlighted.  The first principle entails that the legislative authority of the Republic of South 
Africa is vested in Parliament.37  The passing of legislation requires a majority vote by the 
National Assembly, which provides a great deal of influence to the majority party in the 
formulation of policy and the passing of bills.38  The second principle is that the National 
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Assembly should facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the 
Assembly and its committees, which should include public meetings.39  The process should 
thus remain open and consultative. The third principle provides that cabinet members or 
deputy ministers may introduce bills in the National Assembly.40  Consequently the executive 
branch of government and the relevant cabinet ministers have a prominent role to play in the 
process of drafting the bill that is submitted to the National Assembly.  The South African 
Constitution also stipulates that other procedures should be followed by government in terms 
of policy-making. The process is quite complex and all activities are not necessarily 
regulated.41  The political nature of policy-making is, therefore, of particular importance. 
 
The Constitution further lays down the following principles, which are relevant to defence 
policy: “National security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a 
nation, to live as equals…”.42  It also states that “…the primary object of the defence force is 
to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with 
the Constitution and the principles of international law…”.43  This suggests three points about 
defence-policy making in South Africa. Firstly, there should be agreement on defence policy, 
which necessitates a consultative way of formulating defence policy.  Secondly, both the 
individual and the nation/state’s interests are important, which leaves room for interpretation 
and balanced views regarding the desired emphasis of security policy. Thirdly, the primary 
objective of the SANDF is to protect the Republic against external threats and not to deploy 
internally in support of the South African Police Service, which could erode the military’s 
apolitical role in the democracy, and democracy itself.  All these principles are aimed at 
protecting democratic principles. 
 
The next part of the chapter will focus on the influence of the legislature in South Africa, the 
personal constraints on policy-makers, as well as the organisational constraints they have to 
deal with.  
 
2.1 The Influence of the Legislature in South Africa 
 
By 1994, many policy-makers in government had little experience and saw policy-making 
primarily as a moral activity to “…right the wrongs…” of apartheid policies.44  Considering 
South Africa’s past this was an understandable approach.  It was, however, not a practical 
one.  Many ideas and models that influenced policy-makers and their policies were derived 
from highly industrialised and rich countries. How these had to be applied, implemented and 
sustained in a middle-income developing country had not generally been thought through.  
The differences between South Africa and these societies were not always  properly 
 18
considered. During the first five years of democracy, South African policies were 
characterised as being voluminous, mainly well intended and ambitious, but generally weak. 
Most White Papers reflected a lack of real analysis, and although most documents were 
clear about the intended achievements, there was a lack of thought on how these should be 
implemented. The poor quality of certain bills may also be attributed to many departments 
being under considerable pressure to pass legislation.45  It is clear that legislators formulated 
public policy with a great deal of idealism and moral motivations.  Some of these ideas were 
close to utopian and impractical.    
 
Another constraint on the contribution that policy-makers could potentially make was their 
lack of exposure to policy-making.46  By 1994, most South African policy-makers did not have 
the necessary skills and experience in making and analysing policy.  This contributed 
towards the gaps that developed between multiple policy reform initiatives and 
implementation, in combination with the policy management capacity shortcomings of 
government. One of the methods government has employed to deal with its incapacity and 
inexperience in policy-making was to make extensive use of outside agencies, most often 
consultants and NGOs. The lack of experience among politicians to formulate policy, 
frequently led to consultants and NGOs being relied upon to draft policy and legislation. The 
influence of these consultants on government has been immense.  However, as ministers 
made new appointments of senior public servants, this practise has declined.  
 
The parliamentary committee system is an important mechanism whereby Parliament is able 
to make contributions in policy-making processes and oversee the work of the executive.47  It 
is regarded as the "…working machinery of the new parliament".48  There is a parliamentary 
committee for each national department. It stands to reason that the ANC would dominate 
the parliamentary committees because of its large majority in Parliament.  Many members of 
the ANC are hesitant to critically evaluate the performance of the executive.  In cases where 
ANC members of parliamentary committees have adopted critical stances on policy, they 
were subjected to severe political pressure and became soft targets.  Legislators – and 
especially ANC members – are, therefore, constrained in terms of making personal 
contributions to the formulation of policy. 
 
At one extreme, selected NGOs were given almost carte blanche to write policy in a 
department under the false pretence that they represented the people’s views.49  In principle 
the involvement of NGOs and consultants in the policy process could be positive and a 
useful assistance to government. There are indeed occasions where such involvement has 
been advantageous. On many occasions since 1994, outside consultants played a key role 
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in helping ANC officials to focus on issues in a pragmatic and sensible manner. A dilemma 
that quite frequently arose regarding some reliance on consultants and consultative 
committee-driven policy, was that many of the individuals who make inputs were not 
accountable either politically or administratively. The responsibility to formulate policy, 
therefore, generally shifted from politicians to private role-players.  
 
Internationally, legislatures rarely make major policy decisions and their inputs are usually 
more reactive than pro-active.50  The contribution of legislatures (in general) with regard to 
policy-making is considered to be less visible through public debates, interaction with interest 
groups, links with constituents, and debates within the legislature. The South African 
parliament is no exception and the legislature tends to be weak compared to the executive 
sphere of government. The situation is aggravated by members of Parliament (MPs) and 
their committees facing shortages of technical, research and administrative resources. The 
tendency in South Africa is that the executive usually takes main responsibility for developing 
legislation in major policy areas and it bears the main task of implementing the policy.51  In 
general, parliamentary committees have to rely on the departmental drafter of the relevant 
bill. Parliamentary committees may be expected to initiate legislation pertaining to matters 
that are of special interest to the legislature, such as parliamentary privilege and public 
participation in the legislature, but not major policy initiatives. Their ability to develop an 
active role in policy-making is thus limited, but frequently the chairpersons of parliamentary 
committees enjoy significant political power.52  With parliamentary committees relying on 
departmental drafters, responsibility for drafting legislation devolved to the ministries.         
 
The relations between Parliament, the executive and civil society organisations depend to a 
significant extent on the relevant minister, and the strength and effectiveness of the chair of 
the parliamentary committee, as well as the political sensitivity of the issue at hand.53  Since 
1994, public opinion and the media in particular had a limited impact on policies in South 
Africa.54  The ANC considers itself as being the credible reader of public opinion. Opposition 
parties also had little impact on policy-making processes, in part because they are relatively 
disorganised and because they are deemed unable to offer credible and practical policy 
alternatives.  In practice opposition parties play no prominent role in public policy-making.  
 
In an attempt to change the wrongs of apartheid, policy-makers formulated policy according 
to idealist and moral motivations, which were understandable, but impractical. Policy-makers’ 
inexperience and lack of skill to formulate policy made reliance on consultants and NGOs 
often necessary for the drafting of legislation. The legislature, and parliamentary committees 
in particular, should play an important role in public policy-making, yet legislators and 
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especially ANC members have little leeway to give inputs or be critical.  The legislature is, 
therefore, weak compared to the executive. Opposition parties in the legislature also play a 
limited role in policy-making.  With the limited freedom of parliamentary committees and their 
lack of support staff, they have to rely on departmental drafters and in the process the 
responsibility for the drafting of legislation transferred to the ministries. As the executive 
relied on outside consultants and NGOs for drafting policy, the responsibility to formulate 
policy shifted from politicians to private actors. 
 
2.2 The Role of the Executive  
 
In this section the role of the President and the cabinet will be discussed, as they are 
influenced by the ANC.  It will also cover the sequence that policy-making follows. 
 
The executive authority plays an important role in public policy formulation and consists of 
the President and members of the cabinet.  The Constitution lays down the rules for the 
appointment and role of the President and the cabinet.  It stipulates that the National 
Assembly chooses the President, which means that the majority party is in practice able to 
determine who becomes the President.55  The President of South Africa is the Head of State 
and also leads the national executive.56  The President appoints the cabinet, which 
constitutes the national executive.57  The cabinet consists of the President, as the head of 
the cabinet, a Deputy President and ministers and he also appoints all these other members. 
The President may also appoint deputy ministers from members of the National Assembly to 
assist the members of the cabinet.58  He exercises the executive authority with other 
members of the cabinet.59  The cabinet is responsible to initiate, prepare, develop, and 
implement national legislation, as well as co-ordinate the functions of the state departments 
and administrations. 
 
According to Booysen and Erasmus, South African politics centre around top government 
and the structures of the governing political party, the ANC, which is also the strongest 
policy-generating cluster in the political system.60  In theory the ANC's policy-making 
outcomes are the result of several sets of processes: those focussed around the National 
Executive Committee's sub-committees, those based on the ANC's parliamentary study 
groups, permanently staffed policy units, or departments at the ANC's headquarters.61 
Formally, the party structures of the ANC formulate policy, and government turns it into 
legislation and implements it. Although the national executive plays an important role in the 
formulation of policy, the ANC party structures and committees seem to play a more decisive 
role. 
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The ANC caucus exerts significant political power, because it meets more regularly than the 
main ANC party structures to discuss important issues. 62  This is where the executive and 
legislative wings of the party meet and key policy decisions are sanctioned.  It should, 
however, be borne in mind that decisions made at the ANC's caucus meeting should have 
the approval of the party's constitutional structures.  The ANC caucus as a party structure, 
plays a significant role in making key decisions on important policy issues. 
 
A hierarchical process is usually followed to formulate policy, which for the most part 
originates in government, often with the help of outside experts.63  In practice, however, the 
most influential individuals in government who formulate policy, are cabinet ministers and 
their deputies, the directors-general in the public service, the chairs of the NEC sub-
committees, and some ANC parliamentary caucus study group and portfolio committee 
chairs.64  The cabinet is a core agency in policy-making and implementation and is closely 
linked to ANC structures, such as the National Working Committee and the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions. The increased power of the cabinet and its associated 
structures over the party is an inevitable consequence of assuming power.65      
 
The cabinet has an important responsibility to initiate, prepare and develop national 
legislation, although the ANC’s leadership structure also plays a very influential role through 
the cabinet. ANC policy is usually determined first and government then ensures that it 
becomes legislation.  The process to formulate public policy and drafting legislation is a 
hierarchical process with cabinet members as the most important figures.      
 
2.3 Interest Groups, NGOs and Lobbying 
 
The South African government is required by the Constitution to operate in an open and 
accountable way.66  The Constitution stipulates that the National Assembly has to facilitate 
public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the Assembly and its committees 
in an open manner.67  However, governments are by nature not inclined to operate in this 
way, which resulted in lobbying becoming a new phenomenon in South African politics. It 
would seem as though it would become a more important factor in future policy-making 
processes.  In this section, lobbying as a new development in South Africa will be discussed, 
as well as the different categories of lobbying.  The focus of lobbying groups’ efforts will also 
receive some attention.  
 
Lobbying in South Africa is unregulated and as a result there are no rules to govern the 
conduct of lobbyists, or policy-makers with lobbyists.68  A broad range of interest groups and 
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associations – often including NGOs, business or labour organisations – used the 
opportunity presented by the new openness in the South African decision-making process 
(since 1994) to lobby for policy decisions related to their interests.69  A number of NGOs 
became involved in policy development through research projects undertaken on behalf of  
Public Service departments. Various international, regional and national organisations can 
and do assist in the process of policy-making, for example the Centre for Policy Studies and 
the Public and Development Management Department at the University of the 
Witwatersrand.  Such organisations significantly improve the policy-making capacity of 
governments.  Lobbying in South Africa is unregulated, which provide business concerns 
and NGOs the opportunity to influence policy decisions. 
 
The ability of a lobbyist to influence the policy process depends to an extent on the expertise 
of the relevant lobbyist.70  The more of an expert a lobbyist is, the greater the chance to 
persuade policy-makers, especially if the policy-makers are laypersons and do not have the 
time or means to study the topic in-depth.  
 
There are three main categories of lobbying organisations: Firstly, large corporations and the 
business sector; secondly civil society organisations, which include trade unions and single 
issue interest groups; and lastly professional lobbyists.71  There are various categories of 
interest groups. 
 
The business sector uses three methods to lobby government.  Many companies recruited 
directors and senior managers with strong links with the new government, hoping that they 
would be able to have access to the ANC.72  Companies also established public affairs 
departments and the services of public affairs consultants (professional lobbyists).  Several 
business organisations – such as the SA Chamber of Business (SACOB) – also set up a 
parliamentary unit to monitor, advise and lobby policy-makers.    
 
The number of civil society lobbyists in Parliament has increased since 1996.73  By 1998 
there were approximately ten active lobbying groups that made submissions to parliamentary 
groups, including IDASA (Institute for Democracy in South Africa) and the Black Sash. The 
Institute for Security Studies is another example of a civil society organisation. It is often not 
clear whom these groups represent, or the specific issues that interest them.  Most civil 
society groups have an interest in democratic principles and the effect of policy on 
marginalised groups. Their representation is often expertise-based and they employ 
advocacy experts to represent professional groups.  Civil society lobbyists also share an 
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interest in value-based lobbying, drawing on highly mobilised and specific constituencies in 
civil society.      
 
Professional lobbying takes place when an organisation hires a professional lobbyist to 
represent its interests directly with policy-makers.74  For example, Terry Crawford-Brown is a 
professional lobbyist for Economists Allied for Arms Reduction and he constantly represents 
interest groups that support the notion of a reduced defence budget and he frequently 
criticises arms acquisitions (among other matters) at public meetings, including those of the 
parliamentary defence committee.  The professional lobbying community in South Africa is 
small but growing, such as voluntary lobbying organisations, including the South African 
Institute of Race Relations, and Business South Africa.  Generic lobbying is undertaken in 
many different ways by a wide range of interest groups. Parliament is being lobbied primarily 
by organisations from the left or centre of the political spectrum. "In the particular 
circumstances of Cape Town, these organisations have considerable influence which will 
indubitably change if Parliament were to move to Pretoria".75  The location of many lobbying 
organisations in Cape Town, therefore, has a significant influence on their ability to influence 
policy with Parliament being located in Cape Town. 
 
International consultants and aid organisations have also played a significant role in the 
policy environment in South Africa.76  The influence of international consultants stretches into 
almost every Public Service department, especially in trade policy. Foreign aid in South 
Africa is largely used to fund consultants and NGOs from donor countries to undertake work 
in South Africa.  Many foreign professionals work in South Africa and their organisations 
choose certain policy areas in which they make contributions.  Foreign governments and 
diplomats have also played a role in developing policy. 
 
In South Africa lobbyists started to shift the focus of their energies from MPs to ministers, 
departments and advisers.77  Parliament is considered to be a rubberstamp, while policy and 
legislation tends to be written by the ministries. Parliament seldom presents a substantial 
challenge to the government's agenda.  Williams noted (in the context of the defence policy 
process) that Parliament was rather weak.78 As the influence of MPs in policy-making 
decreased, ministers and departmental representatives are increasingly lobbied. 
 
Lobbying is a new and unregulated development in South Africa, which allows business, civil 
society and professional organisations to influence public policy.  Foreign aid is often utilised 
to fund NGOs and consultants to lobby government.  Because of Parliament’s lack of power 
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in policy-making, lobbying groups have focussed their efforts on ministers, their advisers and 
the relevant departments. 
 
3. DEFENCE POLICY-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
The first part of this section involves a discussion of the constitutional framework for the 
security and defence of South Africa.  The changing views on security and defence will be 
discussed, as well as the subsequent divergent views in the defence debate regarding 
individual and state security. 
 
3.1 The Constitution and Defence 
 
Before 1990, the South African approach to national security was state centred, in which the 
military played a pivotal role.79  Since 1994, South Africa has accepted an integrated 
approach to national security policy.80  The academics who assisted the ANC in formulating 
its policies on security and defence introduced this approach and advocated the so-called 
new security paradigm, which originates from critical security thinking.81  Subsequently the 
traditional narrow and almost exclusive military-strategic approach towards national security 
in South Africa, made way for an approach, which incorporated political, economic, social 
and environmental issues.82  This view of achieving security forms part of the broader post-
Cold War view of security that places less emphasis on the security of the state through 
military means, but more on the security of the individual.83  International and domestic 
changes, therefore, coincided, which profoundly altered South African security and defence 
policy views.  
 
According to the Constitution, South Africa’s national security should be pursued by adhering 
to domestic and international law.84  Consequently South Africa has to promote peaceful 
relations with Southern African states through high level co-operation in politics, economics 
and military affairs.85  National security perspectives shifted from a state centred or realist 
approach, to a more idealist approach with an emphasis on the advancement of the 
principles of collective security, non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes.86  The 
ANC’s advisers introduced policy-makers to the new security approach that was adopted.  
 
The Constitution contains principles along which national security should be achieved.  It 
determines that “…national security policy must reflect the resolve of South Africans as 
individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from 
fear and want…”.87  Two concepts are important here, namely the individual and the nation.   
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The Constitution does not set one entity’s security above the other and this leaves the 
prioritisation of security issues open for interpretation.  The need to secure both the nation 
and the individual is supported by the Constitution.  In the South African Bill of Rights, the 
security of the individual is emphasised by means of the right to have access to adequate 
housing, health care services, sufficient food, water, social security and basic education. 88  
Furthermore, the Constitution determines that the primary object of the defence force is to 
defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people. 89  The Constitution is, 
therefore, not clear about whether the state/nation or the individual’s security is most 
important and this question was subsequently also raised in defence debates.  
 
After the democratic elections in 1994, the Constitution provided a balanced, democratic 
view of security in South Africa.  It emphasises the equal protection of citizens,90 the 
protection of the state’s territorial integrity, as well as the regulation of military force under 
international law.  A clearer notion of development in South Africa also became apparent.91  
The 1996 Constitution of South Africa commits the government to responsibility for the 
welfare of its people and the development of all parts of the nation,92 whereby a broader, 
balanced view of security is entrenched in the Constitution, which provides for different 
interpretations of defence.   
 
In 1994, the ANC’s views on development converged in the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP). The RDP stood as the pinnacle of national policy and 
consequently also of defence policy:93  “…the size, character and doctrines of the new 
defence force must be appropriate to a country engaged in a major programme of socio-
economic reconstruction and development.”94  It received high priority and was the daily 
responsibility of each department.95  The ANC and the government emphasised the principle 
of human security.  
 
During the Cold War era, a major source of instability in the Southern African region was 
apartheid.96  According to Malan, 97 many people who were involved in the writing of South 
Africa’s defence policy documents assumed that apartheid was the last source of 
destabilisation in Southern Africa.  Such idealistic views were proven wrong with the 
continuation of conflict in Angola and the eruption of conflict in the Great Lakes and   
Democratic Republic of Congo (in particular) during the middle 1990s.  While most policy-
makers had idealist world-views, the leaders in the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) on the other hand had a more realistic view of the international system.98 The 
defence debate, therefore, took place within the context of two opposing worldviews, 
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idealism and realism.  The Constitution enabled these different world-views to co-exist, side 
by side..    
 
According to Fourie,99 the idealists who were involved in the defence policy process were 
very influential.  Their views and perceptions of the military in general were very negative.  In 
the process of compiling the 1996 White Paper on Defence, many politicians questioned the 
need for a military in the absence of a conventional military threat. The then Minister of 
Defence Modise decided to allow idealist views to be represented in the White Paper on 
Defence for the sake of an undisputed and accepted defence policy document. The new 
defence policy framework, which was established by means of the White Paper on Defence 
(1996), as well as the more detailed Defence Review (1998), was described by Cock as: 
“…an agenda for demilitarisation”.100  While the apartheid model of security militarised all 
aspects of national policy, the new security approach sought to demilitarise the concept of 
security.101  Anti-militarist views, therefore, coincided with idealist views and these 
represented the most influential policy position during the defence policy-process. 
 
Although idealist views were more influential than realist views, the White Paper on Defence 
represented a measure of compromise between those groups that promoted demilitarisation 
and disarmament, as well as the institutional interests of the SANDF, which supported a 
strong defence force.102  During the subsequent Defence Review process (which was a more 
detailed policy process), compromises between the interests of both had to be made to 
reach consensus, but with a threat perception that was still largely idealistic. The consultative 
way in which defence transformation was undertaken, resulted in a large degree of positive 
co-operation on defence policy between the Department of Defence and civil 
organisations.103  This was, however preceded by initial friction and suspicion.  Despite the 
dominance of idealist views in the defence debate, certain compromises had to be made to 
achieve some consensus.  
 
3.2 Role Players in the Defence Policy Process  
 
A short review now follows on the role and influence of important groups and individuals in 
the defence policy process.  Some constitutional aspects with regard to defence will be 
discussed in the first part of this section.  The second part will emphasise the lack of 
expertise among defence policy-makers, which resulted in policy being formulated by a few 
influential individuals.  Thereafter the limited role of civil society in the process will be 
elucidated.        
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The South African Constitution lays down some important guidelines, which should be 
considered with regard to national security and defence.  Defence forms part of national 
security and is subject to the authority of the South African parliament and the national 
executive.104  The Constitution further stipulates that the SANDF should be regulated and 
structured by national legislation. The national executive and Parliament is responsible for 
defence legislation, which should determine the structure of the SANDF.   
 
In order to give effect to the principles of transparency and accountability, multi-party 
parliamentary committees have oversight of all security services in a manner determined by 
national legislation. 105  The Constitution requires Parliament’s defence committees to ensure 
public involvement in its processes and the conduct of their business in an open manner 
through public sittings. Civil society should be able to play a role in defence policy-making 
through parliamentary defence committee meetings.              
 
According to the Constitution, a member of the cabinet is responsible for defence,106 and 
accordingly a minister of defence bears responsibility for defence matters.  Command of the 
defence force must be exercised in accordance with the directions of the cabinet member 
responsible for defence, under the authority of the President, who is the Commander-in-
Chief of the SANDF.  The Constitution further determines that a civilian Secretariat for 
Defence be established by national legislation to function under the direction of the Minister 
of Defence.107       
 
Forums were an important part of the defence policy-process. Forums opened up the policy 
process and facilitated the participation of community-based groups and NGOs. Although 
defence policy was in a state of considerable flux in “…fairly open-ended debate… at a 
formal level defence policy was to some extent protected from wider transitions, and ring-
fenced by the main actors in the interests of stability”.108  Mti concluded that public 
participation during the White Paper process was limited to those who had direct interests in 
the matters of the SANDF, which included defence academics, defence experts, companies 
with interests in armaments and defence related production.109  Mti argued that the 
advantage of the close involvement of these groups in the policy process ensured that 
“…people who knew about these matters were involved…the downside was that it tended to 
be elitist…”.110  A small group of experts, therefore, were mainly deemed to influence 
defence policy.   
 
The major role players in the defence debate were the Ministry and the Department of 
Defence, as well as the parliamentary committees on defence.111 The role of the Portfolio 
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Committee on Defence, which was chaired by Groenewald, was, however, sidelined by the 
ANC members by not attending certain meetings.112  The role of the Joint Standing 
Committee on Defence (JSCD) then became more prominent as the ANC members threw 
their weight behind Yengeni from the ANC, who chaired the JSCD. Yengeni played a 
valuable role to facilitate defence debates and the JSCD became characterised for its hard 
work and motto that “…defence is not a party political matter”.113  The JSCD became the 
most influential committee to the extent that the portfolio committee was abolished.114  The 
ANC used its position as the majority party to play the leading role on the JSCD.          
 
Civil society organisations were involved in the defence policy process in various degrees.  
According to Mti, there was public participation in the process through public submissions, 
workshops, conferences and public hearings at Parliament.115  Several MPs, however, 
expressed their criticism about the public's access to public hearings and many argued that 
hearings were only attended by those who could afford it.  Consequently civil society had a 
limited role in the defence policy process.         
 
After 1994, the majority of South Africa’s politicians had a very limited knowledge on military 
matters and did not understand the concerns of the military community on strategic issues, 
which limited credible inputs from government and a political vision for the future role of the 
military.116  Consequently a range of NGOs, academics and security experts became 
involved in the defence policy-making process117, and became more prominent in the 
process.     
 
The ANC-aligned think-tank on defence policy (the Military Research Group-MRG) played a 
significant role in the defence policy process since 1990. It filled the need in the ANC in 
terms of a defence transformation planning capacity and many of its recommendations were 
used (often verbatim) in negotiations, ANC conferences, and eventually in policy-outputs of 
government.118  The principal drafter of the White Paper on Defence was a member of the 
MRG.119  A few other NGOs also played a role in the policy-process.  The Institute for 
Defence Policy (now the Institute for Security Studies) influenced the debate through policy-
orientated research and the Ceasefire Campaign promoted demilitarisation and some of their 
less radical proposals were accepted in multi-party forums.120  The JSCD also played a very 
important role in the defence-policy process, since the drafting process of the White 
Paper.121  The JSCD for example insisted on ratifying every line of the draft White Paper.  
The few issues that could not be resolved by the JSCD were submitted to the Minister for 
final decision.  The ANC relied on members of the MRG to formulate its policies on defence 
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and the drafter of the White Paper originated from this group.  Many of the ANC’s initial 
policy principles directly became government policy.   
 
3.3 The Two Defence Policy-making Processes: White Paper and Defence Review 
 
The first part of this section contains a discussion of defence debates prior to the 1994 
elections.  In the second part a brief review will be given of the 1996 White Paper on 
Defence and the Defence Review processes.  Specific attention will be paid to the manner in 
which these two processes were structured and facilitated in order to indicate who held the 
power to make decisions about defence policy.  
 
The landmarks of South Africa’s defence policy process between 1994 and 1998, were the 
White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review.  The defence debate, however, started as 
early as 1990 and the discussions that took place at this initial stage of South Africa’s 
transition should receive attention.  Prior to the 1994 general elections in South Africa, 
certain agreements were already concluded between most parties for the transition of 
defence in the new era.122   
 
Some of the ideas regarding a framework for transformation were already informally 
discussed in May 1990 at a conference in Lusaka on “The Future of Security and Defence in 
South Africa”.123  This conference was attended by senior ANC members, Umkhonto we 
Sizwe (MK) members, South African Defence Force (SADF) Citizen Force members, retired 
SADF officers, researchers and members of the non-conscription campaign, but excluded 
formal representation from the South African government.  The defence approach formally 
adopted by the ANC since 1990 was accepted by most parties and included the following:  
the adoption of a peaceful strategy and co-operative security relationships with Southern 
African states in a collective security system, the establishment of democratic control over 
the military and the integration of all armed forces into a national defence force.   
 
With the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) in South Africa (in late 
1993), a Sub-Council on Defence was established to take responsibility for the overseeing of 
the armed forces and initiating the planning for the creation of a new national defence 
force.124  A multi-armed force structure (the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council - JMCC) was 
established as a non-command council for taking military-strategic and operational 
responsibility to achieve the above goals under the Sub-Council on Defence.  The JMCC 
consisted of military representatives from all armed forces with political representation on the 
TEC.  The ANC, as the most influential party on the Sub-Council, was able to ensure that 
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certain key principles were accepted for the future policy. These principles included the 
acceptance of a primarily defensive posture, the creation of a primarily civilian ministry of 
defence, an integration process and the transformation of the defence force in terms of 
gender and race. The strategic and force design proposals accepted by the SADF-
dominated JMCC, resembled traditional approaches and were later revised during the 
Defence Review process, which was finalised almost two years after the White Paper on 
Defence.  The ANC-dominated Sub-Council on Defence’s agreements on a defensive force 
posture was maintained throughout the rest of the defence policy-process, but the SADF-
controlled JMCC’s traditional force structure proposals were rejected and had to be finalised 
during the Defence Review process.   
 
After the 1994 democratic elections, there was an urgent requirement for an appropriate 
published defence policy for South Africa.125   The Minister of Defence initiated the drafting of 
a White Paper on Defence in June 1995 and the target date for completion was set for May 
1996.126  The Minister then appointed Deputy Defence Minister Kasrils personally to ensure 
that it was finalised.127  Being ultimately responsible for the process, Defence Minister 
Modise was described as “…reluctant and largely absent…”.128  Modise also did not give 
policy direction and he was not considered to be fond of reading policy documents. In theory 
the Defence Secretary should have taken responsibility for the drafting of the White Paper, 
as defence policy became one of its key functions as a civil authority.  The IDP wrote a draft 
paper, which was rejected by the Minister.129  The Minister then appointed the Centre for 
Conflict Resolution (CCR) under the leadership of Nathan as the principal drafter of the 
White Paper.  Because of the lack of expertise in the Defence Secretariat to facilitate the 
defence policy process (at that stage), the responsibility for drafting of the White Paper 
devolved to civilian consultants.  Thus the responsibility for drafting the White Paper 
devolved from the Minister to the Deputy Minister and then to the non-governmental 
organisation CCR, under the leadership of Nathan. 
 
The process of drawing up the White Paper was more inclusive than previous white papers 
and a great deal of interaction took place between the Ministry of Defence and the JSCD.130  
The White Paper on Defence was tabled in Parliament in May 1996 and accepted by all 
parties.  The White Paper established a broad policy framework with regard to civil-military 
relations and normative aspects for the Department of Defence (DoD) and the SANDF within 
the new democratic dispensation.131  However, it did not cover the whole spectrum of 
defence transformation issues and a more comprehensive defence policy had to be 
formulated through the Defence Review process in order to address other matters in more 
detail, such as the defensive posture, size, structure, strategy, doctrine and acquisition. 
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The Ministry of Defence.132 initiated in July 1995  the Defence Review process, which had to 
pay more attention to specific strategic and force design aspects. The Minister of Defence 
once again tasked the Deputy Minister to oversee the process. The Deputy Minister of 
Defence then instructed the DoD to commence with a comprehensive defence review 
process and the first Defence Review Work Group (DRWG) was established to draft a 
Defence Review for discussions with the JSCD.133  The first group consisted of members of 
the Defence Secretariat, the SANDF and two ministerial advisors with the Director Strategy 
(SANDF) as the convenor.  The first consultative conference was held in February 1996 with 
the JSCD. 
 
The Deputy Minister then set up another DRWG and he appointed Williams (then Director of 
Defence Policy at the Defence Secretariat) as the convenor of the DRWG.134  In February 
1997, the Ministry of Defence expanded the working group135 to include three 
parliamentarians from the JSCD, members from the Secretariat, the SANDF, two ministerial 
advisors, representatives from ISS, representatives from the defence industry, and also 
Nathan and Cawthra (University of the Witwatersrand).136  
 
A significant development during the Defence Review was that the power to formulate policy 
rapidly shifted from the SANDF to the Ministry of Defence, the civilian-controlled Defence 
Secretariat and, to a limited but nevertheless significant extent, to civil society through the 
JSCD.137 During the Defence Review process the Departments of Foreign Affairs and 
Intelligence were not comprehensively consulted on foreign or broader national security 
policy.138  Neither was the Department of Finance consulted on long term defence budget 
planning.  
 
As part of the Defence Review process, specialised workgroups were established to focus 
on specific defence issues.139  Open workshops were held in the nine provinces, as well as 
three national consultative conferences in Cape Town between 1996 and 1997.  The force 
design options were completed during this process and these determined the defence 
acquisition programmes.  
   
4. SUMMARY  
 
Public policy and defence policy is a series of decisions (intention) and actions 
(implementation) of a bureaucratic institution in order to achieve its objectives. Public policy 
is shaped by private actors and their interests, but should be approved by the legislature. 
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With opposing interests involved in public policy, this is a political rather than an intellectual 
process, and often involves compromise between the role-players.  
 
The interest group approach (pluralism) was selected as a theoretical framework to explain 
the various activities and role-players involved in defence policy-making. Pluralism promotes 
the legitimacy and implementation of legislation. The interest group approach assumes that 
policy-making is a competitive, self-interest driven process, usually with an even distribution 
of power. It is, therefore, essential to study the relationship between interest groups involved 
in policy-making.  
 
Defence policy may be defined as the provision, deployment and use of military resources to 
protect and pursue the national interests of the state.  Defence policy relates to two worlds, 
namely the external dimension of international politics and the internal dimension of domestic 
politics.  Domestic political demands in South Africa give defence policy less prominence 
because of the inward looking stance involved.  
 
In South Africa, the political power for the passing of bills resides in the ANC's national 
leadership, which includes party and government leaders, as well as their consultants. 
Although the public policy process demands broad consultation of civil society, the ministries 
largely determine the content of policy documents.  Even the legislature and parliamentary 
committees tend to be weak compared to the executive, while following party guidelines.      
 
South African defence policy consisted of two processes, namely the 1996 White Paper on 
Defence and the 1998 Defence Review.  The defence debate, however, dated back to the 
1990 Lusaka conference on the future of defence in South Africa.  Support for defensive and 
co-operative strategy was already then expressed and remained influential in the debate.  
The ANC ensured the acceptance of defensive principles on defence forums during the TEC-
era. 
 
The Constitution determines that both the security of the individual and the nation is 
essential, but it does not prioritise these factors.  This enabled opposing worldviews about 
security to be held and complicated the formulation of South African defence policy.  While 
the ANC had an idealist view, the SANDF held a realist view.  These opposing world-views 
created a competitive policy process between the two interest groups and eventually 
involved compromise to establish broad support.  
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The making of South African defence policy involved politics and compromise, rather than 
rational decision-making.  Defence policy, in common with most public policy, lacked an 
element of thorough analysis and practical consideration. The main aim of the policy-makers 
was to change the former apartheid policies.  This introduced some idealism and models of 
industrialised nations into formal policy.  Some of these models had little relevance to the 
realities in South Africa, especially the Peace Research school of thought.  Idealism and 
compromise characterised SA defence policy. 
 
In an attempt to deal with the incapacity and inexperience of government in defence policy-
making, government relied extensively on the MRG, NGOs and consultants. During both 
defence policy processes, the Minister of Defence devolved responsibility for drafting policy 
to the Deputy Minister, who then appointed MRG members as lead drafters and co-
ordinators.  During the White Paper process the Deputy Minister devolved the drafting to 
Nathan and during the Defence Review, to Williams. The lack of research and technical 
support for parliamentary committees led to a reliance on the drafters and consultants 
provided by the Ministry of Defence.  Policy-making, which is largely the responsibility of the 
Ministry, then devolved to private actors.  NGOs and consultants may play an important role 
to assist government, but they carry no political or administrative responsibility for policy.  
 
The openness required in legislative processes in South Africa, created the opportunity for 
lobbying groups to influence public policy, but such groups are not being regulated. Foreign 
aid is often used to fund consultants and NGOs to influence policy. The focus of lobbying 
groups shifted from MPs to ministers, the departments and their advisers, which is a further 
indication that the power to formulate policy has shifted from the legislative to the executive.   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Since the early 1990s defence policy-making in South Africa, has shared similarities with the 
interest group approach in several respects.  Firstly, various organised interest groups were 
involved: civil society, NGOs, lobbyists, the legislature, government, the ANC and the 
SANDF.  All the various interest groups tried to influence defence policy, which made it a 
competitive process.  Secondly, defence policy did not only involve rational or intellectual 
decision-making.  There was free access and competition of ideas and interests, as required 
by the Constitution, but the policy process involved some compromise.  Thirdly, interest 
groups, such as the MRG, served as a source of expertise regarding security thinking.  The 
interest group approach, therefore, has some clear relevance to defence policy-making in 
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South Africa, because it involves a competition and bargaining between various interest 
groups. 
 
Simultaneously South African public and defence policy formulation deviates from the 
interest group approach in some ways.  The assumption that political power is distributed 
fairly even between interest groups, does not occur in South Africa. The ANC uses its 
majority in the legislature and parliamentary defence committees to off-set the possibility of a 
power balance. The involvement of the ANC leadership in party, parliamentary and 
government structures creates a natural alliance between certain “interest groups”.  The 
ANC alliance, with its majority, structured the defence policy process rather than the 
institutions of the state.  In the absence of expertise in its own ranks, the Defence Secretariat 
was unable to steer defence policy-making and had to rely on outside expertise. 
 
The ANC leadership largely formulates defence policy through its party structures, cabinet 
minister and consultants.  The executive, and specifically the Ministry of Defence, therefore, 
have the political power to determine defence policy to a large extent.  The ANC-dominated 
legislature, which includes the JSCD, has limited power to influence defence policy, being 
compelled to adhere to ANC party policy.   
 
Civil society plays a limited role in defence policy-making. Lobbying groups, with the help of 
foreign aid and in the absence of any regulations, are in a better position to influence policy.   
 
Although there were open forums for public participation through the parliamentary defence 
committees, a relatively small group of MRG members mainly influenced defence policy. 
Politicians had a limited knowledge of defence matters and a lack of expertise to formulate 
defence policy.  The ANC and the Ministry of Defence, therefore, relied on MRG members to 
formulate its policies.  The formulation of defence policy devolved from the Minister to the 
Deputy Minister, to MRG members. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENCE: A COLD WAR PHENOMENON? 
 
The aim of the chapter is to describe the origins, development and application of non-
offensive defence (NOD) thinking in Western Europe.  NOD may be defined as an 
assimilation of political-military ideas aimed at preventing war and the security dilemma 
through a configuration of defence with the least offensive, but maximum defensive strength 
and capabilities.   
 
The first part of this chapter commences with the early origins of defensive ideas in the 20th 
century and the development of NOD thinking in West Germany during the Cold War. The 
influence of NOD thinking in Europe and the acceptance of NOD by the Warsaw Pact will 
then be discussed.  The end of the Cold War will then be highlighted, and its impact on NOD 
thinking will be explained.  The second part of the chapter is a theoretical section that deals 
with the origins and meaning of the term “non-offensive defence”.  The lack of conceptual 
clarity on the variety of defensive terms that are used, will be described.  The paradigms 
inherent to NOD ideas will also be discussed.  Finally the critique against NOD ideas will 
receive some attention. 
 
1. THE ORIGINS AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF NOD THINKING    
 
In this section, the origins of ideas inherent to NOD, will be described, as it became 
predominant in certain eras of war and political tension.  The development of NOD thinking 
will be explained as it gained momentum during the Cold War, as a way to ease tensions 
between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. NOD will also be explained as a tool that was 
used to criticise NATO nuclear strategy and deployments, as well as its conventional 
strategy.    
 
Ideas relevant to NOD could be traced back to several historical origins within three distinct 
eras, namely the post-First World War era, the post-Second World era and the Cold War.1  
The central ideas that emerged during these eras were:  
 
a. that arms races cause war;  
b. that there is a distinction between offensive and defensive arms; 
c. a conviction that defensive weapons and defensive zones provide political 
and military moral power; 
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d. a preference for predominantly non-standing armies; 
e. a desire for transparency to replace military secrecy; and 
f. a consideration of a country’s own role in the creation of threats.      
 
Ideas from the post-First World War era had a significant impact on NOD.  Shortly after this 
war, the problem of war and the means to prevent it, received a great deal of attention from 
Western governments and academics.2  Several conclusions were made, which became 
generalised assumptions in NOD thinking during the nuclear crisis, as the First World War 
was revisited for answers about preventing a third world war.  The first assumption was that 
an arms race was largely responsible for the outbreak of war.3 Secondly, arms races had to 
be stopped with disarmament and arms control measures. The third conclusion was that the 
defensive seemed to have the advantage over the offensive, which was based on the static 
nature of First World War battlefields.  The cult of the offensive was considered an 
overarching cause of the war, which strengthened support for the defensive.4   
 
Prior to the Cold War, Carr argued that with developments in military technology, states 
could not ensure their military or economic security on their own.5  Carr suggested that 
international security be approached in a way that was free from the limitations of national 
sovereignty and state-centred perspectives. Carr’s views were largely ignored against the 
background of the then prevailing realist prescriptions.  
 
The development of nuclear weapons presented a major challenge to defence thinking after 
the Second World War6.  Nuclear weapons affected defensive ideas in two contradictory 
ways.  Firstly, the scope for defensive military ideas declined as deterrence doctrine started 
to dominate.7  The emphasis in military doctrine shifted from defence to deterrence.  
Realism, therefore, became a prominent feature. Secondly, as deterrence evolved, critical 
views about a deterrence doctrine developed and revived defensive ideas.  The prevention 
of accidental war was a matter of great concern during the Cold War and the security 
dilemma concept was used to explain the problem of East-West tensions.   
 
According to Jervis “…the core argument of the security dilemma is that, in the absence of a 
supranational authority that can enforce binding agreements, many of the steps pursued by 
states to bolster their security have the effect-often unintended and unforeseen-of making 
other states less secure.”8  Jervis established a link between the security dilemma, and the 
defensive and offensive nature of strategies and weapons.9 He argued that as states build 
up their security with strategies and weapons, they often unintentionally decrease the 
security of other states.10  Other states could then misinterpret such efforts as being 
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offensive strategies and weapons, rather than defensive steps. Such misperceptions may 
cause a cycle of insecurity that affects many states, and even give rise to arms races and 
war.  Herz identified the following elements of the security dilemma, which could lead to war: 
mutual suspicion and fear, the conditioning effect of anarchy and worst-case assumptions, 
and the need for preventative attack. 
 
Jervis argued that the only way to differentiate between offensive or defensive intentions 
was to look at military technology and whether it made territory easier or harder to attack, or 
to defend.11  Herz and Jervis wrote about the security dilemma from an academic 
perspective and were cautious to suggest practical solutions, such as defensive 
restructuring.  NOD proponents, however, sought a practical use for the security dilemma 
idea.  
 
Non-offensive defence proponents assumed that the security dilemma and arms races were 
central problems to be solved.12 They believed that arms races were a manifestation of the 
security dilemma and that unstable arms races inevitably led to war. NOD advocates  argued 
that as a solution, demonstrably defensive systems had to be developed to prevent any 
uncertainty about a state’s intentions in order to ameliorate the competitive, destabilising and 
war-producing effects of the security dilemma.  They used the idea of defensive restructuring 
as one of the “mix of policies” to improve relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) states.  
 
Non-offensive defence ideas are based on defensive assumptions of the post-First World 
War era.  The main assumption is that war should be abolished. NOD and its emphasis on 
defensive restructuring, disarmament and arms control, was used as a tool to point out the 
high risks involved in mutual suspicion, worst-case planning and the idea of preventative 
attacks. These NOD ideas were attempts to devise practical solutions for the security 
dilemma. These emerging NOD ideas became the critique of NATO’s nuclear strategy and 
conventional strategies.             
 
1.1 The West German Defence Debate and Early Scholars  
 
Defensive ideas and debates, which established the basis for NOD, emerged mainly among 
West German authors during the early 1950s with the controversial rearmament of West 
Germany after the Second World War.13  Germany was a pivotal strategic location during the 
Cold War and had the largest concentration of East-West armed forces.14  In an attempt to 
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lessen tensions, defensive theorists argued for defensive conventional postures and 
subsequently the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from West Germany. 
 
Bonin, a former West German military staff officer, was one of the first authors to write about 
NOD ideas.15  He was concerned that West Germany would become the buffer of NATO and 
suffer the most in a war with the Soviet Union. He was further alarmed by the introduction of 
battlefield nuclear weapons by NATO and the perceived threat it could pose to the Warsaw 
Pact16.  In order to prevent Western Germany from becoming a major battlefield, he argued 
for defensive warfare preparations.17  Instead of encouraging the emerging Panzer divisions, 
he suggested a strictly defensive orientated border protection force, consisting of light 
infantry in concealed bunkers with an integrated network of anti-tank weapons and 
minefields.  
 
Kennan made some interesting contributions to the West German defence debate and 
NOD.18  He argued that nuclear weapons could not provide security for Europe and that 
nuclear attacks could never be limited.  He further suggested that only defensive wars 
should be fought and that Europe’s conventional forces had to be separated and built upon 
the Swiss model of territorial defence.  
 
Since the 1950s the peace movement started to play a prominent role to protest against 
nuclear weapons deployment in Europe.19  NOD was a primary pillar of the peace 
movement’s platform and an attractive idea to academics and strategic analysts who 
supported a radical defensive reform of Western Europe’s defence.20  
 
Non-offensive defence ideas emerged in West Germany during the 1950s from defensive 
authors and the peace movement.  They addressed their concerns about Europe’s defence 
by emphasising defensive restructuring and the elimination of nuclear weapons.   
 
1.2 NATO Strategy and the Peace Movement 
 
Non-offensive defence debates were mainly a critical West German perspective from peace 
researchers regarding NATO’s nuclear and conventional strategies for defending Western 
Europe.  These debates became more intense with nuclear weapon deployments in Western 
Germany and more aggressive conventional strategies for the theatre around Western 
Germany.  
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In an attempt to deal with a possible Soviet conventional offensive with less retaliation, 
NATO developed the strategy of Flexible Response in 1967.21 The strategy relied on the 
option of deliberate escalation and the possible use of nuclear weapons, should a 
conventional defence fail to contain a Soviet attack. The West Germans criticised NATO for 
its reliance on nuclear weapons to defend Europe and argued that it would make nuclear 
war more likely.22  NATO’s later decision to modernise its intermediate-range nuclear forces 
(INF) with the deployment of 108 Pershing missiles in West Germany and 464 cruise 
missiles in Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany and Britain, (arguably in response to 
long-range Soviet SS-20 nuclear missile deployments in Eastern Europe) raised even more 
concern. These concerns were manifested in many publications, which advocated NOD 
ideas.  
 
European defensive theorists argued for denuclearisation, or at the least less dependence 
on first use of nuclear weapons.23  Despite much protest against NATO's INF modernisation 
plans, new missile deployment went ahead and the Strategic Defence Initiative was 
launched in the early 1980s.  This contributed to the decline of the peace movement, as the 
much-expected culmination in East-West conflict did not occur.24  The anti-nuclear debate 
then continued mainly as programmes of leftist European opposition parties.25  The 
conventional debate, however, intensified and NOD advocates played an active role.      
 
Flexible Response involved a conventional deterrent posture with a forward defence 
capability, which included armour, to respond to Soviet aggression with conventional 
escalation rather than nuclear war.26 The strategy was based on a linear defence, firepower, 
attrition and limited manoeuvre.27 Flexible response remained NATO’s defence approach 
into the 1980s. 
 
Peace researchers, such as Afheldt, responded to the Flexible Response’s conventional 
strategy by suggesting NOD ideas.28  Afheldt’s model made similar suggestions as Bonin’s 
and also emphasised dispersed webs of light infantry. Most other pro-NOD models made 
provision for area defence, which consisted of troops and equipment that are widely and 
uniformly dispersed (defence web).29  The argument to structure, equip and deploy armed 
forces for area defence was that it would ensure that armed forces could not be utilised for 
acts of aggression.  
 
Afheldt and other NOD advocates, such as Von Müller, Gerber and Hannig, devised models 
in which high-technology weapons played a prominent role.30  In order to have significant 
firepower, area defence forces had to rely on long-range weaponry such as artillery, as well 
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as anti-tank weapons, mines, and anti-aircraft installations. The mission for area defence 
units was to delay, disrupt and inflict casualties on invading forces.  
 
Less radical models made provision for mobile and armour units to support and reinforce the 
more static infantry.31  Such a model was developed by the Study Group on Alternative 
Security Policy (SAS) under the leadership of Unterseher.32  The model was named “Spider 
in the Web”, which envisioned close co-operation between light infantry in the dispersed web 
and a small mobile element consisting of armour and mechanised infantry, which was 
located in the interior.  NOD models varied between immobile defence webs and mobile 
“Spider in the Web” models.    
 
Many of the models also made provision for civilian defence and important roles for home 
defence regiments were envisioned.  Such units would form an integral part of a countrywide 
area defence system and could be dedicated to protect installations against special forces 
raids and airborne assaults.33            
 
It was quite obvious that a linear defence network would not have been able to halt a full-out 
Warsaw Pact ground offensive through the Fulda Gap or the North German Plain.34  The 
Soviet Union had the advantage in both force-strength and the ability to launch a swifter 
conventional surprise attack.35  By 1982, Rogers (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), 
therefore, argued that the nuclear threshold be raised as high as possible by strengthening 
NATO’s conventional capabilities without posing an offensive threat to the Warsaw Pact.36  
Rogers argued that NATO’s front-line forces had to be prepared to hold back the Warsaw 
Pact lead divisions, while the pact’s follow-on-forces could be interdicted. The controversial 
part of this operational strategy (which the United States later adopted as the AirLand Battle 
doctrine and NATO as Follow-on-Forces Attack) was that NATO had to destroy targets deep 
in Warsaw Pact territory by means of aircraft, missiles and artillery.  
 
The critique against the “offensiveness” of the Airland Battle doctrine created much debate 
from peace researchers and NOD proponents, such as Dankbaar (1984)37 and Mφller 
(1987)38.  Mφller argued that these doctrines of carrying the war to the enemy were against 
the West German constitution and could also cause a great deal of devastation of NATO 
territory.39  Mφller’s proposals and ideas, under the label of non-offensive defence, were 
similar to those of Bonin and Afheld. 
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Non-offensive defence was an unpopular alternative defence idea for NATO, because it 
would have eroded mutual military support within the alliance.40  The antagonism between 
the superpowers and the strength of the military-industrial complex also limited prospects for 
the radical reform of NOD.41       
 
Non-offensive debates intensified in three prominent stages, with the introduction of new 
strategies, or nuclear weapons deployments. The first era, was in the early 1950s, coinciding 
with the rearmament of Western Germany and the deployment of nuclear weapons in that 
country.  The second era was in the late 1960s, when NATO’s escalation strategy and 
reliance on the nuclear war option, was criticised.  The third era was in the 1980s, with the 
introduction of the SDI and the AirLand Battle strategy. NOD proposals still differed little from 
Bonin’s ideas and focussed on conventional defence and the abolishment of nuclear 
weapons.   
 
1.3 Common Security and the Palme Commission 
 
Prior to the 1980s, NOD thinking suggested mainly a military solution for a political problem. 
With the idea of common security, increased attention was paid to a political solution.  
 
In the early 1980s, some research reports started to focus on how to make states more 
secure without increasing the levels of insecurity for other states.42  In 1982, Swedish Prime 
Minister Palme proposed that common security could be obtained, as suggested in his report 
“Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival”, that arose as a result of the Palme 
Commission.  The aim of the commission was to focus on providing an intellectual basis for 
countering the perceived trend towards nuclear war-fighting.43  The relationship between 
NOD and common security was their focus on arms races as a cause of international 
tension. 
 
Palme argued that there could be no nuclear victory between the two superpowers and that 
they should achieve security not against each other, but together.  This became the main 
principle of common security, which was promoted as a solution for the security dilemma.44  
Common security formed the basis for NOD as a higher order principle for interstate 
relations.45  The Palme Commission Report gave the defensive much prominence, although 
it did not make particular reference to defensive concepts.  
 
Common security advocates further argued that there were global threats to all humanity, 
which could not be overcome by individual states.46  This reflected the earlier ideas of Carr. 
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Common security suggested a radical transformation in security policy away from 
confrontation and nuclear deterrence, towards mutual understanding, community building, 
sustainable development and sustainable peace. Common security, therefore, added a 
developmental view of security, and suggested non-state centric and non-military 
perspectives to security, which became very useful for NOD’s survival after the Cold War.   
 
The notion of common security made the following contributions.  Firstly, it suggested co-
operation for security rather than competition, and it was presented as a solution for the 
security dilemma between East and West. Common security thinking added ideas of 
promoting peaceful interstate relations to the views that NOD proponents presented.  
Secondly, it also provided non-state centric views about security, which became part of NOD 
and allowed it to retain its relevance after the Cold War, when inter-state conflict declined. 
Thirdly, common security provided a development perspective of security.  Common security 
thus became another useful policy for NOD proponents.     
 
1.4 The Prominence of NOD During the latter Part of the Cold War 
 
During the 1980s, NOD proponents referred to the defence models of neutral European 
states as successful examples of countries that avoided war through defensiveness.47  
Switzerland and Sweden, with their voluntary defensive systems, were particularly regarded 
as good examples, but not absolute models, by NOD to criticise NATO’s offensive strategy. 
Switzerland and Sweden’s defensiveness and neutrality had existed at least since the end of 
the Napoleonic wars (1815).  In other words, defensiveness is an established phenomenon 
in Europe.  The ability of neutral states to avoid wars because of such postures was cited by 
NOD proponents as success stories of applied NOD principles.  During the Cold War, 
defensive postures were also prominent in Finland, the former Yugoslavia and Austria, but 
for these countries who bordered Warsaw Pact countries, defensiveness was a strategic 
necessity rather than an application of NOD thinking.48  NOD was consequently not adopted 
or applied in any Nordic or West European state during the Cold War.  There is also no 
example of a pure or absolute NOD model applied in practice.       
 
Non-offensive defence was embraced by several major opposition political parties in West 
Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom, which also took part in the anti-nuclear 
debate.49 The failure of leftist parties in these countries to win in their respective general 
elections of 1987, sealed the fate for NOD in these countries.  
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In addition to West Germany, the NOD debate in Denmark was of particular importance and 
although it remained largely academic, some significant writing and open debate took 
place.50  Theories were elaborately conveyed through Denmark’s peace researchers at 
conferences, through publications and newspapers.  Some of its peace researchers included 
Boserup, Mφller (from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute) and Clemmensen.  
 
Non-offensive defence was a notion that developed in Europe during the Cold War.  Political 
neutrality was an established practice in Western Europe, but no country adopted NOD.  The 
Warsaw Pact, however, later became interested in NOD.  There could be two basic 
interpretations about the relevance of NOD.  The first is that NOD is only unique and 
relevant to the West German situation as a way to deal with its security dilemma, and 
secondly, that NOD is a political and military approach with wider applicability for other 
countries and scenarios.   
 
1.4.1 The Warsaw Pact’s Acceptance of NOD 
 
The Palme Commission played an important role during the early 1980s to facilitate informal 
exchanges between defensively orientated thinkers from the West and civilian analysts and 
military professionals from the Warsaw Pact.51  Soviet Prime Minister Gorbachev often 
referred to the Commission’s proposals and was receptive to ideas developed and 
transmitted through transnational experts and activists. The Palme Commission Report 
suited the Soviet Union’s political goals of a détente, which was accepted by leaders from 
both East and West, but also the Third World. NATO’s removal of tactical and theatre 
nuclear systems (as a significant political component of normalising relations in Europe), 
may have encouraged Soviet interest in NOD.52 Since 1987, the Soviet General Staff started 
to show more interest in the views of NOD proponents and started to attend their seminars, 
where previously their views received little attention. In May 1987, the Warsaw Pact 
accepted a military doctrine (in East Berlin), which shared with NOD the objective of 
preventing both nuclear and conventional war and it conformed to NOD's defensive 
posture.53  In 1989, the Warsaw Pact member states promoted defensive security concepts 
at the United Nations General Assembly and called for an international dialogue on 
defensive security.54  
 
The Warsaw Pact was the first strong military power-block to embrace NOD, which gave 
NOD much prominence.  NOD, however, did not receive wider support.   
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1.4.2. Non-offensive Defence and the End of the Cold War 
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the threat of invasion in 
Europe subsided and as military forces demobilised, perceptions of enmity were turned 
around, which put the security dilemma to rest.55 As the threat of large-scale nuclear war 
declined, so interest in NOD also waned.56 NOD was formulated to deal with large-scale 
foreign invasion, but as this threat diminished, the relevance of NOD in Europe declined. 
 
Wider interest in defensive ideas was illustrated in 1989 when the autonomous UN Institute 
for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), convened an international symposium on defensive 
concepts.57  In 1990, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on “Defensive Security 
Concepts and Policies” and the UN Secretary General established a group of member state  
experts to commence with a study on defensive security concepts and policies.  The group’s 
report in 1993 had little impact.     
 
The Gulf War in 1991, which included the success of offensive military doctrine, further 
eroded the idea of NOD.58  This war legitimised the use of offensive force in the “new world 
order”.  The concerns about nuclear proliferation, especially through former Soviet 
dominated states also made prospects for NOD’s prominence less likely. 
 
The instability in the former Yugoslavia, led European states to realise that they had to pay 
more attention to security problems outside the European Union (EU).  The EU had to 
become more involved in peacekeeping, which involve postures that emphasise offensive 
power and power-projection capabilities; aspects contrary to NOD.59  By 1992, the Russian 
Federation also started to emphasise the notion of “peacekeeping”.  Russia accepted 
responsibility to keep the peace throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
former successor republics, without international or UN involvement.60  Russia’s doctrine 
called for a “rapid response force” for use in local conflicts, capable of offensive and 
defensive operations.  Western Europe and Russia’s security priorities necessitated some 
moving away from NOD thinking.  
 
Non-offensive defence ideas became prominent and developed in distinct eras. Its 
assumptions about the causes and prevention of war, originate from post-First World War 
debates. In the 1950s, the West German authors initiated the NOD debate and advocated 
the first NOD models of static defences with light infantry.  In the 1960s, NATO’s escalation 
strategy with nuclear weapons was criticised.  In the 1980s, the Nordic countries and peace 
researchers mainly promoted NOD and used the idea of common security with its non-state 
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centric views to suggest solutions to the security dilemma in Europe.  The Warsaw Pact later 
accepted some of their ideas to demobilise its military.  NOD lost its relevance by the end of 
the Cold War and was short-lived in Russia.  Its relative success in Russia brought about its 
own decline.  NOD has certain inherent assumptions: that war should be abolished, that the 
security dilemma and arms races cause war, that the defensive is the stronger form of 
warfare, and that security can not be achieved by states on their own.  By taking these 
assumptions as ultimate truths, NOD proponents suggested a mix of solutions, which served 
as tools of critique about NATO strategy. Firstly, nuclear weapons should be eliminated, as 
well as reliance on them. Secondly, war should be abolished through disarmament and arms 
control. Thirdly, the security dilemma should be avoided with common security thinking and 
defensive weapons.  Nuclear war and war escalation were thus the main concerns of NOD 
advocates. 
 
2. THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF NOD 
 
The meaning and origins of the concept of NOD still has to be explained in more detail.  
There are many concepts used interchangeably in defensive debates and some of these 
concepts will be discussed with reference to NOD.  The assumptions of NOD proponents 
and the theoretical underpinnings of their ideas will also receive attention.  
 
2.1 Non-offensive Defence and other Defensive Concepts 
 
The term “non-offensive defence” was first used by Mφller from the former Copenhagen 
Peace Research Institute as well as Boserup, in the middle 1980s, but there is some 
uncertainty about who used it first. 61  Boserup defined NOD as a bilateral relationship in 
which “…both sides have forces that are stronger than those of the opponent…”, that is a 
situation in which both sides have ”…ample forces for defence and, by implication, 
insufficient forces for attack”.62  Mφller defines NOD as “…a form of defence possessing a 
minimum of offensive, but a maximum of defensive strength.”63  He prefers to use the term 
NOD as a notion that explains various degrees of defensiveness. Mφller does not distinguish 
between concepts such as NOD and non-provocative defencei (NPD), arguing that all these 
concepts show a preference for minimising offensive capabilities and maximising defensive 
strength.64  All defensive concepts do not necessarily focus on minimising defensive 
                                                
i  Buzan argued that NPD best describes the range of defensive concepts (Wiseman, G, Concepts of 
 Non-Provocative Defence, Ideas and Practices in International Security, New York: Palgrave and St 
 Anthony’s College, 2002, p 76).  NPD avoids the extreme view that all military deployments should be 
 defensive in nature. 
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capabilities and emphasise the lack of conceptual clarity when authors use defensive 
concepts.   
 
Alternative defence thinking developed into an acceptable school of thought, but its 
advocates failed to unify the vocabulary and ideas.65 The ideas were wide-ranging and not 
standardised.  For example, there were over 12 different defensive concepts in the 
alternative defence debate.66  Some authors also changed their models. This made it difficult 
to distinguish between the different defensive schools of thought. The debate was also 
politically charged and statements were difficult to analyse objectively in terms of 
advantages and disadvantages. 
 
There are different alternative concepts for NOD, which do not include “models”, but 
highlight certain aspects of the concept.67  NOD for instance emphasises little or no offensive 
capabilities; structural inability to attack (SIA) highlights that non-offensiveness is a function 
of the structure of the armed forces; defensive defence (DD) focuses on the defensive 
capabilities; non-provocative defence, (which is often used interchangeably with NOD) 
highlights the absence of offensive capabilities as meaning the avoidance of provoking other 
states; and confidence building defence emphasises that this contributes to establishing trust 
between states.  Non-threatening defence (NTD) is another related concept, which is 
advocated by Butfoy.68  It does not require defensive military restructuring, but supports 
defensive deployments and responsible nuclear custodianship. Mφller argues that defensive 
proponents may disagree on the terminology and configuration of defence structure, but they 
envision the same ends, which include disarmament and arms control.   
 
Theoretically, Mφller distinguishes between pure models and mixed models.69  Pure models 
refer to linear, stationary territorial defence, or defence webs, which involve tactical mobility, 
but no strategic offensive capability.  Mixed models, on the other hand, entail combining 
stationary and mobile elements.  Mobile elements are usually withdrawn from the borders so 
as not to present a threat.  
 
There is a wide variety of NOD models and every country that applies NOD principles has 
some unique characteristics.70 He adds that NOD models are only abstract defence models 
and should not be confused with actual defence planning.  NOD models may only be 
considered to be guidelines and not substitutes for thorough defence planning.             
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The studies on NOD were mainly concerned with land warfare, while air and maritime 
defence received little attention.71 According to K. Booth, NOD thinking did not pay specific 
attention to maritime issues, because most of the thinking took place in continental Europe 
and was concerned with the Central Front.72 
 
The term non-offensive defence was first used by Mφller and Boserup. NOD involves the 
minimum offensive, but maximum defensive military capabilities and strength to make 
invasion impossible for any state. NOD proponents consider it as a term that shares the 
objectives of other defensive concepts, which is to prevent war through arms control and 
disarmament. The variety of defensive concepts indicates a lack of conceptual clarity within 
the alternative defence school of thought. 
 
2.2 Key Components of NOD Thinking 
 
There are certain political-philosophical and practical components inherent to NOD thinking.  
The first four components deal with philosophical and political aspects, while the last four 
refer to defence and military-technical aspects.  
 
2.2.1  Peaceful Political Ideas 
 
The first component of NOD is that it should be conceived as a politico-military doctrine for 
durable peace and equal security for all states.73  There is a close relationship between a 
country’s political philosophy and its military doctrine. Political philosophy determines 
whether a country’s doctrine is offensive or defensive. NOD advocates argue that peaceful 
political philosophies should be followed.  The emphasis on common security thinking is an 
example of the peaceful political ideas inherent to NOD thinking.  
 
2.2.2  War Prevention 
 
Non-offensive defence proponents do not agree with the Clausewitzian assumption that war 
is an instrument of policy and it is argued that this presumption promotes strategic offensive 
doctrines.74 NOD proponents question nuclear war as an instrument of policy in particular, 
and argue that no rational objectives could be achieved through such extensive levels of 
destruction.  The role of armed forces for NOD proponents is rather to produce stalemate, 
which will prevent escalation towards nuclear war and allow political negotiation to settle 
disputes.  
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Offensive doctrines are deemed useless by NOD proponents by arguing that many countries 
that initiated wars during the 20th century actually lost those wars.75 NOD supporters argue 
that if there is no possibility for one state to successfully attack another, both would be 
secure.76 The second component is that NOD by definition is a war prevention politico-
military doctrine.  
 
2.2.3  Complete and General Disarmament 
 
Non-offensive defence advocates are convinced that defensive strategies (such as NOD) 
are incomplete paradigms with little credibility, unless this becomes a universal approach.77  
If states accept the idea of NOD, the logical process (it is argued), would be progression and 
a dialectical process towards general disarmament.  The third component of NOD involves 
the establishment of a transitional doctrine for complete and general disarmament. 
Proponents of NOD also argue that efforts to change the offensive capabilities of major 
powers to NOD should be part of a larger political and economical restructuring of the 
international system.  
 
2.2.4  Confidence-Building and Alliances   
 
According to Mφller, NOD may be achieved through various avenues.78 One avenue involves 
the implementation of confidence-building measures (CBMs), which is the fourth component. 
States could use political constraints, constitutional prohibition (as in Japan), political 
structures, civil control over the military and military capabilities to build confidence with 
other states about its defensive intentions.  According to Borawski, CBMs are designed to 
promote stability by providing “tangible and verifiable assurances…regarding the purpose 
and character of military activities”.79  CBMs are designed to control the use of forces, rather 
than the level of forces.     
 
Non-offensive defence could be viewed as a form of confidence-building between states. A 
state that abstains from the means of attacking a neighbour by choice, inspires confidence.80  
Confidence-building may also be achieved by making defence preparations transparent, 
which could include formal understandings, the publication of military data, exchange 
inspections, bilateral and regional frameworks for dialogue.  The revolutionary progress in 
information technology makes military postures more observable and the implementation of 
CBM’s much easier than before.81   
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Non-offensive defence thinking assumes that states should be self-reliant for all their 
defence needs and capabilities.82 Military alliances are contradictory and unacceptable for 
NOD proponents.  The advantage of this principle is that states can implement NOD 
unilaterally without posing a threat to other states. 
 
2.2.5  Defensive Military Restructuring  
 
One of NOD's aims is to reduce the fear of other states that they will be attacked.83 NOD 
proponents argue that this may be achieved through defensive military restructuring, which 
is the fifth component. It is assumed that offensiveness could be derived from the structure 
of a defence force, and that the nature of military structures is able to influence inter-state 
relations directly.84  NOD advocates argue that defensive military structures would prevent 
worst-case analysis about a state’s intentions, and prevent military miscalculation, 
misperceptions, mistakes and accidental war.  
 
Defensive military restructuring involves the lowering of the offensive potential of a country’s 
military capabilities, to the extent that it poses virtually no military threat to others. 
Proponents of NOD argue that such restructuring can still ensure the defence of a country by 
making it "…hard to attack, expensive to invade and difficult to occupy".85  NOD advocates 
accept the principle of deterrenceii by denial, but reject deterrence by retaliation. 
 
Non-offensive defence is mainly concerned with the structure of defence forces, but the 
intentions, plans, training and activities in preparing for the future use of defence forces are 
also considered important.86  Advocates of NOD argue that offensive structures emphasise 
mobility and range, which refer to power-projection capabilities and should be avoided. 
Defensive structures, on the other hand, emphasise firepower, as well as limited mobility and 
range.  NOD entails a radical reshaping of a defence force and its military capabilities for 
purely defensive operations.87      
 
2.2.6  The Superiority of the Defence 
 
The sixth component is that NOD is an effective form of defence, which is based on the 
assumption that defence is the stronger form of war.88  The advantage of the defender was 
emphasised by Clausewitz in the 19th century and he argued that: “…the defensive is the 
                                                
ii  Historically, deterrence operated through denial until the advent of air power and later nuclear weapons in the 
20th century, which introduced the dimension of deterrence through punishment (Singh, J, “Defensive Strategies”, 
In: UNIDIR, Non-offensive Defense: A Global Perspective, New York: Taylor and Francis, 1990, p 27). 
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stronger form of conducting war…we must make use of it only as long as our weakness 
compels us to do so”.89  The logic behind this reasoning is that an opponent could be 
vulnerable when on the offensive, as his lines of communication and supply are extended. 
As an opponent advances he exposes his forces to observation and attacks, which could be 
conducted from well-prepared defensive positions.  The defender has the advantage of 
operating on interior lines of communication and familiar terrain.  NOD advocates argue that 
if these advantages are used correctly, the defence will be stronger than the offensive.   
 
2.2.7   Defensive Weapon Systems  
 
The seventh component is that defensive weapon systems should be used. Offensive 
weapons and the fear that such capabilities stimulate, are considered the central problem of 
military means.90  NOD proponents do not share the assumption that weapons per se are 
the problem, but their thinking is closer to the arms control view that the problem relates to 
instabilities in the configuration of opposed forces.  
 
The difference between offensive and defensive military capabilities and weapons has been 
debated at length and remains a theoretical debate.91  A practical distinction between 
weapon systems as either offensive or defensive is impossible, because any weapon system 
can be used for either offensive or defensive purposes.  Weapon systems that are 
considered to be manifestly offensive by NOD proponents are nuclear weapons, long-range 
strategic bombers and long-range missiles. The question of the degree of offensiveness of 
weapon systems will always remain debatable.  The strategic environment and context in 
which weapon systems are utilised, make a distinction between their offensive or defensive 
use easier.  
 
According to Vreÿ, an analysis of a country’s military capabilities to determine its offensive or 
defensive potential becomes more difficult as the focus of analysis moves from the strategic 
level towards the tactical and technical level.92  It is easier to analyse the offensive potential 
of a large force than an individual weapon system.  A distinction between offensive and 
defensive military capabilities is, therefore, often impractical.  
 
Proponents of NOD consider high technology weapons as important where they support 
defensive missions.93  They want to exploit the technological advantages of weapons suited 
for the defensive. NOD models of the 1970s and 1980s put a particular emphasis on the 
efficient use of precision-guided munitions in countering air and armoured attack.94  The 
 55
success of Egyptian anti-tank missiles against Israeli armour in 1973 created much optimism 
among authors, such as Mearsheimer and Boserup.95  
 
Non-offensive defence proponents argue that high-technology offensive weapon systems, 
such as bombers, aircraft carriers and tanks, are vulnerable to defensive precision-guided 
missile systems.96  The emphasis is on acquiring defensive weapons, such as precision-
guided anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft systems and anti-ship missiles, instead of arming 
oneself with offensive systems.  The use of passive defensive weapon systems also forms 
part of NOD thinking. NOD proponents support the use of especially anti-tank mines, which 
are considered to be useful obstacles in a defensive system97, posing little harm to people.   
 
2.2.8  Defensive Deployments   
 
The last component of NOD is that the deployment of armed forces and their defences 
should be defensive in nature.  Early NOD models already suggested the deployment of 
small and dispersed military units.98  It is argued that units should rely on the advantages of 
local knowledge, defence in depth and concealment. Conventional NOD would further entail 
static defences with tank traps, fixed fortifications and mines. NOD can further involve militia 
resistance and civilian resistance. These defensive principles suit the military aim of NOD, 
which is to deny territory to an attacker and involves territorial defence.  
 
Non-offensive defence thinking involves both politico-philosophical and military-technical 
components.  The politico-philosophical aspects are: that NOD is a politico-military doctrine 
for durable peace and security; that it prevents war; that NOD should eventually involve 
complete disarmament; and that states should use CBMs to build confidence among each 
other.  The military-technical components are that defensive military restructuring is essential 
to promote peaceful inter-state relations; that NOD is an efficacious form of defence with the 
defensive as the superior form of war; and that the fear of offensive weapons should be 
addressed through defensive military restructuring, defensive deployments and the use of 
defensive weapons. 
 
2.3 Critique against NOD 
 
There are four main points of criticism against NOD.  The criticism deals with NOD’s 
theoretical shortcomings, its limited applicability, impracticality and military deficiencies.  The 
first point of criticism is that NOD is theoretically incoherent and deficient with regard to its 
various concepts and models. The divergent views and terminology among defensive 
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theorists is an indication of the incoherence of NOD thinking. NOD proponents also 
overstated what different NOD models could achieve,99 which points out NOD’s vagueness, 
its activist value and its lack of theoretical thoroughness.  
 
Prins argued that NOD proponents often failed to perceive the conceptual level of application 
of their ideas.100  In common with many Western scholars, NOD proponents failed to 
distinguish between the various levels of strategy and their ideas did not address important 
matters on each level to make NOD a presentable alternative to other strategies. NOD 
thinking developed with a focus on military-technical matters, which were offered as strategic 
solutions. This bottoms-up approach was not practical or logical for formulating sound 
strategy.  NOD is clear about its ends and means, but unclear about its ways.  NOD for 
instance lacks an operational strategic focus that explains how forces should actually 
operate in a theatre.  
 
The second point is that NOD is an untested idea with limited applicability outside Europe 
and the Cold War bipolar context.  This criticism is valid considering that despite the short-
lived Russian interest in NOD, it was never adopted by any European country.101   
 
Non-offensive defence proponents further apply theory universally in different time periods 
and countries.102  Non-offensive defence proponents follow an ahistorical approach with 
regard to proposals and models. The focus is too narrow on the problems created by a 
security dilemma, as if it applies to all countries, while it is only one of the security 
dimensions between states after the Cold War.103  The security dilemma, however, only 
continues to be prominent between a few states such as Pakistan and India.  
 
Non-offensive defence proponents also take the socio-political characteristics of Europe for 
granted and assume that other countries are similar.104  Western European states are mostly 
strong, politically cohesive and democratic, which are characteristics not shared by all 
states.  NOD is criticised for assuming that regimes that accept it, rule through popular 
consent rather than by force.105  NOD requires large-scale participation of people who are 
also armed by their governments.  Insecure regimes will not be in favour of such an option, 
which could contribute to their own overthrow.  This point of criticism is especially relevant 
with regard to developing countries.  Consequently NOD has little applicability outside the 
security dilemma and Western Europe.     
 
The third criticism is that from a strategic point of view, NOD is a risky and impractical idea 
for most states.  Laurenti remarked that NOD is often the only option for weak states close to 
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a strong state and that such states may have to accept the risk that stronger opponents may 
muster overwhelming force to invade them.106  This view is often unacceptable to stronger 
powers who want to limit their vulnerabilities.  Although NOD may be useful and even 
necessary to some weak powers, an NOD defence model does not guarantee that a country 
will not be invaded and overrun. 
 
Similar views were forthcoming from Russia’s military.107  One of the main arguments was 
that the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons could benefit a potential enemy by 
allowing him the choice of the mode of combat and hand him the initiative. By strictly 
operating within own state borders, one allows an opponent to prepare or regroup for a large 
or subsequent attack.  The Russians further argued that article 57 of the UN Charter 
stipulates that offensive military operations are legitimate in order to defeat an aggressor.  It 
was further argued that NOD increased the danger of war and military conflict, since 
potential aggressors will not expect retaliation to be severe and will not be deterred from 
war.   
 
Non-offensive defence is further impractical, because there is little economic reasoning to 
adopt it.108  NOD policies may cost even more than the defence set-up it replaces.  NOD 
postures tend to be cheaper only if a military structure already consists of NOD-type 
systems.109 NOD relies on advanced military technology, while, expensive research and 
development functions have to be maintained.  
 
The fourth main criticism is that NOD has several deficiencies from a military-technical 
perspective.  NOD is criticised for assuming that the defence is the stronger form of war, 
especially considering examples of successful offensive strategies employed with Blitzkrieg 
(1940), the Six Day War (1967) and the Gulf War (1991).110   
 
Non-offensive defence proponents were also overoptimistic about technology that favours 
the defensive, and the potential of precision guided missiles such as anti-tank missile 
systems.111  For instance, during the 1980s many NATO precision-guided missiles were still 
under development and not readily available. NOD proponents further failed to see the 
narrow technical spectrum that anti-tank missiles could exploit; tanks have a broad range of 
counter-measures such as reactive armour, smoke, attack helicopter support, terrain and 
weather. Neither did NOD proponents realise the deficiency of anti-tank missile units on the 
operational level, where mass and momentum is of great importance.  Light infantry units are 
unable to cover large areas because of local inferiority, and NATO’s anti-tank missiles had 
insufficient rates of fire to deal with the large echelons of Soviet armour.112  In addition, the 
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optimism about the potential of anti-tank missiles should be studied within the context of the 
principle of combined arms support.113 Considering the limitations of the defence and military 
technology within the context of NOD, the deterrence-through-denial potential of NOD can 
indeed be questioned.   
 
3. SUMMARY 
 
Defensive ideas relevant to NOD may be traced to the post-First World War era, when 
conclusions were made that arms races caused that war and that the defensive was superior 
to the offensive.  Defensive ideas, such as disarmament and arms control, became 
prominent as proposed solutions to arms races and accidental war.  These assumptions and 
ideas were later accepted and advocated by NOD proponents during the Cold War, to 
prevent nuclear and conventional war in Europe between East and West. The security 
dilemma was used to outline the political-military tension between these two alliances and 
focussed attention on the fact that even defensive measures could be interpreted by another 
state as offensive.  NOD became a suggested solution to the security dilemma with an 
emphasis on conventional military restructuring. A wider, non-European application of NOD 
was not intended. 
 
The West German author Bonin devised a defensive model, which created the basis for 
NOD.  Bonin and subsequent defensive authors wished to ensure an adequate defence for 
West Germany and NATO, by proposing a conventional defence that involved territorial 
defence and structural inability to act offensively. This mainly entailed the use of light infantry 
units along an integrated border defence network with minefields.  They protested against  
the presence of nuclear weapons, as well as NATO’s reliance on it. 
 
The term NOD is used by its proponents as an all-embracing term for most defensive 
concepts and entails minimising offensive military capabilities and maximising defensive 
capabilities in order not to threaten other states.  There are various models of NOD which 
share the aims of arms control and disarmament to prevent war.  Inherent assumptions of 
NOD are: that it is a war prevention politico-military doctrine that suggests durable peace 
and security for all states through general disarmament, CBM’s, reliance on the defensive as 
the superior form of war; defensive military restructuring, defensive deployments and the use 
of defensive weapons.  
 
Political neutrality and defensiveness was an established practice in Western Europe, but 
NOD was a relatively new idea of the Cold War era. Besides Russia’s short-lived interest in 
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NOD for its military demobilisation, no other European country applied NOD thinking. The 
application of NOD principles by the Russians facilitated the end of the Cold War. This  
sealed the fate for NOD and its relevance as inter-state military tension subsided.  
Developments towards peacekeeping and military intervention in the 1990s, made NOD 
even more irrelevant in Europe.      
 
Non-offensive defence is criticised for being theoretically incoherent, representing too many 
vague and wide-ranging models and concepts. NATO was uncomfortable with NOD and no 
West European country accepted NOD during the Cold War.  NOD is still an impractical 
option for states that wish to limit their own vulnerabilities and deter enemies. It holds the risk 
of handing over the initiative to opponents to attack when it suits them.  NOD conversion is 
also more expensive for countries with no existing NOD capabilities.  NOD proponents may 
furthermore be criticised for focussing their ideas on the military-technical level and 
presenting it as overall strategic solutions.  NOD lacks content on how forces should be 
utilised on the operational level.  Its military-technical focus also involves optimism regarding 
defensive missile systems, which fails to consider the limited spectrum in which these 
systems can operate, especially when missile counter-measures are involved.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of the chapter was to describe the origins, development and use of NOD thinking in 
Western Europe. NOD ideas originate from three specific eras: Firstly, the early assumptions 
of NOD originate from the post-First World War era, when governments and academics tried 
to address the problem of war.  The primary assumption was that war should be abolished 
through disarmament and arms control.  Secondly, in the 1950s with the rearmament of 
Western Germany, and in an attempt to ease tensions between East and West, West 
German authors suggested the first pure defensive NOD-type model, based on a defensive 
web of light infantry.  Thirdly, in the 1980s, NOD connected with the idea of common security 
thinking.  Peace researchers from Nordic countries and the peace movement then used 
NOD to oppose reliance on nuclear weapons and aggressive military strategies in Europe.  
NOD ideas, therefore, developed in distinct eras and constantly connected to new ideas, 
which made it a “mix of policies”.  
 
The primary ideas of NOD are: that arms races cause war; that offensive and defensive 
weapons may be distinguished; that the defensive is superior to the offence; that 
transparency could avoid misperceptions about military intentions; and that non-standing 
armies are ideal to prevent military tensions.  Non-offensive defence ideas were used in 
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three ways.  Firstly, it was used in an attempt to prevent nuclear and conventional war, as 
well as war escalation, by focussing attention on the security dilemma.  Secondly, it was 
used to criticise NATO nuclear and conventional strategies and presented alternative 
defence options, rather than to provide workable defence solutions.  Thirdly, NOD was used 
by the Russians for a brief period to demobilise their military.   
 
No European country adopted NOD and it remains an untested theory with no practical 
example as a pure model. NOD lacks conceptual clarity with the variety of concepts and 
models it includes.  It became more incoherent, as it connected with other ideas. Initially 
NOD was a state centric view, then it became a non-state centric idea, by connecting with 
common security.  NOD overlaps with many ideas, but qualifies little, which makes it 
theoretically weak.  Its weakness is also apparent with its military-technical focus and its lack 
of detail on how forces should operate on the operational level.   
 
Non-offensive defence is a risky and impractical idea for most states.  Restructuring to 
implement this is an expensive venture that may hand over the strategic initiative to an 
opponent and would limit a country’s ability to stop a surprise attack.  The emphasis of NOD 
on defensive missile systems disregards the wide spectrum of missile counter-measures and 
effect of combined-arms. 
 
The connection of common security ideas to NOD was a significant development in terms of 
this study theme. Firstly, it created a potential for NOD to survive outside a state-centric 
context, such as the Cold War.  Secondly, it added a development view towards promoting 
security.  Within NOD thinking, defence was not considered to be only way to promote the 
security of a nation.      
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PROMOTION AND INFLUENCE OF NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENCE 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the influence of non-offensive defence (NOD) ideas on 
South African defence policy-making since the early 1990s.  In the first part of the chapter, 
the African National Congress’ (ANC) weak defence policy-making capacity by 1990 will be 
described, as well as the way this capacity was established though the Military Research 
Group (MRG).  In the second part, the way NOD entered the defence debate through MRG 
members and other role players, will be discussed with some elaboration on the nature of 
the NOD debate towards and during the drafting of the White Paper on Defence and the 
Defence Review.  Thirdly, the principles of NOD that were accepted into defence policy will 
be discussed.  In the last instance, the impact of NOD principles in South Africa’s (SA) 
defence policy will be discussed.   
 
1. THE LACK OF A DEFENCE POLICY-MAKING CAPACITY WITHIN THE ANC IN 
THE EARLY 1990s 
 
In this section, the lack of an ANC defence policy-making capacity will be discussed, as well 
as the way this shortcoming was addressed by means of the establishment of a defence 
policy think-tank, the MRG.  The way NOD was introduced to the ANC through the MRG will 
be discussed, as well as the reasons why it appealed to ANC politicians.  The role of 
international and local role-players in promoting NOD will also receive attention. In the last 
part of this section, the impact of NOD on policy before the 1994 democratic elections will be 
described.    
 
As South Africa entered a new political dispensation in the early 1990s, both the ANC and 
the incumbent defence establishment lacked an appropriate framework for a new defence 
policy in a democracy.1  The ANC’s defence thinking was traditionally Marxist, while the 
South African Defence Force did not have a tradition of functioning within a democratic 
framework under civil control or parliamentary oversight.  Both, therefore, lacked the thinking 
to formulate defence policy in a new democracy.  The power to determine a framework and 
formulate defence policy would eventually reside with the ANC as the majority and governing 
political party.2  The ANC leadership had the political power to determine defence policy in 
the new South Africa, but initially had no clear framework to do so.    
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By 1990, the Marxist ideology underlying the ANC’s policies was discredited.3  The ANC 
realised that the South African Defence Force (SADF) – and not Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) – 
would form the basis of the new national defence force. The ANC consequently had to make 
a paradigm shift in terms of defence thinking and policy.   
 
The ANC’s broad policy objectives in the early 1990s regarding defence were the following:4 
developing a strategy for peaceful and co-operative security relationships with other 
countries in Southern Africa; integrating all armed forces into a national defence force and 
establishing effective democratic control over the military; lowering force levels and defence 
expenditure; end conscription and reduce involvement of the Citizen Force.5  Besides these 
objectives, the ANC paid very little attention to defence transformation and lacked the ability 
to analyse and formulate defence policy. The ANC lacked the capacity to formulate viable 
defence policy options and this became apparent at the IDASA (Institute for Democracy in 
South Africa) sponsored conference in Lusaka in 1990.       
 
1.1 The Establishment of the Military Research Group 
 
The ANC had few members who were able to formulate defence policy.6  Most MK members 
were line function oriented and the only part of the ANC where military strategic thinking took 
place was in MK intelligence. Few of these members had an intellectual background or 
understood what defence policy-making in a democratic transitional process entailed. The 
responsibility to formulate ANC defence policy fell upon an odd group of ANC operatives and 
academics. 
 
With the realisation that the ANC lacked a defence policy-making capacity, ANC politicians 
and academics decided to establish the Military Research Group (MRG).7  The MRG held its 
first meeting at the ANC headquarters in November 1991, with Williams as the first 
convenor.8  The MRG was as also established to enable the ANC to play a more active role 
in the South African defence debate and to counter the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP), 
which initially dominated the debate and was suspected by the ANC for being a front 
organisation of the SADF.9  The MRG was established to create a defence policy-making 
capacity and to counter the IDP. 
 
 
The MRG consisted of academics (of whom many were ANC members and political 
activists), members from MK and ANC members in other departments, such as military 
intelligence.10  ANC membership was an unofficial prerequisite to be part of the MRG.11  The 
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MRG’s goal was to create a forum where “…researchers, academics and policy analysts 
could network…discuss issues of common relevance and prioritise future areas of co-
operation”.12  The importance of the MRG was that it brought ANC policy makers and MK 
members in contact with academics and researchers to discuss defence policy issues. The 
MRG helped the ANC to expand the defence debate beyond the integration and 
rationalisation of the military. 
 
The MRG conveyed its ideas by means of conferences, workshops, the publication of 
working papers, articles and a training programme.13  Such activities and the functioning of 
the MRG were funded mainly by pacifist organisations.14  For example, the Joseph Rowntree 
Charitable Trust, which openly supports pacifism, the end of the arms trade, and the end of 
military service15, provided some money to the MRG.16   The MRG was reluctant to receive 
money from governments.17             
 
In summary the ANC had the political power to dictate defence policy in the new South 
Africa.  The ANC, however, lacked a clear defence policy by 1990 because of its deficient 
capacity to formulate and analyse defence policy. The MRG was established to fulfil this role 
and made policy recommendations on defence issues, which eventually became 
government policy.  The MRG used networking, conferences, publications and training 
programmes to communicate its ideas, which were funded mainly by pacifist organisations.   
 
1.2 The Military Research Group and ANC’s Interest in NOD 
 
The way NOD became part of the South African defence debate will be discussed by 
pointing out the role of both local and international role players. Although the roles of these 
actors are discussed separately, their roles were inseparable and considerable co-operation 
and interaction took place between them.  The way NOD entered the South African defence 
debate through the MRG will be discussed, as well as its attractiveness to ANC politicians.     
 
Members of the MRG followed security debates in Europe, which were relayed to South 
Africa, because there was no existing theoretical framework for ideas on transforming 
defence.18  The MRG studied policy options in the context of contemporary international 
debates and then promoted certain ideas within the ANC.19 Several MRG members obtained 
postgraduate degrees from European universities and were exposed to NOD thinking in the 
process. Nathan and Rupiya (from Zimbabwe) for instance, were familiar with Peace Studies 
after studying it through Bradford University in the United Kingdom (which is renowned for its 
Peace Studies) and later brought those ideas to MRG discussions.20  MRG members 
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introduced NOD ideas to South Africa after studying it in Europe or following the relevant 
debates.    
 
The MRG focussed its research activities on the needs expressed by ANC representatives 
and then made recommendations, which usually became ANC and later government 
policy.21  One of the MRG’s research priorities was “…a common security regime in Southern 
Africa on the basis of non-offensive defence, collective security and demilitarisation…”.22 The 
MRG paid attention to new developments in security thinking and “…sought to explore 
alternative approaches to security dilemmas, including non-offensive defence…”.23  It also 
studied various issues such as regional security, arms control and conversion issues, civil-
military relations, and the integration of the armed forces.  NOD was a particular research 
focus of the MRG. 
 
Non-offensive defence appealed to ANC politicians for personal and political reasons.  
Firstly, the ANC wanted to change South Africa’s role from being a source of instability in the 
past, to being a source of stability within the region.  During the liberation struggle South 
African armed forces were involved in military attacks, bombings and assassinations across 
the region, for example in Maputu, Harare and Lusaka.24  ANC members and bases in 
Southern African countries were often on the receiving end of such incursions during the  
apartheid era and this created a consciousness among ANC politicians about the 
destabilising effect of such cross-border attacks in neighbouring countries.25  On a personal 
level, ANC politicians were aware of the destabilising effect of cross-border attacks. 
 
There was also a realisation that political change in South Africa was not necessarily going 
to change the perceptions of other countries in the region.26  From a foreign policy 
perspective, ANC policy-makers were determined to change South African foreign policy and 
military doctrine from a traditional offensive approach towards a defensive approach.27  
South Africa’s technological advancement in military capabilities, made NOD even more 
attractive to the ANC.28  Within the Southern Africa region, the ANC wanted to promote 
regional security and prevent the security dilemma. NOD represented a useful paradigm to 
change South Africa’s foreign policy and military doctrine to improve relations with Southern 
African countries and to promote regional security.  
 
Secondly, the driving factor behind the defence transformation agenda in South Africa was 
the ANC’s aim to prevent the military from being a threat to democracy.29  Although 
democratisation does not form part of NOD thinking, Peace Research ideas were used by 
the ANC to curb the role and power of the military in South Africa. During the apartheid era 
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the military enjoyed significant political and institutional influence without clearly defined civil 
control or oversight mechanisms.30  There was no parliamentary committee that had clearly 
defined oversight over the military. The military also largely formulated defence policy, 
particularly the White Paper on Defence.31  The ANC argued that the military could pose a 
threat to democracy through extensive internal deployments in support of policing.32  It was 
feared that such deployments would politicise and discredit the military, and expose civilians 
to harsh treatment, which would transform the state into the problem, instead of being the 
solution to internal insecurity.           
 
Thirdly, various sentiments within the ANC spurred a search for alternative, non-aggressive 
ways to approach defence in South Africa. Within ANC circles there was implicit anti-
militarism, which was rooted in the Ghandian tradition.33 Some ANC politicians for example 
questioned the need for a defence force in the new dispensation, especially in the absence 
of an external military threat.34  Within the MRG, some members were pacifists.35  Others, 
such as Nathan, came from the anti-war movement of the 1980s, which started at the 
traditional English-speaking universities through the End Conscription Campaign (ECC).36  
Most MRG members who became involved in the defence policy process were from the anti-
war and anti-apartheid movement.37  Anti-war, anti-militarism and pacifist sentiments were, 
however, not the only views within the ANC and restricted negotiation or compromise about 
defence policy issues.  Within the ANC there were also opposing and more militarist views, 
especially from within MK. This variety of sentiments urged the ANC to search for defence 
alternatives in order to break away from past trends.  Peace Research thinking and 
specifically NOD later became instrumental as the alternative approach to defence issues.             
 
Fourthly, the MRG introduced the ANC politicians to the new security paradigm, which 
sidelined military security issues under a holistic approach to security.38  This thinking came 
from Peace Research thinking and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute in particular.  
The ANC accepted this approach, which also sought to demilitarise the concept of security39.  
The ANC considered the concept of security as the inclusion of social, political and 
environmental issues, as well as the security of individuals and communities. 40 The new 
security paradigm within the ANC reinforced support for NOD thinking.    
 
Lastly, NOD seemed to be an attractive and appropriate framework, which was politically 
correct, especially through terminology.41  NOD’s framework and concepts to establish peace 
through negotiation were appealing to the ANC, for example: tolerance, common security, 
confidence-building, dialogue and transparency.42  Consequently NOD models and 
terminology, such as confidence-building, received significant attention in the defence policy 
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process, which had some utility from an intellectual and philosophical perspective, but had 
little practical value.43  NOD, therefore, provided a promising framework to transform the 
political-military affairs of South Africa. 
 
MRG members who studied Peace Research and followed European defence debates, 
introduced NOD to South Africa.  NOD was promoted through specific individuals of the 
MRG.  NOD became a research focus of the MRG to formulate policy options for the ANC. It 
appealed to the ANC because it presented foreign policy alternatives to stabilise relations 
with Southern African states; Peace Research thinking could be used to curb the power of 
the military and prevent it from threatening democracy; the ANC accepted the “new security” 
paradigm, which also sidelined military issues, and most MRG members were anti-war 
activists or anti-militarists.  NOD thinking, therefore, suited the ANC’s goals.      
 
1.3 International Role Players Promoting NOD 
 
In this part, the role of international role players in promoting NOD in South Africa through 
local NGOs, such as the MRG, will be discussed.  International funding and conferences that 
were aimed at promoting NOD, will also receive attention.    
 
Peace researchers in Europe were surprised by the sudden developments that took place by 
the end of the Cold War, and by the disintegration of the Soviet Union in particular.44 Mφller 
noted that: “…there has been a significant general decline of interest in the topic (NOD), 
simply because the problem NOD was intended to solve (the threat of external attack) 
vanished into thin air with the collapse of the Soviet Union.”45  The end of hostility between 
East and West negatively affected the availability of funding for Peace Research.46     
 
Although peace movement activism and interest subsided, the declining number of defensive 
scholars maintained their strong Peace Research connections and they tried to keep 
defensive concepts alive by establishing a transnational network of scholars and “second-
trackers”, which refers to government officials discussing new policy ideas in a personal 
capacity.47  This way of preserving NOD ideas through transnational networks rather than 
states, was an appropriate response to declining public and probably state support for their 
ideas.  A group of analysts worldwide collaborated and shared ideas on NOD with one 
another, but also did some networking in South Africa, by interacting with NGOs, academics 
and policy-makers to facilitate local discussions on NOD.       
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Despite NOD’s decline in Europe, NOD proponents tried to export the idea to East Asia, the 
Middle East, South America and South Africa.  For example, in February 1995, a Global 
Non-Offensive Defence Network Seminar was held in Copenhagen by the Centre for Peace 
and Conflict Research, which was funded by the Ford Foundation.48  This seminar gathered 
prominent scholars on the theme from all the above-mentioned regions, including Europe 
and the United States. The focus of the conference was the relevance of NOD for these 
regions.  Cawthra and Siko, both MRG members, did a presentation on NOD with regard to 
South Africa and Southern Africa at this seminar.  Networking on NOD thinking took place 
through international seminars and the MRG took part in the networking.   
 
Non-governmental organisations, mainly from Europe, saw the period after 1994 as a 
“window of opportunity” to share their views on how to change military affairs in South 
Africa.49  Some generous funding was made available from donor countries that wanted to 
help create a peaceful Southern African region.  The most prominent donor countries were 
Denmark and Norway, especially since they supported the ANC prior to 1994. Donor money 
was aimed at establishing democratic values and transition in South Africa.  Denmark played 
the most prominent role to introduce NOD ideas to South Africa, mainly through peace 
researchers from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI). Denmark also 
provided some money to the MRG.50 Nordic countries and NGOs played a significant role to 
introduce and fund projects that promoted NOD in South Africa.  
 
The Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), which forms part of the Danish 
Foreign Ministry, funded several projects in South Africa.51  Denmark’s motivation for funding 
these projects was to “…imprint its image on South Africa…help them become like us”.  
DANIDA funded the projects of Mφller (from COPRI) in South Africa, who had several 
meetings with the MRG to discuss NOD. DANIDA also funded the establishment of the 
Defence Management Programme in 1993 in co-operation with Cawthra at the University of 
the Witwatersrand, which later became the Centre for Defence and Security Management.   
 
In 1994, the first course of the Defence Management Programme also became the first ever 
course attended by representatives from all the statutory, and non-statutory armed forces, 
Armscor and Denel.52  NOD was presented as a theme in the defence planning module of 
the programme and Mφller facilitated it.53  This course was not attended by people who were 
on the Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee (JMCC), or those who later became involved in 
the defence policy process, but rather by people from middle management levels in the 
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various armed forces.54  DANIDA and COPRI were thus involved in introducing NOD ideas to 
the various armed forces in South Africa. 
 
Denmark also sponsored several short study tours for South African politicians and members 
of the Department of Defence to Europe, including countries such as Denmark.55  During 
these study tours South Africans were introduced to NOD ideas.  
 
Other NGOs, such as the Commonwealth Institute, were also involved to promote NOD 
ideas in South Africa by writing papers on NOD, which involved authors such as Connetta 
and Knight.56  The Study Group on Alternative Security Policy (SAS) was also involved in 
writing papers and interacting with policy-makers.  Unterseher from the SAS had meetings 
with South African politicians and tried to convince them to accept the “spider in the web-
model” of NOD.      
 
Although NOD's relevance declined after the Cold War and funding for Peace Research 
decreased, NOD proponents maintained their transnational network connections and 
exported NOD ideas, among other to South Africa.  The transition in South Africa was seen 
as a window of opportunity to promote NOD in South Africa.  This was done in co-operation 
with MRG members working in NGOs and with funding provided by Nordic countries and 
Denmark in particular.  Through COPRI, DANIDA provided funding for the MRG, 
international NOD conferences, study tours in Europe and local academic programmes that 
included NOD themes.  The Scandinavian countries, therefore, mainly promoted NOD rather 
than strong powers and the former directed the new security idea and NOD in South Africa. 
 
1.4 The Role of the Military Research Group to Promote NOD   
 
Members of the MRG promoted NOD, because it suited their views on defence 
transformation, as well as the ANC’s policy objectives.  MRG members also had close links 
with European peace researchers and they co-operated to advance NOD.   
 
The promotion of NOD in South Africa was a process of interaction between MRG members, 
local and foreign NGOs, with ANC policy-makers. ANC politicians were receptive for inputs 
on defence issues from NGOs, such as COPRI and the Centre for Conflict Resolution 
(CCR).57  The MRG had close links with the ANC and the NGO community, which enabled it 
to organise conferences and seminars that could influence policy-makers.58 The ANC was 
therefore receptive to NOD ideas conveyed through local and foreign NGO’s. 
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Members of the MRG were also part of NGOs to run projects for donor countries,59 since the 
latter were looking in particular for local NGOs to manage projects in South Africa.  In March 
1996 for example, Cawthra and Mφller collaborated in organising the Conference on the 
Defence Restructuring of the Armed Forces in Southern Africa in Helderfontein, South Africa.  
This conference was organised by the Global Non-Offensive Defence Network and the 
Defence Management Programme, run by Cawthra at the University of the Witwatersrand 
(WITS).60  The conference was funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ford 
Foundation. A group of analysts shared their views at the conference by presenting papers, 
and NOD received much attention.61 The conference was attended by SANDF officers, 
defence officials and academics from Southern Africa. MRG members were part of local 
NGOs that implemented projects with foreign donor countries and NGOs to promote (among 
others) NOD ideas within the ANC and the defence community. 
 
Several members of the MRG were involved in introducing NOD to the ANC and the defence 
community namely: Cawthra, Williams and Nathan.62  Their motivation in this regard was to 
change the former offensive defence policy to a defensive approach, because they realised 
that South Africa had to build confidence among Southern African countries. They also 
considered NOD as a way to “…clip the wings…” of the SADF in South Africa.63  It was a 
central pillar of the MRG aims to weaken the power of the SADF. 
 
Cawthra, Williams and Nathan shared similarities that enabled them to influence ANC policy.  
All three had close political links with the ANC, took part in the struggle against apartheid, 
were connected to NGOs to receive overseas funding for projects on defence 
transformation, and they researched defence-related issues. Struggle credentials and 
interpersonal relationships formed during the fight against apartheid determined an 
individual’s influence on the defence policy-process.64 All three obtained postgraduate 
degrees from universities in the United Kingdom and introduced the new security paradigm 
to South Africa.65  While they were studying in Britain they were invited to seminars on NOD, 
which promoted international networking on this debate.66 A small group of MRG members 
was, therefore, able to influence ANC policy and the South African defence debate with NOD 
thinking, which meant that the debate was personality driven.  
 
The MRG member who had the most significant influence on the South African defence 
policy framework was Nathan.67 He was a well-known anti-apartheid activist and leader of 
the End Conscription Campaign in South Africa during the apartheid era.68  Nathan was 
respected by ANC politicians for his legal expertise, his insight and hard work.69 Since the 
early 1990s, Nathan became the unofficial advisor to Kasrils, who later became the Deputy 
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Minister of Defence.70  Nathan became the most influential MRG member through his 
association with the Ministry of Defence.  
 
Nathan acknowledged that, although he and other MRG members had strong sociological 
foundations, they were not defence experts at all.71  He and other members had to devote 
themselves to studying in order to obtain better knowledge on defence issues.  At the end of 
the 1980s, Nathan enrolled for a doctorate in Peace Studies at Bradford University in the 
United Kingdom.72 His personal view about the military was to close it down.73  Nathan’s later 
advocacy of NOD could to some extent be considered as a departure from this view. 
Nathan’s views were subsequently mainly influenced in this regard by the Palme 
Commission’s report, the new security thinking of Buzan, the work of Booth74, and Finan’s 
notions, which suggested NOD and disarmament for South Africa.75 It is fair to state that 
Nathan’s knowledge on defence issues were influenced by NOD and Peace Studies.         
 
Nathan’s views and publications influenced ANC policy, the Interim Constitution of 1993 and 
the White Paper on Defence.76  The sections on defence and security in the ANC's 
guidelines as the ruling party contained in Ready to Govern were largely based on Nathan’s 
article, entitled “Principles of Defence in a Democracy”.77  Ready to Govern, called for a 
defensive orientation, posture and strategy.78  The NOD principle of a defensive doctrine and 
posture also appeared in the Interim Constitution, which stated that the SANDF would be 
"…primarily defensive in the exercise or performance of its power and functions".79 Nathan’s 
views influenced the ANC’s policy, the Interim Constitution and the White Paper on Defence, 
which later also determined the policy framework of the Defence Review.     
 
Principles of NOD were promoted on the Transitional Executive Council’s Sub-Council on 
Defence and the JMCC, which were both charged with drawing up a new threat analysis as 
the basis for defence policy.80  The MRG advocated policies, such as common security and 
NOD through its involvement in these committees.81  Many of the MRG’s ideas were 
accepted in the transitional process and were also apparent in the Joint Military Co-
ordinating Committee (JMCC) agreement. This agreement encompassed all the armed 
forces, and their political principles contributed to the military integration process, which 
adopted the Interim Constitution’s principles, including the principle of strategic 
defensiveness.82  In terms of the JMCC-agreement South Africa would promote common and 
mutual security in the region through mutual confidence and trust.  It also stated that South 
Africa would adopt a “non-threatening” force structure in relationship to the region and that 
arms races would be discouraged.  Basic NOD principles were, therefore, accepted by the 
JMCC and the Sub-Council on Defence.  
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The ANC was receptive to NOD ideas from local and foreign NGOs and the MRG played a 
prominent role to facilitate this.  A few individuals in the MRG promoted NOD ideas in the 
ANC as an approach to neutralise the power of the military in South Africa. Nathan became 
the most influential MRG member in the defence policy process.  His work influenced ANC 
policy, the Interim Constitution and the White Paper on Defence.   
 
2. THE DRAFTING OF THE WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE 
 
The defence community in South Africa identified the need to draft a new White Paper on 
Defence after the 1994 general elections, which could create a framework for defence 
transformation.83  In 1995, Modise, the Minister of Defence, presented plans to the Joint 
Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) for the acquisition of ships and submarines for the 
SA Navy to replace its obsolete systems.84  The JSCD rejected these proposals and insisted 
that the “..legitimacy of the defence force…be tested before new acquisitions could be 
approved.”85  The White Paper on Defence had to provide the policy framework for the 
transformation of South African defence.     
 
2.1 Efforts to Establish a Defence Policy Process 
 
In early 1995, the Defence Headquarters submitted a draft defence policy paper to the 
Defence Secretariat and the Defence Headquarters staff in order to have a new force design 
approved, but the Secretariat rejected it as a unilateral product that had not been broadly 
consulted outside the military.86  The Secretariat, which was just getting off the ground, then 
started to draft a Green Paper together with the IDP, which was rejected by JSCD on the 
basis that it was not approved by the Minister of Defence and was declared void.87  Although 
the SANDF and Secretariat's draft documents entailed thorough strategic defence 
appreciations, they lacked a normative content, which were important to the politicians, 
especially considering their intentions to transform and integrate the various armed forces 
into the SANDF. The military’s focus was on four aspects: the size and structure of the 
SANDF, development and training of personnel, the procurement process, and the defence 
budget.88  On the other hand the normative foundation for the White Paper on Defence was 
of primary importance to the legislative.           
 
The haphazard attempts from the SANDF and the Secretariat to formulate defence policy did 
not correspond with the Constitution. According to the Constitution, the Minister of Defence 
has to take responsibility for defence.89 In addition, only a cabinet minister or a deputy 
minister may introduce a draft White Paper to the legislative.90 The Constitution further 
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determines that a civilian Secretariat for Defence function under the direction of the Minister 
of Defence.91  Most of the SANDF and the Secretariat’s leadership consisted of former MK or 
SADF officers, who had no policy analysis experience, and to make matters worse, there 
was no clarity about their respective roles. The SANDF and Secretariat’s early attempts to 
establish a defence policy process failed. 
 
The Minister of Defence then came under pressure to promote a new and appropriate 
defence policy for South Africa.92  According to Kasrills (former Deputy Minister of Defence), 
the purpose of this policy was not only important to transform the SANDF: “…establishing 
this policy, and defence capability, will provide the certainty upon which other states can 
base their interaction with us…the clarity of our message will create certainty in the minds of 
others as to our motives and intentions, and will eliminate the possibility of 
miscalculations...".93  Preventing miscalculations indicates the security dilemma logic 
associated with NOD thinking.  The formulation of a new defence policy had to be an 
extension of foreign policy to establish peaceful interstate relations and the underlying 
thinking in this regard clearly reflected NOD. 
 
The Minister instructed the Deputy Minister of Defence to personally attend to a speedy 
finalisation of a White Paper on Defence.94  The Deputy Minister had to supervise the whole 
process. The Deputy Minister then approached Nathan and offered him the post as lead 
drafter for the White Paper.95 Nathan agreed to accept it on the condition that his article 
Principles of Defence in a Democracy would serve as the basis for the draft.96  The defence 
policy principles contained in this article enjoyed the support of Defence Minister Modise, 
since it appeared in 1992.97  This article was later published in the South African Defence 
Review under the title “Beyond Arms and Armed Forces: A New Approach to Security”.98  In 
this article Nathan argued that NOD and CSBM’s (confidence and security building 
measures) should be implemented to reorientate the military’s doctrine and structure.99  
Nathan insisted that his publications, which also advocated NOD, serve as a basis for the 
White Paper.   
 
The Ministry of Defence accepted Nathan’s terms. The CCR was then contracted by the 
Department of Defence100 to consult government on defence policy and Nathan, as a 
member of the CCR, was officially appointed as drafter for the White Paper process.101 This 
was a historic appointment and the first time that a civil society organisation became 
involved in the defence debate.102  It was also the first time that the military did not formulate 
policy on its own. The responsibility to draft defence policy shifted from the military to the 
Ministry and an NGO.    
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A democratic policy framework for defence transformation was of the utmost importance to 
government.  The Defence Ministry supported Nathan’s normative ideas in publications that 
also supported NOD.  This was reflected in the Ministry’s intention to prevent miscalculations 
(the security dilemma) regarding defence policy.  Nathan was appointed as the drafter of the 
White Paper, which meant that the responsibility to formulate defence policy devolved to an 
NGO (CCR).        
 
2.2 The Influence of The Changing of the Guard 
 
A significant part of Nathan’s book on defence policy, The Changing of the Guard (1994) 
appeared in the final White Paper on Defence.103  This book was the culmination of his 
earlier work to establish a coherent framework for a new defence policy. Nathan's 
suggestions in this book were largely based on views shared by ANC Members of 
Parliament.104  Many of the views expressed in this book also emerged from MRG 
debates.105  The Changing of the Guard was supported by ANC members and created a 
framework for the White Paper on Defence.      
 
In this book, Nathan pronounced himself in favour of common security and NOD as 
alternatives to the “offensive defence” approach of the SADF during the Cold War.106  He 
argued that “…South Africa will undermine its own security if its doctrine and posture invoke 
insecurity in the states around it.”107  He argued for the acceptance of NOD in South African 
defence policy, but added that ”…non-offensive defence in South Africa need not to be as 
complex as that suggested for countries in heavily armed regions.”  In the absence of a clear 
military threat in Southern Africa, Nathan argued for the downscaling of South Africa’s 
offensive capabilities and made the following suggestions based on NOD:  
 
a. The reduction of armed forces to levels commensurate to neighbouring states; 
 
b. A volunteer reserve that should be the bulk of the fighting force and can only 
be mobilised over a long period, ruling out its use for surprise attack; 
 
c. Limiting the number of predominantly offensive weapons such as tanks, 
heavy and medium infantry fighting vehicles, long range bombers, ground-
attack aircraft and ballistic missiles; 
 
d. Neighbouring states should be given adequate notice of major training 
manoeuvres and could be invited to send observers to these exercises; and 
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e. Undertaking CSBMs, which provide for greater transparency. 
 
All these principles were later accepted in the White Paper on Defence108, although 
suggestions for disarmament in the White Paper did not make specific reference to 
downscaling certain weapon systems, as suggested in sub-paragraph C (above). 
Consequently not all of Nathan’s force design suggestions in The Changing of the Guard 
became policy.109  
 
Being the official drafter of the White Paper, Nathan's publications, in which he advocated 
NOD, served as a basis for the Draft White Paper.  Several NOD principles in his work 
became policy, for instance: the downsizing of the military, a small volunteer force, warning 
of exercises and confidence and security building measures.  
 
2.3 The Formal Drafting of the White Paper 
 
In June 1995, the first draft of the White Paper, which was drafted by Nathan, was published 
and citizens and Parliament were invited to comment on it.110 This first draft was largely 
based on Nathan's earlier publications.111 Over 90 submissions were received from political 
parties, NGOs, defence analysts, the SANDF and the public.112 After considering these 
submissions, three further drafts were produced with inputs from the JSCD, the Portfolio 
Committee on Defence, the SANDF and the Secretariat. 
 
After the first draft was distributed, substantial amendments were incorporated.113  During 
personal sessions between Nathan and the Chief of the SANDF with his staff officers, an 
extensive process of inputs, feedback, debating and redrafting took place.114  In some cases 
matters were discussed with the Minister for closure. The White Paper process was 
characterised by intensive debating about almost every paragraph between the drafter and 
the military. Many of the SANDF’s inputs were, however, not included in subsequent 
drafts.115  
 
The JSCD held four special sessions to obtain inputs with regard to the Draft White Paper. 
The MRG was influential with the JSCD and some of the JSCD’s members were also active 
members of the MRG.116 The JSCD went through every paragraph of drafts, to achieve 
multiparty support for the document.117 The JSCD’s main concerns were the transformation 
and demobilisation of the military, and not the technical aspects of defence.  The posture of 
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the SANDF was, however, a major debate in which NOD principles featured, but the term 
“non-offensive defence” was deliberately avoided by those who were familiar with it.118   
 
Non-offensive defence principles featured in the JSCD’s debates about military posture, but 
MRG members deliberately refrained from using the term “non-offensive defence” during 
these debates.119  There was a realisation that NOD principles would not be accepted by all 
parties by using this term. NOD principles were promoted in a subtle way and the focus was 
on common security and CSBM principles, rather than a structural inability to attack.120  
Although NOD principles were emphasised, Nathan and other MRG members did not argue 
for a pure NOD model to be followed.  NOD principles were promoted in a subtle way among 
the JSCD. 
 
There was some intensive debate about Nathan’s argument to remove manifestly offensive 
weapons in which the JSCD and the military took part.121  Defining “manifestly offensive” 
weapons was a matter that the SANDF constantly commented on.  In this debate the 
principle of having a power projection capability was quite a contentious issue and the 
SANDF made a major effort to emphasise the necessity of a strategic capability.122  
Manifestly offensive weapons was a contentious issue in the defence debate.   
 
 
Nathan and Kasrils controlled the process of amending every version of draft policy, after 
receiving inputs and demands from Parliament, the military and the public.123  The Minister 
mostly paid attention to the principles and the broader layout.124 Although drafts were 
published for comment, it was largely a closed process without national consultation.125  The 
final authority to make revisions for a draft rested with Kasrils, yet in all (but a few cases) he 
followed Nathan’s recommendations, which indicates that the process was personality driven 
in a closed loop.126  It should be added though, that Nathan formulated his policy inputs in 
such a way that Kasrils would accept it.127  Nathan, as the appointed drafter of the White 
Paper on Defence, had a primary influence on the drafting of policy, but he drafted it 
according to the Ministry’s preferences and policy positions.  The Ministry (the executive) 
had the power to determine the content of the White Paper on Defence.    
 
Lobbying usually involves “… direct efforts by representatives of pressure groups to 
influence public officials to act as the groups wish”.128  A prerequisite for successful lobbying 
is access, and the usual techniques of persuasion are: formal presentations, threats about 
re-election and bribes. From a lobbying perspective, the CCR’s direct access to and 
involvement in the Ministry of Defence through Nathan, could be viewed as a form of “ideal” 
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lobbying, which made the usual lobbying techniques unnecessary. Nathan’s success to 
predetermine the content of draft defence policy may be viewed as unconstrained lobbying 
and the privatisation of policy-making.  
 
Intensive debate took place between the drafter, the SANDF and the JSCD about almost 
every paragraph of draft policy.  The military was not able to determine policy as in the past. 
Several MRG members on the JSCD were well positioned to promote common security and 
CSBM principles of NOD in a subtle way.  The drafting of policy was controlled by Nathan 
and Kasrils, although Nathan had to reflect the Ministry’s preferences.  As a member of an 
NGO, Nathan’s influence on the White Paper could be viewed as unrestricted lobbying and 
an example of the privatisation of policy-making. Considering that all role-players, including 
Nathan, could not entirely determine policy, the defence policy-making process was a 
competition of ideas between groups on the one hand and between individuals on the other.   
 
2.4 A Compromise Between Realism and Idealism 
 
While the policy-makers supported idealist principles, such as NOD, the SANDF supported a 
realist view of security129.  The SANDF accepted that it had to perform secondary roles, but 
emphasised its primary role within the Constitution, which entails the protection of the 
country’s territorial integrity and its people.130   
 
The Chief of the SANDF, Meiring, maintained the traditional and a geo-strategic approach 
towards the defence of South Africa.  Although he acknowledged the non-military security 
problems in Southern Africa such as poverty, illiteracy, disease, overpopulation and drought, 
he nevertheless argued for the maintenance of a strong military.131  In the SANDF annual 
report of 1994/1995, Meiring argued that as South Africa entered into a new phase of 
relations with neighbouring states, new security challenges could only be addressed by 
establishing a strong military balance of power.132  During the White Paper process, he also 
argued that an analysis of the strategic environment should serve as the point of departure 
for the process.133 This argument was not accepted and a normative framework was rather 
used.  The policy-makers supported a normative approach to defence policy-making, while 
the SANDF supported a realist approach.  
 
The JSCD considered the so-called “soft-issues” – such as civil-military relations, civic 
education, affirmative action and environmental issues – as the top priority, rather than the 
SANDF’s concerns for “hard issues”, such as military roles and functions.134  In addition the 
JSCD was also committed to understand the posture of the military, its roles and functions, 
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capabilities and operational concepts.  The JSCD and the SANDF leadership had different 
priorities and perspectives regarding matters that had to be addressed in defence policy.   
 
The opposing views within the defence debate were made possible by the broad view of 
security within the South African Constitution.  The Constitution focuses on both the security 
of the individual and the nation as a whole.135  Some compromise had to be reached 
between these extreme views in order to achieve consensus.  According to Bachelor, “…the 
contradictions between the traditional and new approaches to security which exist side by 
side in the White Paper have come about as a result of a process of compromise between 
the old and new, which is an essential feature of the ‘negotiated revolution’.”136            
 
The military accepted much of the new framework for defence policy.  Although the SANDF 
debated all issues, it did not argue with politicians about the essence of the White Paper.137  
The SANDF accepted many of the political changes and transformation that had to occur in 
the military.  The SANDF was not interested in determining the political framework of the 
White Paper, but it rather wished to be enabled to have a major input regarding the planning 
process.138  The posture of the SANDF and maintaining a balanced defence force primarily 
for defence, were important issues for the military.  The SANDF wanted to maintain a strong 
military and it had to aim to achieve a compromise with policy-makers on almost every policy 
decision to promote its interests in this regard. 
 
The SANDF’s argument for a strong military was met half-way through a compromise with 
policy-makers, which entailed the idea of a Core-Force.  The Core-Force idea was also a 
compromise for the military.139  The potential for this compromise with policy-makers was 
reflected in the ANC’s submission and feedback regarding the draft of the Defence White 
Paper, which stated: “While we embrace this principle [disarmament and demilitarisation] this 
however does not mean that our offensive capacity must be blunted”.140  The Core-Force 
concept in the White Paper was a compromise between the military and policy-makers.   
 
The inclusion of the Core-Force idea in the White Paper was the result of informal 
discussions and correspondence between Nathan and the SANDF’s then Director Strategy 
Le Roux (a former Air Force general).141  Le Roux explained the Core-Force concept in an 
informal letter to Nathan as the “…immediate ready first line of defence for short term 
contingencies as well as those elements of the Defence Force that will serve as the basis for 
growth to meet longer term, more predictable contingencies”.142  The content of this letter 
appeared almost verbatim in the White Paper.143 The White Paper explained the Core-Force 
as: “…the ability to expand the size of the Defence Force to appropriate force levels within a 
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realistic warning period should the threat situation deteriorate significantly…it does not 
require a large standing force. Instead, the SANDF will comprise a relatively small Regular 
Force and a sufficiently large part-Time Force”.144 The informal communication between 
Nathan and Le Roux had an influence on the inclusion of the Core-Force concept in chapter 
4 of the White Paper.145  In the event the military was able to significantly influence Chapter 4 
of the White Paper, which discussed the SANDF’s roles and functions.        
 
The White Paper on Defence was approved by Parliament in May 1996, after three special 
sessions of the JSCD and its approval by the cabinet.146  Prior to this, in July 1995, the 
Minister of Defence Modise, appointed the first Defence Review Work Group, with Le Roux 
as the convenor, to commence planning for a comprehensive Defence Review process on 
the basis of the government policy and the Defence White Paper.  Initially this committee 
only consisted of members in the Secretariat, the SANDF and the Ministry, but was later 
expanded to include other interest groups and civil society before the formal drafting began.  
 
The SANDF and policy-makers had different policy priorities and world-views on defence 
matters.  The military had a realist approach and wished to maintain a strong and balanced 
defence force.  The policy-makers, however, had a normative approach and considered non-
military issues – such as civil-military relations and transforming the SANDF – as the 
pressing policy issues.  These diverging views were the result of a broadly formulated 
Constitution and the compromise that was reached, entailed the establishment of a Core-
Force capability. 
 
2.5 The Military’s Unfamiliarity with NOD 
 
The White Paper on Defence underlined the already strong support for a defensive posture. 
Although the White Paper emphasised the concept '”defensive posture”, it did not explain 
how it should be implemented.147  The White Paper merely highlighted that operations 
should be conducted within the guidelines of international law and that the adoption of a 
defensive and non-threatening military posture would contribute to promoting confidence and 
positive relationships in Southern Africa.  The policy-makers of the White Paper left the 
strategic and technical implications of the constitutional provision of the SANDF's primarily 
defensive posture for the Defence Review process.  The NOD principle of a defensive 
posture had to be operationalised, but the SANDF was unfamiliar with NOD.   
 
According to Meiring, “non-offensive defence” was an unknown term in military circles during 
the White Paper process.148  The MRG members refrained from using the term NOD during 
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discussions with the SANDF, because they knew that the military would not consider NOD 
principles under this label.149  Senior officers of the SANDF were only introduced to the idea 
of NOD during the Conference on Defence Restructuring of the Armed Forces in Southern 
Africa in Helderfontein, early in 1996, when the White Paper process was almost finalised.150  
NOD was a new idea to former SADF members and this notion was not studied at the 
military colleges.151   
 
Le Roux, who attended the conference in Helderfontein, was influenced by NOD thinking 
and supported certain NOD principles.152  He later became instrumental in the Defence 
Review process as a member of the second DRWG and he also saw to it that  NOD became 
part of the debate.  Some of his staff officers who later became involved in the drafting of the 
Defence Review, also attended the Helderfontein conference.153  Although NOD thinking did 
not significantly alter their views about defence, they understood the usefulness of certain 
principles, which they filtered through into policy debates and the final Defence Review, 
which included the inclusion of Option 4 and the term “confidence-building defence”.154  
SANDF members who became involved in the Defence Review process supported certain 
NOD principles and included it in the debates.      
 
Non-offensive defence was an unknown term in military circles and senior SANDF officers on 
the DRWG were introduced to its meaning only in 1996.  These officers subsequently 
supported certain NOD principles and brought it into the Defence Review debates.  The 
military did not necessarily oppose NOD, but rather accepted its language as part of its force 
posture.  
 
3. THE DEFENCE REVIEW PROCESS 
 
The policy framework of the White Paper on Defence was used as the basis for the Defence 
Review and its underlying assumptions were not open for discussion.155  The motivation 
behind the Defence Review was to ensure that the Core-Force capability (emphasised in the 
White Paper) was affordable, and to establish a future force design for the SANDF.156  The 
White Paper served as the given policy framework for the Defence Review, which had to 
establish a force design for the SANDF.   
 
3.1 The Defence Review Work Group  
 
The MRG member who played a key role in the Defence Review process, was Williams.157  
Williams was an academic who served as an MK commander, integrated into the SANDF, 
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and then moved to the Defence Secretariat where he served as Director Defence Policy. The 
Deputy Minister of Defence appointed Williams as a member from the Secretariat to convene 
the second Defence Review Work Group (DRWG), which was expanded to include three 
members from the JSCD, a representative from the Part-Time Forces, a representative from 
the defence industry, representatives from NGOs and academics.158  Another MRG member 
who played a significant role during this process was Cawthra, who worked as a consultant 
on various sub-committees and served on the DRWG.159  Other members of the DRWG who 
played prominent roles were: Le Roux as the Director Strategy (and representative of the 
Chief SANDF) and Sendall, the administrator of the DRWG.160 Nathan was also a member of 
the DRWG, but was not much involved except when the DRWG reported to the JSCD at 
Parliament in Cape Town.161  The drafting of the Defence Review, like the White Paper, was 
largely co-ordinated by an MRG member. 
 
The DRWG established sub-committees that took responsibility for every chapter of the 
Defence Review.162  As part of the consultative process, the Secretariat distinguished 
between stakeholders and interest groups.163  The most important group was the  
stakeholders, which consisted of Public Service departments, trade unions, the SANDF, the 
defence industry and Parliament.  The DRWG focussed its efforts on achieving consensus 
among the stakeholders.  The views of interest groups, which consisted of academics, 
NGOs, research institutes and civil society organisations were taken into account and 
representatives from such groups were invited to serve on the sub-committees.  Interest 
groups on gay rights for example, served on the Human Resources sub-committee.  
Although the DRWG focussed on reaching consensus within the defence community, it 
broadly consulted civil society and interest groups too.            
 
Since the White Paper process was a relatively closed process, the DRWG wished to ensure 
that the Defence Review process would be a more open debate, involving civil society.164  
The DRWG obtained inputs through discussions with other departmental governing bodies, 
and also held national as well as consultative conferences in all the provinces.  After the final 
national consultative conference, The JSCD held a series of public hearings, before the 
Defence Review was finally presented to cabinet and Parliament for approval.  
 
The DRWG worked in virtual isolation from the top echelons of the SANDF to complete the 
Defence Review, which was a Ministerial project, but received little administrative and moral 
support from the formal channels of the SANDF.165  The hardliners in the SANDF tried not to 
support it, which largely isolated senior officers on the DRWG.  For instance, there was no 
budget for the Defence Review process and the DRWG had no budget manager.  Some 
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consultants were appointed to hold workshops and drafted contracts, but their contracts 
were not managed properly, to the extent that some were never paid for their services.  Only 
when the Minister became aware of the non-payments of services, was there some 
improvement, but the Minister was powerless to improve the whole situation.  There was little 
interest from the SANDF to become involved in the process, until the force design aspects 
became debated.166  The DRWG received little support from the hardliners in the SANDF, 
which had little initial interest to support the drafting of the Defence Review. 
 
The aim of the Defence Review was to create an affordable Core-Force design for the 
SANDF.  A DRWG was established in 1997 to draft this policy and in common with the White 
Paper process, it was co-ordinated by an MRG member.  The Defence Review process was 
more consultative to involve civil society than the White Paper process, but consensus in the 
defence community was a priority.  Initially the DRWG worked in virtual isolation from the 
support of formal SANDF channels. 
 
3.2 The Drafting of the Defence Review  
 
Since an initial reluctance of the SANDF leadership to attend the first consultative 
conference of the DRWG, progressive senior officers became actively involved with the 
DRWG and many chaired some of its sub-committees.167  Progressive officers provided 
expert inputs in the defence debates and spent much time debating issues with the JSCD 
and civil society at regional conferences. Those officers’ involvement in the policy-process 
was essential for the broadening of policy-makers’ understanding of defence issues and they 
contributed towards the content of the policy itself.   
 
During the drafting of the White Paper, politicians and their advisors had a primary influence 
on the content of the White Paper. During the Defence Review process however, the SANDF 
started to play a more prominent role with the drafting of chapters, especially Chapters 4-8, 
which deal with more technical military matters.168 Outside the SANDF there was little 
expertise to draft the Defence Review chapters dealing with these details.  SANDF officers, 
therefore, chaired most of the sub-committees.  Le Roux played a prominent role as chair of 
the sub-committees that were engaged with Chapters 1-8, entitled: the introduction, defence 
posture and doctrine, self-defence and the peace-time force, regional security co-operation, 
international peace support operations, co-operation with the South African Police Service, 
non-military tasks, while Chapter Eight related to the force design options.  Chapter 9 on 
force structure was driven by Uys (a Navy Admiral), Chapter 10 on human resources was 
chaired by Van der Poel (former Army general), Chapter 11 on the part-time force was 
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headed by Bakkes (a Navy Admiral), Chapter 12 on land and the environment was guided by 
Sendall and Cordier (a retired general), and the chapter on the acquisition management 
process was chaired by C. Shaick and Sendall.      
 
One sub-committee was engaged on both force posture and force design under the 
chairmanship of Le Roux, and he played a significant role to draft these two chapters.169  The 
committee consisted (among others) of Colonels Wilcock (Air Force), Golis (Army), Navy 
Captains Higgs and Christian, three parliamentarians who included Kota, Motlekane,  
Marais, as well as Cilliers and Sass (both from the Institute for Security Studies).  This sub-
committee and its military members in particular, did most of the planning and drafting of the 
chapters on force design and posture, but its contents as a whole was debated and 
scrutinised by the JSCD. The parliamentarians could not attend all sub-committee work 
sessions, but they were kept up to date with progress and their approval was always 
necessary to make submissions.170  During the Defence Review process, the military played 
a prominent role in drafting, although all inputs were scrutinised by the JSCD. 
 
All SANDF arms of service were represented on the force design and posture sub-
committee.  To a large extent the SA Navy and SA Air Force drove the intellectual defence 
debate about force posture, doctrine and force design.171  The locus of power was almost 
deliberately removed from the SA Army, which was traditionally more conservative than the 
other Arms of Service.  The Navy and Air Force played a leading role in the defence debates 
about posture, force design and doctrine. 
 
All drafts produced by sub-committees were presented to the Defence Command Council of 
the SANDF and the Defence Secretariat Board for approval.172 Only when these two bodies 
reached consensus, the sub-committees could submit drafts to the JSCD and the Council on 
Defence, which consisted of the Minister, the Chief of the SANDF and the Secretary for 
Defence for further approval.  The legislature, and specifically the JSCD (with an ANC 
majority), played a strong role throughout the Defence Review process by discussing drafts 
with the DRWG and civil society, but also within the ANC’s National Executive Committee.  
Whenever there was no consensus about certain issues, the Minister made final decisions 
and he took such matters to cabinet for approval.  The progress and finalisation of chapters 
was, therefore, a fragmented process.  The ultimate power to determine defence policy lay 
with the executive, although the legislature played a prominent role. 
 
Lobbyists did not play a significant role in the Defence Review process.173  Their views, 
arguments and concerns were heard, but they did not have much of an impact on policy.  
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Professional lobbyists, such as Terry Crawford-Browne, however, succeeded in shaping the 
debate.  His arguments and questions helped the SA Navy to formulate its motivations and 
arguments for new vessels in a better way.  Although lobbyists did not significantly influence 
defence policy, individuals helped to shape the debate.  
 
Compared to the White Paper process, the military played a more prominent role during the 
Defence Review process, especially on technical matters.  Progressive SANDF officers for 
instance chaired most sub-committees.  Although parliamentarians were part of the force 
posture and force design sub-committee, SANDF members did most of the planning and 
drafting.  This was driven largely by Navy and Air Force representatives.  Drafts were cleared 
with parliamentary members on the committee before submissions.  Before draft chapters 
were scrutinised by the JSCD and the Council on Defence, the Defence Command Council 
and the Defence Secretariat Board had to approve these. Lobbyists had little impact on 
policy-making. The ultimate power to formulate policy lay with the executive.  
 
3.3 Explaining the Defensive Posture with NOD  
 
Non-offensive defence was not actively promoted by the MRG after the White Paper on 
Defence was finalised.174  The limitations of NOD became apparent to MRG members.  Yet 
NOD thinking was instrumental in debates of the Defence Review process. NOD set the 
framework for the Defence Review to get underway and Williams saw this as NOD’s main 
usefulness.175   
   
The debate regarding NOD was an important part of the policy process to establish ways for 
policy-makers and defence officials to launch the debate. It served as a tool to unlock debate 
between the MRG members and the progressive senior officers with a military technocratic 
background.176  The NOD debate established a theoretical common ground between the 
“doves” and the military,177 and it provided a neutral framework to discuss defence issues 
and, therefore, served as a catalyst.178  
 
The Defence Review had to explain the “defensive posture”, which was highlighted in the 
White Paper in much more detail, as well as the force design. During the Defence Review 
process, attempts to explain the practical meaning of a primarily defensive posture entailed 
an examination of the concept “non-offensive defence”.179  Many principles of NOD were 
"borrowed" in order to broaden this concept.180  The terminology used in the Defence Review 
did not refer explicitly to “non-offensive defence”, and the content of policy documents often 
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served as a better indication.  The term “non-offensive defence” was avoided and the notion 
served to give substance to the principle of a defensive posture. 
 
In its original form NOD did not receive support from within the SANDF, as it posed a major 
challenge to its existing force structures and operational doctrine.181  A pure NOD model 
would have impacted severely on certain defence capabilities held dear by the Arms of 
Service chiefs, for example long-distance fighters, air refuelling, tanks and submarines.182  
As the SANDF’s traditional doctrine was challenged, it took the offensive during defence 
debates and the Defence Review process in particular.  The SANDF identified those threats 
that would require military preparedness.  The most likely threat scenario identified was the 
overflow of regional conflict and it was considered to be the most likely threat to national 
security.  The SANDF argued that South Africa could be pulled into a regional conflict as a 
result of refugees and illegal immigrants fleeing to the Republic.  The SANDF did not support 
pure NOD models.   
 
Direct reference to the term “non-offensive defence” was deliberately avoided during the 
Defence Review process because of its unpopularity among the more senior generals on the 
Defence Command Council.183  These senior mostly ex-SADF officers were sceptical about 
NOD and its ideas were regarded as philosophies of the "anti-militarists".  The understanding 
of NOD principles by most of the SANDF representatives taking part in the Defence Review 
process, was also limited and frequently based on misperceptions.  This limited the SANDF’s 
ability to debate these issues. The principles of NOD were nevertheless incorporated into 
defence policy within the concepts of “confidence-building defence” and “a primarily 
defensive posture”.184  This assisted in avoiding “resistance in principle” to the NOD 
principles that were essential as a basis for developing the concept of a primarily defensive 
orientation and posture. 
 
The SA Navy was the one Arm of Service that paid particular attention to the NOD debate in 
South Africa.  Its interest in this debate was to ensure that its proposal for the acquisition of 
patrol corvettes and later also submarines, was in line with the SANDF’s primarily defensive 
doctrine.185  A few well-respected senior naval captains were assigned to take part in the 
Defence Review process to promote the Navy’s interests, namely: Higgs and Christian.186  
With these representatives, the Navy participated in all possible policy processes and 
defence debates from which it could argue for new vessels.187  The Navy became interested 
in the NOD debate as one of the avenues to argue for acquiring new vessels.    
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Higgs wrote a chapter for the book published after the Defence Restructuring conference in 
Helderfontein, which was entitled: Defence Restructuring for the South African Navy: 
Uncharted Waters.188  He wrote the chapter from an NOD perspective, emphasised the 
strategic defensive roles of corvettes and submarines and argued that the profile of these 
vessels complemented the SANDF’s primarily defensive doctrine.189  He wrote this with the 
approval of the Chief of the Navy. 
 
In the final analysis the Navy managed to obtain public sentiment for new naval equipment, 
after much effort.190  Higgs was of the opinion that the SA Navy’s success to gain support for 
the acquisition of corvettes and submarines also made it possible for the SA Air Force to 
purchase new fighter aircraft.   
 
Although MRG members did not actively promote NOD during the Defence Review process, 
NOD ideas nevertheless served as a catalyst to launch the defence debate and to explain 
South Africa’s defensive posture in more detail.  Many NOD principles became policy, but 
pure NOD models were avoided, including the term “non-offensive defence”.  The SA Navy 
played an active role in the NOD debate in South Africa in order to obtain support for new 
corvettes and submarines.  NOD ideas were used to explain the strategic defensive role of 
these vessels, and it was, therefore, instrumental in more than one way in these defence 
debates. 
 
3.4 Non-offensive Defence as a Force Design Option 
 
The SANDF became much more interested in the Defence Review process when the force 
design debates commenced.191  This was coupled with more financial support from the 
SANDF when this debate opened, especially for the funding of Project Optimum.  
 
The auditing firm of Deloitte and Touche developed a quantitative computerised modelling 
programme (Project Optimum) for this analysis, which could also determine force design and 
estimated costs, with relative accuracy.192  The programme was used to generate four 
design options that were presented to the JSCD, Parliament and the Minister.193  Many 
outsiders did not comprehend Project Optimum which gave rise to some scepticism.  The 
advantage of this expensive programme was that it offered cost implications for selected 
force designs, which removed some pressure from the military to make proposals, and gave 
policy-makers a range of options in terms of force design.194 
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The methodology of the DRWG was to commence with a primary threat analysis by 
identifying a wide range of potential conflict scenarios that South Africa could face in 
future.195  Approximately 93 contingencies were identified, which were separately examined 
and ways to counter them were determined through operational analysis.  There was a 
calculated risk factor for every contingency, which was assessed in terms of probability and 
impact on the state.  This was a joint task undertaken by all Arms of Service.    
 
One of the four options debated and simulated, was an NOD-based model (Option 4), with 
significant air power capabilities.196 Le Roux’s personal interest in NOD thinking contributed 
to the inclusion of this defensive option in the Defence Review, which he also formulated.197  
He was of the opinion that NOD was theoretically attractive, but much work had to be done 
to make it more applicable to the South African situation.  Policy makers did not choose this 
option, who – despite their intent to change the SANDF’s pre-emptive strike doctrine to a 
more defensive one – also wanted to maintain a military capability that could give decision-
makers the option to utilise military power. NOD was useful as a very defensive option and 
benchmark in the force design debate, but had little applicability for the South African setting.    
 
Few people actively promoted NOD during the Defence Review process.198  MRG members 
on the DRWG understood the SANDF’s argument that South Africa’s foreign policy already 
made provision for peaceful coexistence with other countries (common security) and that it 
could not base its force design on NOD, because in future it would be called upon to perform 
peacekeeping duties in Africa, which requires certain power projection capabilities.  NOD 
was also too expensive to implement in South Africa.  The costing estimates about the NOD 
option indicated that it would be too expensive to implement.199 NOD was R 900 000 000 
more expensive than Option 1, which was eventually chosen.  It is revealing that when the 
NOD force design was used in war-gaming, it was found inadequate and in the event could 
not provide any deterrent capability.  As the defence debate progressed and political realities 
became clear, NOD became a less important feature. 
 
In May 1997, the DRWG submitted the four design options to cabinet, which passed the 
document on to the JSCD in October 1997.200  Both bodies approved Option 1, subject to the 
availability of finances.201 Option 1 entailed: a rapid deployment force consisting of a 
mechanised brigade and a parachute brigade; a special forces brigade; 26 infantry battalions 
and two medical battalion groups.202  The table below is a summary of the main systems that 
were approved for the force design:203 
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Table 1: The SANDF Force Design   
 
WEAPON SYSTEM AND  
ARM OF SERVICE 
QUANTITY 
SA Air Force  
Light Fighter 16 
Medium Fighters 32 
Combat Support Helicopters 12 
Maritime Helicopters 5 
Transport Helicopters 96 
SA Navy  
Submarines  4 
Corvettes 4 
 
Sources: The Public Protector, Auditor General and National Director of Public Prosecutions, Joint Investigation 
 Report into the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages, November 2001, p 5; and Defence Review of 
 South Africa, Department of Defence, Pretoria:1 Military Printing Regiment, 1998, p 47-48. 
 
 
The force design planning was done by using quantitative modelling which provided cost 
implications.  An NOD-based model was one of the force design options that was debated.  
Although this option was not accepted by policy-makers because of its irrelevance and high 
cost, it served as an important benchmark for the debate.  
 
3.5 Non-offensive Defence Principles in SA Defence Policy 
 
South Africa has accepted several principles of NOD in its defence policy, which was 
facilitated by the adoption of civil control over the military, accepting a defensive posture and 
predominantly defensive military structures. South Africa’s defensive orientation is reinforced 
through executive and parliamentary control over the employment of the SANDF.204  South 
Africa has accepted significant elements of NOD, which also appear in the Defence Review 
document: 
 
 a. Commitment to use force only within the context of international law, 
 b. Being strategically defensive, 
 c. Having no weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
 d. Having no manifestly offensive weapon systems, 
 e. Having limited power projection capabilities, 
 f. Support for the principle of territorial defence, and 
 g. Having a small professional force and a large reserve that will take a 
considerable time to mobilise.205 
 
The South African Constitution and White Paper on Defence committed South Africa to its 
obligations under international laws and treaties.206  The SANDF is, therefore, compelled not 
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to contravene any law relating to aggression and situations of armed conflict.  South Africa is 
bound to adhere to the United Nations Charter, which states that members shall refrain from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.  
 
South Africa has stated that strategically it will have a defensive posture and that its military 
structures will only be sufficient to protect “…military and economic assets against offensive 
actions by an aggressor”.207  This also suggests that South Africa is not interested in power 
projection capabilities for offensive strategic action.  In-flight refuelling and tank transport 
capabilities, which provide strategic reach, have nevertheless been retained.208  Other NOD 
principles that were accepted in South African defence policy entail transparency and 
confidence-building measures.209   South Africa has openly stated in its published defence 
policy that it does not have aggressive intentions towards other states.210  This policy also 
states that South Africa will pursue a "…common security regime, regional defence co-
operation and confidence- and security-building measures in Southern Africa".211  
 
The pure NOD principle of structural inability to attack did not appear in the Defence 
Review.212  The Defence Review does, however, emphasise that “…SANDF doctrine 
requires an emphasis on defensive rather than offensive force elements…”.213  This clause  
indicates the presence of NOD principles in defence policy and was aimed particularly at 
removing manifestly offensive weapons.   
 
Manifestly offensive weapons have been excluded from the force design of the SANDF.214  
The absence of weapons of mass destruction and overtly offensive weapons, such as long-
range missiles and bombers, in the force structure of the SANDF, are an indication of the 
above. South Africa has also signed most of the treaties on weapons of mass destruction, 
including the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxins Weapons 
Convention.215  South Africa stated that it abolished its nuclear weapons programme and 
signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992.  It also became an active sponsor of the African 
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.  
 
South Africa has accepted the principle of deterrence through a “credible defence capability” 
to prevent future conflict.216  It is argued that conventional deterrence can prevent armed 
conflict and will deter potential aggressors.  This is similar to the NOD principle of deterrence 
through denial.  The Defence Review also states that the defence capabilities of the SANDF 
should be strong enough to reverse the effects of foreign offensive action and be able to 
drive an opponent from own territory.217  The Defence Review supports the NOD principle of 
deterrence by denial.     
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The Defence Review set guidelines for operational doctrine, which state that the SANDF 
should be able to "…halt, contain and roll back such actions…”,218 which requires the 
appropriate offensive capabilities at the operational level such as deep interdiction.  This 
may be viewed as deviating from pure NOD models.  The SANDF will follow a counter-force 
approach, which entails deterrence that threatens to destroy enemy forces and capabilities 
rather than civilian institutions and populations.219  According to Williams, the SANDF’s 
operational strategy reflects a synthesis of defensive and offensive components.220   
 
The non-threatening deployment of forces is underlined by SA defence policy, which states 
that the force design of the SANDF should allow for the dispersion of forces, which will 
contribute towards confidence-building in the region.221  NOD entails deployments that are 
not threatening in manner or location.  Where practically and financially possible, mobile and 
offensive forces of the SANDF will be drawn from border areas to deeper internal bases.   
 
The location of South Africa's network of light infantry battalions across the country and 
mobile forces more towards the interior, demonstrates similarities with the ‘Spider in the 
Web’ model of NOD.222  The SANDF is an infantry-based defence force and the dispersion of 
its infantry units is an effective way to promote non-threatening deployment in terms of 
location, and shares similarities with NOD’s territorial defence in this regard.  It may 
consequently be concluded that South Africa’s defence is largely based on a mixed model of 
NOD.  This is clearly reflected in the SANDF’s operational doctrine, which provides for 
interdiction capabilities, as well as territorial and mobile defence elements. 
 
Several principles of NOD became policy namely: the use of force within the context of 
international law, strategic defensiveness, having no WMD or manifestly offensive weapons, 
limited power projection capabilities, territorial defence, and having a small professional force 
and a large reserve.  Structural inability to attack did not become policy, because certain 
operational, counter-attack and deterrent capabilities were deemed important.  The SANDF’s 
operational strategy, therefore, encompasses both offensive and defensive elements, which 
makes it comparable with mixed NOD models.  
 
3.6 Implications of NOD Principles  
 
Non-offensive defence principles in South African defence policy had no significant impact 
on the force design and structure of the SANDF.223  There is also no real application of a 
pure NOD model in South Africa. The small force-to-space ratio in South Africa prevents any 
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NOD model from being viable. South Africa needs a defence force that is able to  protect its 
extensive borders and for this purpose strategic reach is needed.   
 
Although pure NOD principles are not applied in South Africa, it did however have other 
implications. Firstly, the normative content of the White Paper on Defence and the Defence 
Review coincides with the Peace Research School of Thought, from which NOD derives.224 
South African defence policy, therefore, corresponds to the normative thinking associated 
with NOD. Secondly, NOD had a significant influence on the force posture chapter of the 
Defence Review and promoted confidence-building in the Southern African region225 in 
enabling South Africa to take a leading political role in the region, without posing a threat to 
other states.226  Thirdly, with regard to South Africa, NOD principles in defence policy eroded 
South Africa’s strategic lift capabilities and its ability to sustain operations over long 
distances.227  Those capabilities now have to be re-established with South Africa’s 
involvement in peacekeeping in the Great Lakes region.  Although NOD principles gave 
substance to normative policy ideals and also promoted confidence-building in the region, it 
seriously eroded the SANDF’s strategic lift capabilities. 
    
4. SUMMARY  
 
By 1990, the ANC as the future governing party in the new South Africa, lacked both a clear 
defence policy, and the capacity to formulate and analyse defence policy. This deficiency 
was addressed with the establishment of the Military Research Group, which consisted of 
ANC academics, politicians, intelligence and MK operatives. The MRG made policy 
recommendations on defence issues, which usually became government policy.  The MRG 
used networking, conferences, publications and training programmes to communicate its 
ideas, and was funded by pacifist organisations.   
 
Non-offensive defence thinking became part of MRG debates through its members who 
studied Peace Research and it became a specific research focus, from which policy options 
were formulated for the ANC.  NOD appealed to the ANC as a framework that could 
normalise relations with states in the region and lessen the military’s power in a democratic 
South Africa.   
 
After the Cold War, NOD advocates in Europe tried to keep NOD alive by maintaining their  
transnational connections and exporting NOD to (among others) South Africa, which entered 
a phase of transformation.  They promoted NOD mainly through COPRI and the MRG with 
Nordic funding, by hosting international conferences, workshops and study tours.  A great 
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deal of co-operation took place between the MRG and COPRI to promote NOD in South 
Africa. 
 
Williams, Cawthra and Nathan mainly promoted NOD ideas in the ANC. Nathan became the 
most influential MRG member during the defence policy process. The ANC accepted his 
policy proposals regarding defence, which influenced the Interim Constitution and the White 
Paper on Defence. Nathan’s views also enjoyed the support of the Ministry of Defence, 
which appointed him as drafter of the White Paper. Nathan used his publications, which 
promoted NOD as the framework for the Draft White Paper. Several NOD principles became 
policy, for instance: the downsizing of the military, a small volunteer force, regional warning 
of exercises and confidence and security building measures.  
 
During the drafting of the White Paper, the SANDF and the JSCD (which had several 
MRG/ANC members) debated almost every paragraph of draft policy. The JSCD played a 
prominent role in policy-making and the military was unable to determine policy as in the 
past. The drafting of the White Paper was controlled by Nathan and Kasrils, although Nathan 
was restricted to the Ministry’s preferences that largely formulated the policy. 
 
The SANDF and policy-makers had different policy priorities and world-views on defence 
issues.  The military maintained a realist approach and wanted to maintain a strong and 
balanced defence force. The policy-makers, however, had a normative approach and 
considered non-military issues and transforming the military as the pressing policy issues. A 
compromise was reached by accepting a Core-Force capability. 
 
Although MRG members on the JSCD promoted NOD principles, such as common security 
and CSBM-principles, during the defence policy-process, NOD was an unknown term in 
military circles.  After senior SANDF officers on the DRWG were introduced to the meaning 
of NOD, they supported certain principles and made it part of the Defence Review debates. 
 
The aim of the Defence Review was to create an affordable Core-Force design for the 
SANDF.  A DRWG was established in 1997, to draft this policy and similar to the White 
Paper process, it was co-ordinated by an MRG member (Williams).  The Defence Review 
process was more consultative to involve civil society than the White Paper process, but 
consensus within the defence community was more important.  
 
During the Defence Review process the military started to play a more prominent role in 
defence policy-making, because they had the expertise on technical military matters. 
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Progressive SANDF officers chaired most sub-committees, whilst the SA Navy and Air Force 
representatives largely drove these military debates.  Drafts still had to be cleared by 
parliamentarians on these committees.  Lobbyists had little impact on policy-making and the 
power to formulate defence policy was with the executive.  
 
Realising the limitations of NOD, the MRG did not promote this during the Defence Review 
process.  The military drafters’ interest in NOD, however maintained NOD as part of the 
defence debate and these ideas stimulated the defence debate in explaining the country’s 
defensive posture in more detail. Pure NOD models and the term “non-offensive defence” 
were avoided, but an NOD-based model was introduced by Le Roux as one of the force 
design options.  Although this option was not accepted because of its irrelevance and high 
cost, it served as a benchmark in the force design debate.  The SA Navy utilised the NOD 
debate and perspectives as part of its efforts to obtain support for new vessels, by explaining 
the strategic defensive roles of those vessels.   
 
Several principles of NOD became policy namely: the use of force within the context of 
international law, strategic defensiveness, having no WMD or manifestly offensive weapons, 
limited power projection capabilities, territorial defence, and having a small professional force 
and a large reserve.  Structural inability to attack did not become policy, because certain 
operational, counter-attack and deterrent capabilities were deemed important.  The SANDF’s 
operational strategy, therefore, has both offensive and defensive elements, which makes it 
comparable with mixed NOD models.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this chapter was to explain the influence of NOD in the defence policy-making 
process in South Africa since the early 1990s.  The main influence of NOD was its utility as a 
theoretical tool for interest groups, particularly the ANC and the military, to influence defence 
policy according to their preference, although there was an absence of full confidence in all 
NOD’s principles.   
 
Non-offensive defence was a theoretical tool in South Africa to influence defence policy in 
three ways: Firstly, it was used by the MRG to lessen the influence of the military in South 
Africa and to disarm it.  Secondly, NOD was used by Nathan to change South Africa’s 
military posture towards the defensive. Lastly, it was used by the DRWG to stimulate debate 
about force design options, especially by the SA Navy, which used it to promote support for 
new vessels. 
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The main way that NOD was promoted was through the MRG and its partners, such as 
COPRI. The MRG was established by the ANC to fill its void to formulate defence policy. 
With the help of the ANC and its leadership, especially the subsequent Deputy Minister of 
Defence, Kasrils, the MRG was involved on every single defence policy-making forum since 
the early 1990s and it promoted NOD in a subtle way on all those forums through every 
documentary stage.  NOD principles also appeared in all the policy documents.  NOD’s 
principles, especially the defensive posture, appeared in the Interim Constitution, the JMCC-
agreement, the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review.  NOD was promoted by 
the MRG on every forum of defence policy-making and some of its principles appeared in 
every policy document.   
 
Neither the military nor the policy-makers supported a pure model of NOD for South Africa. 
Structural-inability-to-attack was not a viable force structure option for South Africa with its 
extensive borders and low force-to-space ratio. NOD is also too expensive to implement. As 
in Europe, NOD had little relevance to South Africa, except some usefulness to improve 
inter-state relations in Southern Africa.  In this sense NOD added some content to the ANC’s 
policies in support of a strategic defensive posture and doctrine.   
 
The study also pays attention to the nature of policy-making in South Africa and some 
conclusions should be made in this regard.  During the White Paper process, the power to 
formulate policy resided mostly with the Ministry of Defence and Nathan as the drafter, which 
made it personality driven and largely a closed process for civil society.  Nathan’s influence 
can also be seen as a form of lobbying. The JSCD played a prominent role and like the 
SANDF, it debated almost every paragraph of the Draft White Paper. The Ministry, however, 
dominated this process.   
 
The Defence Review process was much more consultative and provided more opportunities 
for civil society to take part, although lobbying groups had little impact on policy.  During the 
Defence Review process the military started to play a more prominent role in formulating 
policy, especially on technical matters.  A shift had, therefore, taken place since the military’s 
marginalisation during the White Paper process.  The JSCD was still involved, but the 
military now did most of the drafting and planning on sub-committees.  The power to 
formulate policy during this process remained with the Ministry. 
 
The realist and idealist paradigms of the military and the policy-makers respectively, made 
compromise necessary during the policy-process. Eventually this made policy ambiguous 
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and impractical. The military wanted a strong defence force, while the policy-makers and the 
ANC in particular, wished to weaken the military. The following are examples of 
compromises that were made:  
 
a. Instead of a strong military, a Core-Force capability was approved with a 
 small standing force, but a large Part-Time Force.    
 
b. A deterrent capability with interdiction capabilities, but also emphasis on 
 defensive capabilities, no manifestly offensive weapons and relocating bases 
 to the interior. 
 
With the declining defence budget and no intended down-sizing, the Core-Force was 
unaffordable and the almost non-existence of the Part-Time Force made it impractical.  The 
existence of both deterrent and defensive ideas in policy makes it ambiguous.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this study was to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa 
since 1994, by describing how non-offensive defence became prominent.  Defence policy 
involves decisions and compromises made by various interest groups, within the framework 
of a state’s Constitution, legislation, clearing houses and bureaucracy. The aim of this 
concluding chapter is to describe the processes, role players and institutions that shaped 
South African defence policy since 1994.   
 
The first part of this chapter contains a summary of the main findings regarding the nature of 
defence policy-making in South Africa by revisiting the theoretical and descriptive chapters.  
The second part will cover the promotion of NOD in South Africa and its significance with 
regard to a better understanding of defence policy-making.  The last part is a conclusion of 
the main findings.   
 
1. DEFENCE POLICY-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
This section commences with a short overview of what public policy and defence policy 
entails within a pluralist framework of analysis.  The second part summarises the defence 
policy processes in South Africa according to the Constitution and established practice.  The 
last part will pay attention to the role and influence of various role-players in the making of 
South African defence policy.       
 
1.1 The Nature and Boundaries of Policy-making  
 
Public policy involves a series of decisions about what should be achieved (policy intent), 
and what is implemented.  Defence policy forms part of public policy, and could be defined 
as those decisions that affect the provision, deployment and use of military resources to 
protect and pursue the national interests of the state.  Defence policy exists in two worlds, 
namely the external dimension of international politics and the internal dimension of domestic 
politics.  It is shaped by public and private actors, as well as their beliefs and attitudes.  The 
variety of interests involved lead to compromise, rather than intellectual choices.  
 
The pluralist or interest group theory was used to demarcate the formulation of defence 
policy from other political aspects.  This theory is useful to explain role-players and alliances 
 105
in policy-making, and is applicable to South Africa’s constitutional principle of consultative 
policy-making.  
 
South Africa’s defence policy-making in the post-1994 period exhibited the following 
characteristics: Firstly, various organised interest groups were involved: civil society 
organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) - such as the CCR (Centre for 
Conflict Resolution) and ISS (Institute for Security Studies) -, lobbyists such as Terry 
Crawford-Browne, the legislature, government, the ANC (African National Congress) and the 
SANDF (South African National Defence Force).  All the various interest groups tried to 
influence defence policy, which made it a competitive process.  Secondly, defence policy did 
not only involve rational or intellectual decisions.  The involvement of various interest groups 
gave rise to compromise.  Thirdly, interest groups such as the MRG (Military Research 
Group) served as a source of expertise on defence thinking.   
 
South African defence policy-making was not pluralistic, as purists would understand it.  The 
assumption that political power is distributed fairly even between interest groups does not 
occur in South Africa.  The ANC used its majority in the legislature, the Sub-Council on 
Defence, and the JSCD (Joint Standing Committee on Defence), to offset the possibility of a 
power balance.  The involvement of the ANC leadership in party, parliamentary and 
government structures created a natural alliance with certain “interest groups”.  The 
involvement of the ANC’s MRG on every defence policy-making forum made the ANC the 
most influential interest group, and it also made MRG members the most influential role-
players.  Therefore, the ANC alliance, with its majority, structured the defence policy process 
rather than the institutions of the state.  The Department of Defence (DoD) did not have the 
expertise to significantly steer defence policy-making and the eventual expertise of the 
Defence Secretariat, came from the MRG.   
 
1.2 The Process of Formulating Defence Policy: A Focus on Three Actors 
 
The domestic political process in South Africa determines the nature of defence policy-
making.  Both Government policy and legislation are subject to the Constitution.  The latter 
determines that the legislative authority is vested in Parliament and the passing of legislation 
requires a majority vote from the National Assembly, which provides a great deal of influence 
to the ANC as the majority party.   
 
In reality, the ANC’s party structures, such as the NEC (National Executive Council), 
formulate policy and government turns it into legislation.  The National Assembly and its 
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committees have to facilitate public involvement in policy-making through public hearings, 
but they rarely introduce policy and when they do, its usually about matters pertaining to the 
legislature.  The ANC party structures largely initiate and determine public policy.  
 
The tendency in South Africa is that the executive usually takes responsibility for developing 
legislation and policy.  The Constitution stipulates that the Cabinet is responsible to initiate, 
prepare, develop, and implement policy and legislation.  Only Cabinet Ministers or Deputy 
Ministers may introduce legislation to the National Assembly.  The Constitution states that 
the Minister of Defence is charged with taking responsibility for defence matters and that a 
civilian Defence Secretariat should support him with policy-making.         
 
The established practice in South Africa is that within the executive, the Ministry of Defence 
takes responsibility for the commencement of formal defence policy processes, by 
presenting a draft White Paper to the public and other departments for inputs.  The 
appointed drafters of the policy then receive written submissions from various interest 
groups.  The Minister largely determines the extent and process of further consultation and 
the content of subsequent drafts.  The drafting of a White Paper involves consulting various 
clearing houses such as the Defence Secretariat, the Defence Command Council, the 
Council on Defence, the JSCD, the Cabinet and Parliament.  The JSCD usually plays a 
prominent role as a clearinghouse and facilitator of public hearings, as well as national 
conferences.  
 
The ANC party structures largely initiate and formulate public and defence policy.  The 
executive then takes responsibility to make it government policy and legislation.  The JSCD 
and Parliament then approve it. 
 
1.3 The Role of the Legislature  
 
The international tendency is that legislatures are generally weak in terms of formulating 
policy.  This is also the case in South Africa.  Members of Parliament (MPs) rarely take part 
in public debates.  In addition, Parliament has limited research, technical and administrative 
support.  During the defence policy processes, MPs were not much involved in the drafting 
process, even when they served on sub-committees.  Opposition parties have little impact on 
public policy-making, because of poor organisation and policy suggestions.  In general 
Parliament is weak compared to the executive.  
 
 107
Parliamentary committee chairs, however, do yield significant political power.  The JSCD 
played a significant role as a clearinghouse, by scrutinising every paragraph of draft policy 
and ensuring multi-party approval.  The chair of the JSCD has a critical role to facilitate the 
legislature’s involvement in policy-making. 
 
The purpose of the parliamentary committee system is to contribute to policy-making and to 
oversee the work of the executive.  In general, the ANC ensures that it holds the political 
power on parliamentary committees with its majority representation.  For instance, the ANC 
undermined the functioning of the Portfolio Committee on Defence, which was chaired by a 
non-ANC member, by boycotting its meetings.  Eventually the Portfolio Committee ceased to 
exist and the JSCD under an ANC chair became the only defence committee of the 
legislature.  It should be added, however, that with the functioning of the JSCD, the principle 
was maintained that defence is not a party political matter.    
 
The world-views of policy-makers have an impact on the way they perceive problems and 
aim to solve them.  Policy-makers in South Africa consider policy-making as a way to correct 
the wrongs of apartheid, which makes their policy approach normative, idealistic and 
impractical.  Peace Research ideas and NOD in particular appealed to the policy-makers as 
a way to change South Africa’s former pre-emptive, offensive military doctrine to a defensive 
approach that could promote confidence building in the region.  The lack of defence 
expertise also limits policy-makers to move beyond normative proposals. 
 
The legislature in South Africa is weak compared to the executive in terms of formulating 
defence policy.  The ANC’s tight control of parliamentary committees such as the JSCD 
aggravates this.  The legislature lacks the capacity and the freedom to play a significant role 
in defence policy-making or to oversee the executive authority.  
 
1.4 The Role of the Executive  
 
In South Africa, there is a tendency that the executive takes main responsibility to develop 
and implement policy.  The executive authority consists of the President and members of the 
Cabinet, which is in turn a central agency in public policy-making and is closely linked to the 
ANC’s national leadership.   
 
The President appoints a Minister of Defence and a Deputy Minister of Defence to take 
responsibility for initiating and developing defence policy and legislation.  The Minister of 
Defence has the most power of all individual role-players to influence defence policy.  In 
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practice however (during the 1990s), Minister Modise devolved much of that power to his 
deputy, Mr Ronnie Kasrils, who then devolved his responsibility to MRG members.   
 
Minister Modise gave little defence policy direction, but oversaw the overall layout and 
principles in defence policy.  He also made some rulings on contentious issues during the 
drafting of policy.  Deputy Minister Kasrils was much more directly involved in the drafting of 
policy, especially with Nathan.  They jointly controlled the process of amending the Draft 
White Paper on Defence.  Kasrils usually followed Nathan’s recommendation in all but a few 
cases, since the latter drafted policy according to the Ministry’s preferences.  During the 
Defence Review process, Kasrils appointed Williams as the convenor of the Defence Review 
Work Group (DRWG).  During this process, the DOD started to play a more prominent role 
through the Secretariat.  The technical policy issues that had to be addressed also 
necessitated a more involved role by the military. 
 
In South Africa, the executive formulates defence policy.  The Ministry of Defence, however, 
devolved much of that responsibility to MRG members.  During the Defence Review process, 
the military started to play a more prominent role in making defence policy. 
 
1.5 The African National Congress Party Leadership 
 
Together with the Cabinet, the ANC’s national leadership structure forms the strongest 
policy-making body in the South African political system.  Most public policy documents 
originate from the ANC’s National Executive Council (NEC) or National Working Committee, 
as well as the Cabinet and consultants.  This seems to be in line with the way defence policy 
developed in South Africa.  Nathan’s publication The Changing of the Guard, which served 
as a basis for the White Paper, was discussed with ANC Members of Parliament, as well as 
members of the executive, and received their support.  It was also discussed with MRG 
members, which formulated ANC defence policy.  The ANC party leadership and its 
consultants were consulted and involved in the making of defence policy. 
 
The ANC receives policy inputs from various party structures: NEC sub-committees, 
parliamentary study groups, permanently appointed policy units, or departments at the ANC 
headquarters.  The ANC also pays attention to the policy inputs from the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions.  ANC party structures, therefore, make policy and government turns it 
into legislation.  It follows that the ANC’s party structures play a decisive role in defence 
policy-making.   
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The ANC party leadership and its advisors, which are closely linked to the Cabinet, is the 
strongest policy-making interest group in South Africa.  Thus the ANC dominates defence 
policy-making.  
 
1.6 Lobbying Groups   
 
Lobbying is a relatively new development in South African politics.  It involves direct efforts 
by the lobbying group to influence public officials to act as they wish.  Since the Constitution 
required Parliament to facilitate public involvement in policy-making, a broad range of 
interest groups became involved in lobbying government.  Lobbying has grown ever since, 
but remains unregulated. 
 
There are various categories of lobbying groups, but in the making of defence policy, civil 
society organisations and professional lobbyists are mostly involved.  Some of the prominent 
civil society organisations involved in defence policy were: the Public and Development 
Management Department at the University of the Witwatersrand, the Institute for Democracy 
in South Africa (IDASA), the ISS and the CCR.   
 
The location of civil society organisations in Cape Town had a significant influence on 
defence policy-making and lobbying in this regard. Nathan as a member of the Cape Town-
based CCR, played a prominent role during the White Paper process, but when the Defence 
Review was drafted by the DRWG in Pretoria, Nathan was unable to play an active role on 
the DRWG. 
 
Conventional lobbying did not play a significant role in the making of South African defence 
policy.  As part of the process of broad consultation their views were heard, but not adhered 
to.  Terry Crawford-Browne as a professional lobbyist (from Economists Allied for Arms 
Reduction) helped to shape the defence debate.  His viewpoints and questions helped the 
SA Navy to formulate its arguments for new vessels.    
 
Lobbying is usually considered as attempts from pressure groups to influence the behaviour 
of policy-makers through formal presentations, threats and bribes.  Nathan’s direct 
involvement in the defence policy process as part of the civil society organisation CCR, could 
be considered as lobbying.  He had direct access to the Ministry of Defence as the personal 
advisor of the Deputy Minister and the drafter of the White Paper on Defence and he was 
able to directly inculcate defence policy with NOD ideas in this manner, without having to 
revert to conventional lobbying techniques.  The CCR’s involvement in the drafting of the 
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White Paper may, therefore, be viewed as unconventional, unrestricted and “ideal” lobbying.  
According to this argument, the CCR played a significant role as a lobbying organisation in 
defence policy-making. 
 
International consultants and aid organisations had a major part in the defence policy 
process.  Their presence and influence in South African public policy-making are present in 
almost every Public Service department.  Foreign aid organisations usually fund consultants 
and NGOs from donor countries to undertake work in South Africa.  Foreign governments – 
such as Norway and particularly Denmark – became involved in South African defence policy 
debates.  The Danish Foreign Ministry, through the Danish International Development 
Agency (DANIDA), lobbied South African politicians (among others) regarding NOD ideas.  
DANIDA funded peace researchers such as Mφller (from the Copenhagen Peace Research 
Institute-COPRI) to discuss NOD with parliamentarians who proved to be receptive for these 
inputs from COPRI.  DANIDA also funded the attendance of NOD conferences for South 
Africans in Europe and locally.  The Study Group on Alternative Security Policy (SAS) also 
lobbied parliamentarians on defence issues. Unterseher from the SAS tried to convince 
policy-makers to accept the “spider in the web model” of NOD.  
 
1.7 The Military Research Group 
 
By 1990, the ANC’s Marxist policies became discredited as South Africa moved towards 
democratisation. The ANC, therefore, had to rethink its policies on defence and formulate a 
framework to transform defence in South Africa, but it lacked a defence analysis and policy-
making capacity. The MRG was established to fill this deficiency, to counter the IDP (former 
Institute for Defence Policy, now ISS) in debates, and enable the ANC to play a more active 
role in the defence debate.      
 
The MRG mostly consisted of ANC academics and intelligence operatives, many of whom 
came from an anti-apartheid activist background.  MRG members were not defence experts 
and, therefore, several enrolled for postgraduate courses in Europe (among other Peace 
Studies) to get a better understanding of security issues.  MRG members’ exposure to Peace 
Studies and following European security debates, created an interest in NOD ideas, which 
were introduced to the ANC as policy principles to transform South African defence, 
particularly its offensive doctrine.  NOD was a specific research focus of the MRG, and the 
MRG also promoted it. 
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The ANC relied on MRG members to formulate its defence policy, but also positioned them 
on forums to see to it that it became government policy. MRG members served on literally 
every formal defence policy-making forum since 1990.  They served on the Transitional 
Executive Council’s Sub-Council on Defence, the JMCC (Joint Military Co-ordinating 
Committee) and later also the JSCD.  The drafter of the White Paper on Defence was an 
MRG member, the convenor of the DRWG also convened the MRG, and several MRG 
members served on the DRWG.  By placing MRG members in vital policy-making positions 
and forums, the ANC ensured that it dominated the making of South African defence policy.       
 
The MRG enabled the ANC to dominate and formulate defence policy-making in South 
Africa.  MRG members served on every defence policy-making forum and were also involved 
in drafting policy.  
 
1.8 The Armed Forces and the Secretariat 
 
During the apartheid era, the military traditionally drafted all White Papers on Defence, but 
they lost this power under the new Constitution.  Nevertheless the military and the 
Secretariat continued attempting to play an active role in policy formulation.  Their attempts 
to launch  a White Paper process in 1995, failed for two reasons. Firstly, they did not consult 
the correct clearinghouses and secondly, their policy ideas only focussed on maintaining a 
strong military and not on the political aspects of defence transformation.  Thus, the policy 
proposals of the DoD deviated from political realities and came to nought.  
 
When the drafting of the White Paper was finally tackled, the military took an active part in 
debating all issues.  It accepted the framework of the policy-makers, but wished to maintain a 
strong, balanced defence force.  The military seriously debated the definition of “manifestly 
offensive weapons” in order to maintain its power projection capabilities.  However, few of 
the military’s policy proposals were accepted.  It was consequently forced to reach 
compromises with policy-makers and was only able to significantly influence the White Paper 
with the inclusion of the Core-Force concept in Chapter 4 of the 1996 White Paper on 
Defence.              
 
The DoD started to play a more prominent role in defence policy-making with the drafting of 
the Defence Review.  This was facilitated by the appointment of more capable individuals at 
the Defence Secretariat and the need for more military-technical input in policy from the 
SANDF.  The military chaired most of the sub-committees that drafted specific chapters.  
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Progressive senior officers from the SA Navy and Air Force drove these debates and they 
included the notion of NOD in these debates.      
 
During the initial White Paper process, the military and the Secretariat played a limited role in 
policy-making because of a lack of policy-making expertise and adequate policy suggestions.  
With the Defence Review, they played an increasingly active role on technical policy matters.  
 
1.9 The White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review   
 
The legislature responded in three ways to the political challenges with regard to defence in 
South Africa. Firstly, it insisted that a White Paper on Defence had to be finalised to give 
legitimacy to the SANDF within a democratic framework. Secondly, the White Paper had to 
communicate South Africa’s new peaceful foreign policy, as well as its defensive military 
doctrine. Lastly, the legislature intended changing the military in terms of civil-military 
relations, integration, as well as affirmative action. This involved a normative framework of 
liberal internationalism or idealism. 
 
The drafting of the White Paper was largely a closed, personally driven process with limited 
consultation of civil society.  Intensive debating did, however, take place between the 
military, the drafter and the legislature.  These debates indicated the contrasting world-views 
involved.  The military had a realist view, which included a geo-strategic outlook on 
defending the country and having a strong military.  Policy-makers had a more idealist 
outlook, which involved the downsizing of the military.  These opposing views were made 
possible by a broadly formulated Constitution, which did not prioritise the security of the state 
or the individual as more important.  Compromises were eventually reached between these 
extreme views, which are characteristic of defence policy-making in general, but also in 
South Africa.       
 
The Defence Review process was a much more open and consultative process than the 
drafting of the White Paper.  Significant efforts were made to involve the public in the policy 
process. The sub-committees that drafted the Defence Review also consisted of various 
civilian interest groups.  The SANDF chaired most committees on mainstream military and 
technical issues, such as force design, posture and doctrine.  The military and particularly 
the SA Navy and Air Force, took the lead in most of these debates, although 
parliamentarians served on the sub-committees.  In the event lobbyists played a much more 
subdued role during this process, although they helped to shape the debate. 
 
 113
Defence policy-making involved compromise as a result of idealist versus realist views on 
defence.  The Constitution enabled this state of affairs, since it does not emphasise state or 
individual security. The White Paper process was largely a closed process with little 
consultation and was dominated by policy-makers. In contrast the Defence Review was a 
consultative and open process, in which the military played a more prominent role in debates 
and drafting. 
 
2. THE PROMOTION OF NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
This section relates to NOD and the significance of its promotion in South Africa.  It will firstly 
cover the origins, ideas and promotion of NOD in Europe.  The second part refers to the 
promotion of NOD in South Africa and conclusions about defence policy-making in this 
regard.  Lastly, NOD’s impact on defence in South Africa will be discussed.     
 
2.1 The Rise and Decline of Non-offensive Defence 
 
Non-offensive defence ideas developed during the Cold War to prevent a third world war in 
Europe. The main characteristics of NOD were the following: Firstly, there had to be general 
disarmament for all states. Secondly, states had to build confidence through transparent 
defence policy and defensive deployments. Thirdly, defence forces had to be restructured to 
conduct only defensive operations.  Fourthly, it was assumed that the defensive is superior 
to the offensive and, therefore, only defensive weapons systems had to be used. Lastly, 
states had to rely on non-standing armies.  All these ideas were promoted by West 
Germans, peace researchers, the peace movement and leftist opposition parties in Europe.  
They used NOD to protest against nuclear weapons deployment in Europe, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) reliance on these arms, as well as to criticise NATO’s 
conventional strategy. The overall aim was to prevent some accidental nuclear and 
conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.   
 
Peace researchers from Denmark, – COPRI in particular, became involved in developing the 
term “non-offensive defence” with ideas such as common security. NOD ideas became an 
integral part of the peace movement and peace researchers’ attempts to achieve their goals. 
COPRI communicated and promoted NOD at conferences, in publications and the public 
media.  The Palme Commission and NOD proponents promoted NOD with the Russians, 
who accepted NOD principles for a short period to demobilise its military subsequent to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union..   
 
 114
After the Cold War, proponents of NOD tried to keep Peace Research and NOD ideas alive 
by promoting them in countries undergoing transition.  DANIDA and peace researchers from 
COPRI specifically saw a window of opportunity to promote NOD in South Africa.  They 
played an active role to lobby policy-makers in South Africa through conferences and funding 
local NGOs. 
 
Non-offensive defence was a Cold War idea.  It was an untested theory with no wider 
applicability than a strategic context of looming war between industrialised powers. 
Nevertheless NOD proponents still promoted this notion in South Africa. 
 
2.2 The Promotion of NOD  
 
The ANC was introduced to NOD thinking mainly through MRG members who promoted it.  
The ANC became interested in NOD for several reasons. Firstly, the ANC saw NOD as a 
useful paradigm to change its foreign policy and improve relations with Southern African 
countries. ANC politicians were personally aware of the destabilisation that SADF attacks 
caused in the region and also wanted to inculcate South Africa’s military doctrine with certain 
NOD principles. NOD was an attractive framework with useful terminology such as common 
security, transparency and confidence building, which supported South Africa’s new foreign 
policy.  Secondly, NOD complemented the ANC’s domestic policy goals with the new 
security paradigm.  The ANC accepted the new security paradigm to focus on socio-
economic issues and NOD underscored this by relegating defence to a lower priority. NOD, 
therefore, suited both the ANC’s domestic and foreign policy priorities. 
 
Non-offensive defence was promoted mainly by the MRG and COPRI through conferences 
and discussions with ANC politicians. Nathan promoted NOD principles in his publications, 
which served as the basis of the White Paper, while the SANDF made NOD part of the 
defence debate by incorporating it into a force design option to stimulate debate.  
 
2.3 The Impact of NOD in South Africa 
 
Non-offensive defence influenced South Africa in three significant ways.  Firstly, the ANC 
used NOD instrumentally as a framework to justify and explain its initial objectives to 
drastically transform the military. The ANC’s use of NOD as a tool to change the military was 
successful, because South African military capabilities have been scaled down significantly, 
especially in terms of power-projection capabilities.  NOD totally changed the SANDF’s 
operational strategy to only defend the country against attacks.  It enabled South Africa to 
 115
build confidence with its neighbours and to play a leading role in Southern Africa. NOD ideas 
became part of the framework of South African defence policy and doctrine.  Secondly, NOD 
was used as a defensive idea to emphasise the difference between the ANC’s peaceful 
foreign policy and the destabilising policies of the apartheid government.  Thirdly, the 
terminology used with NOD ideas complemented the language of the new security paradigm.  
NOD terminology suited the new security paradigm, because they originate from the same 
school of thought.  
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Several conclusions could be made about the promotion of NOD in South Africa. Firstly, the 
tendency in South Africa to investigate models from industrialised countries, is an indication 
that policy-makers are open and receptive for ideas from abroad. In common with other 
models from developed countries, NOD has limited applicability for South Africa.  It is a Cold 
War defence model for preventing the security dilemma, arms races and war.  The absence 
of an external threat to South Africa makes it largely irrelevant. Its focus on an integrated 
defensive network with light infantry is also unsuitable to South Africa, which needs mobile 
capabilities to protect its extensive borders. Secondly, models can be used in various ways 
as tools to influence policy.  NOD was used as a theoretical tool by the MRG and the military 
to influence defence policy according to their preferences.  The MRG used it to disarm the 
military; Nathan used it to change the military’s posture towards the defensive; the military 
used it to stimulate debate about force design options; and the SA Navy used it to promote 
support for the purchase of its new vessels.  
 
Certain characteristics of South African defence policy-making should be mentioned.  Firstly, 
conflicting world-views of idealism and realism about defence are made possible, because 
the Constitution does not prioritise the state or the individual’s security as more important.  
Defence policy, therefore, tends to involve some compromise between these views.  
Secondly, policy-makers tend to focus on civil-military relations and human resource issues  
(so-called “soft issues”) as important, while the military tend to focus on military technical and 
force design issues (so-called “hard issues”).  Thirdly, the military have the expertise to be 
more involved in the details of policy-making such as force posture, structure and doctrine; 
while policy-makers will be more involved in the decisions about defence spending, the role 
of the military and its transformation. 
 
With the making of defence policy, the ANC controlled both the policy-making process and 
the formulation of policy.  This was done in several ways.  The ANC established the MRG as 
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a think-tank to formulate ANC policy on defence, which became government policy. MRG 
members were represented on every defence policy-making forum, including the JSCD, and 
MRG members controlled the drafting of policy.  The Ministry of Defence ensured that MRG 
members did the drafting. The ANC undermined the functioning of the Portfolio Committee 
on Defence and used its majority to dominate through the JSCD.  The ANC, therefore, 
largely controls defence policy-making through the Ministry of Defence and the JSCD. 
 
The involvement of the CCR in defence policy-making, and Nathan’s promotion of NOD, 
indicate two aspects about South African public policy-making.  Firstly, this was an example 
of the privatisation of public policy as a result of the lack of policy-making expertise.  
Secondly, Nathan’s promotion of NOD was a form of lobbying, which influenced the thinking 
and behaviour of legislators, as well as Ministers.  This amounted to extensive, unrestricted 
and unregulated lobbying.  MRG members, however, never carried responsibility for policy.     
 
The ANC party leadership largely formulates public policy in South Africa through its majority 
representation in Cabinet, Parliament, and parliamentary committees. The party makes 
policy and government turns it into legislation.  The ANC enforces its policies by putting 
political pressure on MPs to conform to party policy. MPs who deviate from it, become soft 
targets.  The ANC restricts its MPs in terms of formulating policy, which also prevents 
parliamentary committees, such as the JSCD, from effectively overseeing the executive.  
This makes the legislature weak compared to the executive.  Parliament is consequently  
merely a rubber stamp for ANC policy, which means that South Africa is in practice a one-
party governed state.   
 
Although the Constitution makes provision for public participation in policy-making and 
therefore also for pluralism, there is no equal distribution of power for interest groups to 
influence policy.  The ANC uses its power as the majority party on all policy-making forums 
to prevent such a balance.  The making of defence policy in the 1990s serves as an 
example. 
 
Finally: The following themes may be considered for further studies about defence policy-
making in South Africa: Firstly, a shift occurred from an internal focus on defence during the 
Mandela era, towards an external focus on promoting peace in Africa. A review of this shift 
could well be considered further. Secondly, a study of the various views about how the 
SANDF should conduct different kinds of conventional operations, specifically in Africa, may 
constitute a valuable research area.   
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